From Financial Crash to Debt Crisis
Open accessAbstract
Newly developed long historical time series on public debt, along with modern data on external debts, allow a deeper analysis of the cycles underlying serial debt and banking crises.The evidence confirms a strong link between banking crises and sovereign default across the economic history of great many countries, advanced and emerging alike.The focus of the analysis is on three related hypotheses tested with both "world" aggregate levels and on an individual country basis.First, private debt surges are a recurring antecedent to banking crises; governments quite contribute to this stage of the borrowing boom.Second, banking crises (both domestic ones and those emanating from international financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises.Indeed, we find they help predict them.Third, public borrowing accelerates markedly ahead of a sovereign debt crisis; governments often have "hidden debts" that far exceed the better documented levels of external debt.These hidden debts encompass domestic public debts (which prior to our data were largely undocumented).
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Claims the paper makes
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- Findingown data
Evidence from new long historical public debt series and modern external debt data confirms a strong association between banking crises and sovereign default across many advanced and emerging economies.
“The evidence confirms a strong link between banking crises and sovereign default across the economic history of great many countries, advanced and emerging alike.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Rapid increases in private debt, driven by bank credit expansion and foreign borrowing, repeatedly come before domestic banking crises.
“First, private debt surges-fueled by both domestic banking credit growth and external borrowing are a recurring antecedent to domestic banking crises; governments quite often contribute to this stage of the borrowing boom.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Banking crises help predict sovereign debt crises.
“Indeed, we find they help predict them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Governments frequently contribute to the borrowing boom that precedes banking crises.
“First, private debt surges-fueled by both domestic banking credit growth and external borrowing are a recurring antecedent to domestic banking crises; governments quite often contribute to this stage of the borrowing boom.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Sovereign debt crises are frequently preceded or accompanied by banking crises, whether local or coming from international financial centers.
“Second, banking crises (domestic ones and those in international financial centers) often precede or accompany sovereign debt crises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingown data
Concealed debts include domestic public debt, which had been mostly unrecorded before the authors' data.
“These hidden debts include domestic public debt (which prior to our data were largely undocumented) and private debt that become public (and”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Higher public debt burdens tend to coincide with more frequent sovereign defaults.
“The evident positive correlation between rising debt burdens and higher incidence of default will be investigated more systematically in Section V.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Iceland, the short-term share of external debt rose from about 17 percent to 49 percent as the crisis approached.
“The small table inset in Figure 10, which shows external debt for Iceland over 1922-2009, also reveals striking increase in the share of short-term debts as the crisis approaches, rising from about 17 to 49 percent.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Several historical episodes, including the German hyperinflation of 1923-1924, support the pattern of rising short-term debt before crisis.
“Several episodes from the country histories (including the famous German hyperinflation of 1923-1924) corroborate this pattern.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In emerging markets from 1971 to 2009, lagged external debt/GDP is positively associated with the share of countries in systemic banking crises.
“Emerging Markets: External debt/GDP (t-1) 0.383 0.007 p-value 0.000 0.000 Number of observations 39 39 R 2 0.479 0.514”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The emerging markets regression shows lagged emerging market public debt/GDP is positively associated with the share of countries in default or restructuring.
“Emerging Markets: Public debt/GDP (t-1) 0.232 0.007 p-value 0.000 0.000 Number of observations 144 144 R 2 0.120 0.133”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the early 1980s Latin American debt crisis, the pre-crisis increase in indebtedness occurred in private sectors.
“Along the lines shown in Figure 15 (inset), the pre-crisis surge in indebtedness is in private sectors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Except for Portugal, every advanced or larger emerging economy had at least one post-World War II banking crisis before the current episode.
“However, all except Portugal experienced at least one post-War crisis prior to the current episode.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The Chartbook's histories of all seventy countries offer wide evidence that serial default occurred across different regions and eras.
“The 70 country histories presented in the Chartbook provide broad-based evidence that serial default cut across regions and across time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
Sovereign debt crises are usually either preceded by banking crises or occur at the same time as them.
“Banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Currency crashes and inflation crises are strongly correlated.
“Hardly surprising, currency crashes and inflation crises go hand in hand.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingnone given
Concealed debts also include private obligations that turn into public debt as a crisis develops.
“and private debt that become public (and”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The world aggregate regression shows lagged world public debt/GDP is positively associated with the share of countries in default or restructuring.
