Lead Them to Water and Pay Them to Drink: An Experiment with Services and Incentives for College Achievement
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
High rates of attrition, delayed completion, and poor achievement are growing concerns at colleges and universities in North America.This paper reports on a randomized field experiment involving two strategies designed to improve these outcomes among first-year undergraduates at a large Canadian university.One treatment group was offered peer advising and organized study group services.Another was offered substantial merit-scholarships for solid, but not necessarily top, first year grades.A third treatment group combined both interventions.Service take-up rates were much higher for students offered both services and scholarships than for those offered services alone.Females also used services more than males.No program had an effect on grades for males.However, first-term grades were significantly higher for females in the two scholarship treatment groups.These effects faded somewhat by year's end, but remain significant for females who planned to take enough courses to qualify for a scholarship.There also appears to have been an effect on retention for females offered both scholarships and services.This effect is large enough to generate an overall increase in retention.On balance, the results suggest that a combination of services and incentives is more promising than either alone.
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Cites
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Cited by
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta7416 · Cited by 654
Do dropouts drop out too soon? Wealth, health and happiness from compulsory schooling
Oreopoulos, P. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.002 · Cited by 581
Self-citationMilligan, K., & Stabile, M. (2011) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.3.3.175 · Cited by 382
Help or Hindrance? The Effects of College Remediation on Academic and Labor Market Outcomes
Martorell, P., & McFarlin, I. (2011) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00098 · Cited by 299
Rewarding Persistence: Effects of a Performance-Based Scholarship Program for Low-Income Parents
Richburg-Hayes, L., Brock, T., LeBlanc, A., Paxson, C. H., Rouse, C. E., & Barrow, L. (2009) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1353360 · Cited by 104
Assessing the Impact of Financial Incentives in Extension Programmes: Evidence From Ireland
Läpple, D., & Hennessy, T. (2015) · Journal of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1111/1477-9552.12108 · Cited by 33
Metadata
- Authors
- Angrist, J., Lang, D., & Oreopoulos, P.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2006-12
- OpenAlex
- W1486035986
- Cited by
- 47
- References
- 3
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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