“World: Public debt/GDP (t-1) 0.346 0.008 p-value 0.000 0.000 Number of observations 184 184 R 2 0.224 0.246”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Governments frequently hold concealed debts much larger than the external debt figures that are better documented.
“hidden debts”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A similar increase in short-term debt share occurs before sovereign defaults, which in this exercise immediately follow banking crises.
“A similar pattern emerges in the runup to sovereign defaults (which in this particular exercise immediately follows banking crises).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
When indebtedness is higher, inflation crises also tend to be more frequent.
“Periods of higher indebtedness are also associated with a higher incidence of inflation crises (a more indirect form of default, highlighted as a darker shaded bar where the incidence of inflation exceeds that of default).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In advanced economies from 1880 to 2009, lagged public debt/GDP is positively associated with the share of countries in default or restructuring.
“Advanced Economies: Public debt/GDP (t-1) 0.209 0.002 p-value 0.000 0.000 Number of observations 130 130 R 2 0.176 0.167”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Government borrowing rises sharply and systematically in the period before a sovereign debt crisis, whether that crisis is outright default or restructuring.
“Third, public borrowing accelerates markedly and systematically ahead of a sovereign debt crisis (be it outright default or restructuring); the government often has”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In emerging markets from 1971 to 2009, lagged external debt/GDP is positively associated with the share of countries in default or restructuring.
“Emerging Markets: External debt/GDP (t-1) 0.574 0.013 p-value 0.000 0.000 Number of observations 39 39 R 2 0.615 0.595”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In advanced economies from 1880 to 2009, lagged public debt/GDP is positively associated with the share of countries in systemic banking crises.
“Advanced Economies: Public debt/GDP (t-1) 0.057 0.002 p-value 0.002 0.006 Number of observations 130 130 R 2”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Greece's default beginning in 1932 lasted roughly 33 years, ending in 1964.
“the latter default spell lasting about 33 years from beginning to its eventual resolution in 1964.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingnone given
After World War II, banking crises became much less frequent in advanced economies and larger emerging markets.
“The frequency of banking crises drops off markedly for both the advanced economies and the larger emerging markets post-WWII.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Rises in the debt ratio generally come before increases in default rates.
“Upturns in the debt ratio usually precede the rise in default rates, as the regressions for the world aggregates shown at the bottom of Figure 3 confirm.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Banking crises became more frequent as financial markets developed in smaller, poorer economies.
“It also should be noted that as financial markets have developed in the smaller, poorer economies, the frequency of banking crises has increased.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingnone given
Episodes with annual inflation over 500 percent, called hyperinflations, occur only in the modern era.
“Hyperinflations, which are defined as episodes where the annual inflation rate exceeds 500 percent, are of modern vintage.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingcitation
In emerging markets, the share of short-term debt in total external debt roughly doubled from 12 percent to 24 percent just before banking crises.
“Consistent with Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) famous model of banking crises, short-term debts escalate on the eve of banking crisis; the ratio of shortterm to total debt about doubles from 12 to 24 percent.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Diamond and Dybvig's (1983)
Not checked in the free run.
- Findingnone given
As hyperinflation approaches, long-term debts often vanish entirely.
“In the march toward hyperinflation, it is not unusual to see long-term debts disappear altogether.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Default spells after World War II had a median length of 3 years, half the 6-year median for 1800-1945.
“Another noteworthy insight from the”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Domestic banking crises help explain sovereign default.
“The main results, irrespective of which sample period or estimation strategy is selected, is that systemic banking crises in financial centers help explain domestic banking crises and domestic banking crises help explain sovereign default.”
- Also stated in: § 2. Public and external debt, default and banking crises · plain
“Turning to the debt crisis equation, domestic banking crises continue to be a significant predictor of debt crises, while crises in the financial center have no direct independent effect (obviously, there is an indirect link through systematic relationship with domestic banking crises).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Also stated in: § 2. Public and external debt, default and banking crises · plain
- Findingown data
In the banking crisis equation, debt crises remain statistically insignificant.
“Debt crises remain statistically insignificant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
Public debt rises markedly as a sovereign debt crisis approaches.
“Specifically, we noted that: (i) public debts rise markedly as a sovereign debt crisis draws near; (ii) private debts exhibit a similar nonlinear build-up ahead of banking crises; and (iii) public debts may or may not contribute to the pre-crisis surge in indebtedness on the eve of banking crises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Over 1800-2009, there are long periods when a high percentage of all independent countries are in default or restructuring.
“Aside from the current lull, there are long periods where a high percentage of all countries are in a state of default or restructuring.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
The three-year change in public debt/GDP is a significant predictor in the banking crisis equation only for the 1947-2009 subsample.
“The three-year change in public debt/GDP only enters the banking crisis equation significantly for the most recent 1947-2009 subsample.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
External (public and private) debt has no systematic direct impact on the probability of default.
“but had no systematic direct impact on the probability of default”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Rests on an assumption: The definitions of banking crises, debt crises, and default are consistently applied across countries and over time.
- Findingown data
The prevailing pattern from country histories suggests that banking crises precede debt crises.
“As noted earlier, the prevalent pattern emerging from the country histories appears to suggest that banking crises come before the debt crisis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The average external debt/GDP ratio for advanced economies doubled during the decade leading to the 2007 global financial crisis.
“In effect, the average external debt/GDP ratio doubles during this period.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Rests on an assumption: The definitions of banking crises, debt crises, and default are consistently applied across countries and over time.
- Findingnone given
Public debts may or may not contribute to the pre-crisis surge in indebtedness before banking crises.
“Specifically, we noted that: (i) public debts rise markedly as a sovereign debt crisis draws near; (ii) private debts exhibit a similar nonlinear build-up ahead of banking crises; and (iii) public debts may or may not contribute to the pre-crisis surge in indebtedness on the eve of banking crises.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
External (public and private) debt significantly increases the chances of a banking crisis.
“External (public and private) debt for the period over which this data is available significantly increases the chances of a banking crisis”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Rests on an assumption: The definitions of banking crises, debt crises, and default are consistently applied across countries and over time.
- Findingnone given
More often than not, banking crises occur before debt crises.
“and, more often than not, banking crises anticipate (temporally preceded) debt crises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The default history from 1800 to 2009 contains five pronounced peaks or default cycles.
“Indeed, there are five pronounced peaks or default cycles in the figure.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
The probability of default continues to depend significantly on whether there is a banking crisis.
“which continues to depend significantly on whether there is a banking crisis or not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
Systemic banking crises in financial centers help explain domestic banking crises.
“The main results, irrespective of which sample period or estimation strategy is selected, is that systemic banking crises in financial centers help explain domestic banking crises and domestic banking crises help explain sovereign default.”
- Also stated in: § 2. Public and external debt, default and banking crises · plain
“Banking crises in financial centers are still significant in the domestic banking crisis equation, as Table 5 highlights.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Also stated in: § 2. Public and external debt, default and banking crises · plain
- Findingreasoning
Financial center crises have no direct independent effect on sovereign debt crises.
“while crises in the financial center have no direct independent effect (obviously, there is an indirect link through systematic relationship with domestic banking crises).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingreasoning
When the model is estimated for the full crisis period rather than the first year only, the lagged dependent variables are significant.
“We also estimated the same model for the full crisis period-rather than the first year only.The main result was that the lagged dependent variables came in significant”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingnone given
The positive effect of public debt surges on default is somewhat weaker in the 1947-2009 subsample.
“although it appears that the relationship is somewhat weaker for the 1947-2009 subsample.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
For 22 advanced economies, public and private external debts surged over the decade leading to the global financial crisis that began in the United States in 2007.
“The small inset in Figure9also depicts a similar surge in public and private external debts (comparably defined) for the 22 advanced economies in our sample over the decade leading to the global financial crisis which began with the subprime debacle in the United States in 2007.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Rests on an assumption: The definitions of banking crises, debt crises, and default are consistently applied across countries and over time.
- Findingown data
Domestic banking crises are a significant predictor of sovereign debt crises.
“Turning to the debt crisis equation, domestic banking crises continue to be a significant predictor of debt crises”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
The debt cycles and their connections with economic crises have not changed appreciably over time.
“There is little to suggest in this analysis that these debt cycles and their connections with economic crises have changed appreciably over time.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
Private debts show a nonlinear buildup before banking crises.
“Specifically, we noted that: (i) public debts rise markedly as a sovereign debt crisis draws near; (ii) private debts exhibit a similar nonlinear build-up ahead of banking crises; and (iii) public debts may or may not contribute to the pre-crisis surge in indebtedness on the eve of banking crises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Banking crises are importantly preceded by rapidly rising private indebtedness.
“Banking crisis are importantly preceded by rapidly rising private indebtedness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
Banking crises directly increase the likelihood of a sovereign default.
“But banking crises (even those of a purely private origin) directly increase the likelihood of a sovereign default in their own right (according to our findings)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
Adding a public debt/GDP measure to the model does not change the temporal patterns between banking crises and sovereign default.
“Adding the public debt variable does not alter any of the aforementioned temporal patterns.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
Surges in public debt have a significant positive effect on the likelihood of default.
“Surges in public debt, have the significant expected positive effect on the likelihood of default”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingreasoning
Hidden debt has been a major factor in many sovereign defaults throughout history.
“Hidden debt has loomed large in many sovereign defaults over history.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingnone given
Public sector borrowing surges as a crisis nears.
“Public sector borrowing surges as the crisis nears.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Findingown data
Iceland experienced one of the most dramatic external debt buildups recorded since World War II.
“One of the most dramatic external debt buildups recorded since World War II is that of Iceland, shown in Figure10for the 1922-2009 period.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Rests on an assumption: The definitions of banking crises, debt crises, and default are consistently applied across countries and over time.
- Findingnone given
Banking crises and debt crises often happen at the same time or close together.
“Furthermore, banking and debt crises often occur simultaneously (or in close proximity of one another)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If a government defaults under such circumstances, it would directly affect banks' balance sheets.
“A government default, in those circumstances, would directly impact the banks' balance sheet.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Alesina and Tabellini (1989) and Persson and Tabellini (1990) model incumbents as running large deficits because their temporary time in office raises their effective discount rate.
“For example, Alesina and Tabellini (1989) as well as Persson and Tabellini (1990) develop models where incumbents tend to run large deficits essentially because the temporary nature of their term in office raises their effective discount rate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Alesina and Tabellini (1989)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Persson and Tabellini (1990)
Not checked in the free run.
- Study design and conductown data
A Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test found the distributions of default spell durations in 1800-1945 and 1946-2009 unequal at the 1 percent level.
“The Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test for comparing the equality of two distributions rejects the null hypothesis of equal distributions at the one percent significance level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
The sample covers over 90 percent of world GDP.
“For the world as a whole (more than 90 percent of global GDP represented by our dataset), the current period can be seen as a typical lull that follows large global financial crises.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
A possible explanation for banking crises preceding debt crises is that governments take on large private bank debts, weakening their own solvency.
“The reasons for this temporal sequence may be the contingent liability story emphasized by Diaz Alejandro (1985) and formalized in Velasco (1986), in which the government takes on massive debts from the private banks, thus undermining its own solvency.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Diaz Alejandro (1985)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Velasco (1986)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Financial repression and capital controls can allow a government to force otherwise healthy banks to purchase large amounts of government debt.
“Financial repression and international capital controls may give the government scope to coerce otherwise healthy banks to buy government debt in significant quantities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Refinements of multiple equilibrium models beginning with Morris and Shin (2001) can be sensitive to hard-to-verify assumptions, such as the relative importance of public and private information.
“True, there have been important efforts to refine multiple equilibria models to strengthen their explanatory power starting with Morris and Shin (2001), but the results can be sensitive to difficult-to-confirm underlying assumptions, such as the importance of public relative to private information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Morris and Shin (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The possibility that sovereign debt crises cause banking crises cannot be easily dismissed.
“A causal chain from sovereign debt crisis to banking crisis, perhaps obscured in these simple graphs, cannot be dismissed lightly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Domestic debt crises generally happen in worse economic circumstances than the typical external default.
“Indeed, as Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) show, domestic debt crises typically occur against much worse economic conditions than the average external default.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Mendoza and Terrones (2008) found that most booms are followed by currency crises, banking crises, or both.
“The most comprehensive in terms of country coverage is Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who find most booms are followed by currency crises, banking crises or both.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mendoza and Terrones (2008)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
A sudden stop resulting from such conditions could cause bank insolvencies either immediately or later.
“The result would be sudden stop that could give rise to bank insolvencies either immediately or subsequently.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Including the current wave of crises, the post-World War II decline in banking crisis frequency will probably be even smaller than it appears.
“When the present wave of crises is fully factored in, the apparent drop will likely be even less pronounced.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Serial default should not be assumed to have ended.
“Given that international waves of defaults are typically separated by many years, if not decades, there is no reason to suppose that serial default is dead.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductown data
The study covers more than 200 years, starting at independence or earlier colonial times for some countries.
“Our analysis spans over two centuries, going back to the date of independence or well into the colonial period for some countries.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The observed buildup of short-term debt before financial crises is consistent with a multiple equilibrium explanation.
“The buildup in short term debt we observe on the eve of financial crises (perhaps to economize on interest rate costs as debt rise) is certainly consistent with a multiple equilibrium story.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Although recent sovereign default performance differs greatly, advanced economies and emerging markets have roughly the same frequency of banking crises.
“Indeed, as discussed in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), despite dramatic differences in recent sovereign default performance, the incidence of banking crises is about the same for advanced economies as for emerging markets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Recent default episodes have been separated by far fewer years than earlier ones.
“The fact remains that, as Bordo and Eichengreen (2001) observe, the number of years separating default episodes in the more recent period is much lower.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Bordo and Eichengreen (2001)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Even when banks have little government debt exposure, the sovereign ceiling can make their offshore borrowing very expensive or impossible.
“But even if banks are not overly exposed to government paper, the “sovereign ceiling” in which corporate borrowers are rated no higher than their national governments may make banks' offshore borrowing very costly or altogether impossible.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Any entity that funds illiquid assets with short-term borrowing can be vulnerable to runs.
“Their analysis suggests that any entity that uses short-term borrowing to fund holdings of illiquid assets (from construction loans to future tax revenues) can be vulnerable to crises of confidence (runs).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Diamond and Dybvig's (1983)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The standard multiple equilibrium model is a version of Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) analysis of bank runs.
“The generic multiple equilibrium model is a variant of Diamond and Dybvig's (1983) analysis of bank runs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Diamond and Dybvig's (1983)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
After a debt restructuring, countries tend to borrow heavily again quickly.
“Once debt is restructured, countries are quick to releverage (see Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003, for empirical evidence on this pattern).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- Study design and conductown data
The data include 70 countries from six world regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania.
“The data covers seventy countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and Oceania.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Globally, the present period looks like a normal quiet interval after major international financial crises.
“For the world as a whole (more than 90 percent of global GDP represented by our dataset), the current period can be seen as a typical lull that follows large global financial crises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Recent quantitative studies of sovereign default, including Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), suggest that high government discount rates are central to explaining borrowing and default cycles.
“Recent quantitative analyses of sovereign default, including for example Aguiar and Gopinath (2006), suggest that high discount rates for governments are a key element of any cogent explanation of the borrowing and default cycle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Aguiar and Gopinath (2006)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Market access is more limited for governments that tolerate borrowing but not repayment.
“Simply put, the upper limit to market access is lower when governments suffer from an intolerance to repayment but not to borrowing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisereasoning
Multiple equilibrium models can explain why it is easier to identify an economy's vulnerability to a financial crisis than to estimate the probability or timing of collapse.
“Multiple equilibrium models, and related refinements, would appear to offer an explanation of one central feature of the “This Time is Different” syndrome: it is ypically much easier to identify when an economy is vulnerable to a financial crisis than to assess the probability or the timing of the collapse.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Even for ordinary government debt, governments seldom make it easy to obtain the time-series data needed to assess vulnerability.
“Even for plain vanilla government debt, governments rarely make it easy to obtain the kind of time series data one would require to meaningfully assess vulnerability (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
In a crisis, many governments must handle not only external debts owed to foreigners but also the debts of private domestic borrowers.
“As we emphasize in Reinhart andRogoff (2009 and2010), many governments find in a crisis that they are forced to deal not only with their external debts (owed to foreigners) but those of private domestic borrowers as well.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reinhart andRogoff (2009 and2010)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Kahenman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) give examples of overconfidence in which people underestimate the variability of future shocks.
“For example, Kahenman, Slovic and Tversky (1982) provides examples of overconfidence in the sense of underestimating the variability of future shocks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kahenman, Slovic and Tversky (1982)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisenone given
Governments commonly guarantee the debt of quasi-government agencies that may take on substantial risk, as with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States.
“One important example is the way governments routinely guarantee the debt of quasi-government agencies that may be taking on a great deal of risk, most notably as was the case of the mortgage giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the United States.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Banking crises indirectly increase the likelihood of sovereign default through surges in public debt.
“But banking crises (even those of a purely private origin) directly increase the likelihood of a sovereign default in their own right (according to our findings) and indirectly as public debts surge.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Study design and conductown data
The results were consistent across specifications and estimation strategies.
“The results described in what follows were consistent across specifications and estimation strategies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 21
- May combine two claims. 21
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenCrises in global financial hubs have historically been useful in forecasting domestic banking crises in other countries.
“(Banking crises in financial centers have also historically helped predict domestic banking crises elsewhere).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingcitationIn the last phase of borrowing booms that precede banking crises, debt crises, and especially hyperinflations, debt maturity composition moves sharply toward short-term instruments.
“A fourth related hypothesis (which we document but do not test) is that during the final stages of the private and public borrowing frenzy on the eve of banking and debt crises and (most notoriously) bursts of hyperinflation, the composition of debt shifts distinctly toward short-term maturities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [6] 6. Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel, Maria Soledad Martinez-Peria, "Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?" Economic Policy 16, April 2001, 51-82.
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
FindingcitationDomestic credit rises sharply before banking crises and contracts afterward, matching other measures of indebtedness.
“Like every other measure of indebtedness that we could find, domestic credit climbs sharply prior to the banking crisis and unwinds afterward.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationThe United Kingdom, the United States, and France had 12, 13, and 15 banking crisis episodes, respectively.
“The world's financial centers, the United Kingdom, the United States and France stand out in this regard, with 12, 13, and 15 banking crisis episodes, respectively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe rise in debt before banking or sovereign debt crises is not a smooth linear buildup; it involves surges in capital inflows or debt.
“The pattern that emerges is not indicative of a gradual (linear) accumulation in debt in advance of a banking crisis or a sovereign default.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenThe median inflation rate was 0.5 percent in 1500-1799 and 0.7 percent in 1800-1913, compared with roughly 5 percent in 1914-2009.
“Median inflation rates before World War I were well below those of the more recent period: 0.5 percent for 1500-1799 and 0.7 percent for 1800-1913 versus about 5 percent for 1914-2009.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenArrears or payment suspensions on domestic debt are frequently mentioned only in footnotes.
“Another feature that characterizes domestic defaults is that references to arrears or suspension of payments on domestic debt are often relegated to footnotes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataMost episodes in the Brazil and Greece timelines show a characteristic debt surge just before a debt crisis, a banking crisis, or both.
“The”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingnone givenSome domestic defaults that forcibly converted foreign-currency deposits into local currency took place during banking crises, hyperinflations, or both, and deposit freezes were common.
“Lastly, some of the domestic defaults that involved the forcible conversion of foreign currency deposits into local currency have occurred during banking crises, hyperinflations, or a combination of the two; deposit freezes are also numerous.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe correlation between the share of countries with inflation crises and currency crashes was 0.607 for 1800-2009, 0.240 for 1800-1940, and 0.754 for 1950-2009.
“Figure 1 Emerging markets: Correlations of the share of countries with inflation and currency crises 1800-2009 0.607 1800-1940 0.240 1950-2009 0.754”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataRepeated sovereign default is common in emerging markets and occurs in some advanced economies too.
“Serial default is a widespread phenomenon across emerging markets and several advanced economies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataBefore banking crises, private debts such as external debt, private capital inflows, and domestic bank debt show a recurring boom-bust cycle, with debt accumulation speeding up as the crisis approaches.
“Ahead of banking crises, private debts (external debt, broader private capital inflows, domestic bank debt) also display a repeated cycle of boom and bust-the runup in debts accelerates as the crisis nears.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningIn the aggregate, debts continue to rise after default as arrears accumulate and GDP contracts markedly.
“In the aggregate, debts continue to rise after default, as arrears accumulate and GDP contracts markedly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIncreases in external debt systematically help predict increases in the share of countries in default and the share of emerging markets with systemic banking crises.
“Increases in external debt systematically help predict increases in the share of countries in default and the comparable share of emerging markets with systemic banking crises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
- Rests on an assumption: The definitions of banking crises, debt crises, and default are consistently applied across countries and over time.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Findingnone givenThailand in 1997, before its financial crisis, concealed large forward exchange market interventions that eventually caused huge losses.
“Famously, Thailand (1997), just prior to its financial crisis, kept hidden its massive forward exchange market interventions that ultimately led to huge losses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataBoth banking and debt crises are mostly multi-year phenomena.
“both banking and debt crises are mostly multi-year phenomenon.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEven without large bailouts, government debt usually increases by about 86 percent in the three years after a systemic financial crisis, mainly because revenues collapse, which can lead to rating downgrades and default.
“Even absent large scale bailouts (and without counting the post-crisis new government guarantees), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a and b) argue that, largely owing to collapsing revenues, government debts typically rise about 86 percent in the three years following a systemic financial crisis, setting the stage for rating downgrades and, in the worst scenario, default.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a and b)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenDebt intolerance probably stems from weak institutions and politics that make foreign borrowing attractive for governments avoiding tough fiscal choices, while investors distrust their motives.
“Debt intolerance likely owes to weak institutional structures and a problematic political system that makes external borrowing a useful device for developing country governments to avoid hard decisions about spending and taxing and global investors rightly suspicious about the government's motives.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMultiple equilibria are common in financial markets, especially debt markets, which is consistent with crises being nearly universal.
“Multiple equilibria in financial markets, especially debt markets, is fairly generic, and therefore consistent with the near universality of crises.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationBefore World War II, advanced economies had repeated banking crises, and larger emerging markets began having them after developing financial sectors in the late 1800s.
“Prior to World War II, serial banking crises in the advanced economies were the norm; as the larger emerging markets developed a financial sector in the late 1800s-these economies joined the “serial banking” crisis club.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Study design and conductnone givenThe crisis definitions used here broadly match those in prior empirical economics research.
“The boundaries drawn are generally consistent with the existing empirical economics literature, which by and large is segmented across the various types of crises considered (e.g., sovereign debt, exchange rate).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAmador (2002), building on Laibson (1997), shows that politicians' limited horizons can fundamentally alter the market for sovereign debt.
“Amador (2002), building on Laibson (1997), shows how politicians' limited horizons can fundamentally change the market for sovereign debt.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Amador (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Laibson (1997)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningSunspot triggers related to investor confidence could cause crises in many countries simultaneously.
“Moreover, sunspot triggers to such crises, as they may be related to investor confidence, could potentially hit many countries at once.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningDuring a boom, politicians and investors may mistake a high-trade outcome for evidence that circumstances have permanently changed, leading to a This Time is Different mentality and delayed recognition of vulnerability.
“During the boom, politicians and investors could misinterpret a “high-trade” outcome among a set of potential equilibria as evidence of permanently changed circumstances.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBecause domestic debt crises typically leave external creditors untouched, many such episodes may escape notice.
“Domestic debt crises do not usually involve external creditors, which may help explain why so many episodes go unnoticed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningSince World War I, default via inflation has become more common as fiat money spread and gold links weakened.
“Default through inflation is more prevalent since World War I, as fiat money became the norm and links to gold eroded.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenSuccessive global default waves usually lie many years, sometimes decades, apart.
“Given that international waves of defaults are typically separated by many years, if not decades, there is no reason to suppose that serial default is dead.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductcitationA companion Chartbook covering over two centuries and all 70 countries' crisis and debt histories supports the descriptive analysis.
“The robustness of the descriptive analysis is grounded in a related Chartbook that spans more than two centuries of data and documents the crisis experience and debt history of each and every one of the seventy countries that make up our sample.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [7] 7. Cagan, Philip, "The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation," in Milton Friedman, ed. Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money (University of Chicago Press,1956), 25-117.
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationAmador (2008) argues that competition among interest groups can create a tragedy of the commons that favors short-term spending over long-term fiscal sustainability.
“In a related approach, Amador (2008) argues that contemporaneous competition by different interest groups can lead to a “tragedy of the commons” situation in which short term expenditures are favored at the expense of longer term fiscal sustainability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Amador (2008)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenWithout a model of the underlying sunspots, assessing risk levels across economies is difficult.
“Absent a model of the underlying sunspots, it is difficult to assess the degree of risks across different economies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenThe dataset was assembled from earlier scholarly work plus substantial new evidence from primary and secondary sources.
“The construction of our dataset builds on the work of many scholars; it also includes a considerable amount of new material from diverse primary and secondary sources.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenApart from a small group of experts, few people fully understand how universal financial crises are.
“Outside a small number of experts, few people fully appreciate the universality of financial crises.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenAt the time of writing, Greece's hidden debts were facilitated by Goldman Sachs.
“At the time of this writing one only has to read the debacle in the financial press concerning Greece's hidden debts conveniently facilitated by its underwriter Goldman Sachs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe accounting of financial crises in poorer countries may be incomplete, especially for earlier periods.
“As already acknowledged, our accounting of financial crises in poorer countries may be incomplete, especially for earlier periods, despite our best efforts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationDuring a boom, the financial sector becomes richer and more influential, often leading to reduced regulation that increases its profits while raising crisis risk for society.
“Often the result is reduced regulation that raises the financial sector's profitability at the expense of greater crisis risk for society as a whole.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe ignorance behind financial crises comes from the belief that crises happen to other people at other times and places.
“The ignorance, of course, stems from the belief that financial crises happen to other people at other times in other places.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenEven combining the political economy and financial crisis literatures, large gaps remain in understanding the arrogance and ignorance behind most financial crises.
“Even taking together all these promising strands of the political economy and financial crisis literature, one suspects there are still large gaps in our understanding of the arrogance and ignorance that underlie most financial crises”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationcitationPrivate information about debt can in principle be included in models.
“Private information on debt can, in principle, be incorporated into models.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe many ways governments can cheat are a significant complication.
“However, the many different margins on which governments can cheat are a significant complicating factor.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationFalse confidence could lead agents to hold too few buffer assets or too much debt.
“Such false confidence could lead agents to hold insufficient buffer stocks of assets, or equivalently, to hold too much debt.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataIn crises, government debt burdens often emerge unexpectedly, revealing solvency problems that the public had not recognized.
“In a crisis, government debt burdens often come pouring of out the woodwork, exposing solvency issues about which the public seemed blissfully unaware.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe arrogance behind financial crises belongs to those who believe they have learned to keep a boom going without a crisis.
“The arrogance is of those who believe they have figured out how to do things better and smarter so that the boom can long continue without a crisis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The direction of causality between banking crises and sovereign debt crises may run in either direction or both.
“The causal direction between banking and debt crises can potentially run in either or both directions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The causes of serial default and serial financial crises are almost certainly rooted in human and social behavior.
“As such, the roots are almost surely buried deep in human and social behavior, in areas where modern economics has only scratched the surface.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Having public or private debt is a necessary condition for default.
“It is certainly true that having debts (public or private) is a prerequisite to default.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The historical data on crises and debt are sufficiently complete and comparable across countries and time to support the paper's conclusions.
“As already acknowledged, our accounting of financial crises in poorer countries may be incomplete, especially for earlier periods, despite our best efforts.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The definitions of banking crises, debt crises, and default are consistently applied across countries and over time.
“External Debt: total liabilities of a country with foreign creditors, both official (public) and private.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Default episodes are attributed to the wrong figure
MinorThe passage attributes shaded sovereign-default episodes to Figure 1, but the paper labels Figure 1 as a chart of currency crashes and inflation crises.
“Figure 1 anticipates this point by the numerous episodes (shaded) in which at least 20 percent of the independent nations were in default.”
“FIGURE 1.The Tight Connection Between Currency Crashes and Inflation Crises: Emerging Markets, 1865-2009”
Figure 11 notes disagree about which crises are counted
MinorOne note says the bottom panel counts banking and currency crises. The same notes say exchange-rate crashes are excluded and describe the count as banking crises and defaults instead.
“The bottom panel tallies the number of banking and currency crises for the six countries that are capital inflow recipients.”
“If each of the six countries had both a banking crisis and default (new or ongoing) the sum of these would be 12; the year with the largest number of crises is 1890 during the Barings episode.Exchange rate crashes and inflation crises (which often coincide with default and banking crises) are not included in these calculations.”
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Greenfield versus merger and acquisition FDI: Same wine, different bottles?
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Banking Crises and Sovereign Defaults in Emerging Markets: Exploring the LinksPreprint
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Public Debt and Private Firm Funding: Evidence from Chinese CitiesPreprint
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Bank-specific determinants of nonperforming assets of Indian banks
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Public Debt, Economic Growth and Non-Linear Effects: Myth or Reality?Preprint
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A General Equilibrium Model of Sovereign Default and Business Cycles
Mendoza, E. G., & Yue, V. Z. (2011) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w17151 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
Rising Government Debt: Causes and Solutions for a Decades-Old Trend
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The Consequences of Banking Crises for Public Debt
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Linkages across Sovereign Debt Markets
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The Roles of Banks in Financial Systems
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- Authors
- Reinhart, C., & Rogoff, K.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2010-03
- OpenAlex
- W3121956495
- Cited by
- 355
- References
- 57
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 41 · 2019: 18 · 2018: 19 · 2017: 25 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 35 · 2014: 19 · 2013: 35 · 2012: 23
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (0849224)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Global Financial Crisis and Policies
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Banking stability, regulation, efficiency
- Keywords
- financial crisis, debt crisis, banking crisis, sovereign default, public debt, private debt, hidden debt, external debt, debt cycles
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