Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We survey the Personnel Economics literature, focusing on how firms establish, maintain, and end employment relationships and on how firms provide incentives to employees.This literature has been very successful in generating models and empirical work about incentive systems.Some of the unanswered questions in this area --for example, the empirical relevance of the risk/incentive tradeoff and the question of whether CEO pay arrangements reflect competitive markets and efficient contracting -are likely to be very difficult to answer due to measurement problems.The literature has been less successful at explaining how firms can find the right employees in the first place.Economists understand the broad economic forces --matching with costly search and bilateral asymmetric information --that firms face in trying to hire.But the main models in this area treat firms as simple black-box production functions.Less work has been done to understand how different firms approach the hiring problem, what determines the firm-level heterogeneity in hiring strategies, and whether these patterns conform to theory.We survey some literature in this area and suggest areas for further research.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Spence, M. (1973) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882010 · Cited by 19,518
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1995) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(94)00382-f · Cited by 2,559
Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?
Lazear, E. P. (1979) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260835 · Cited by 2,038
Berman, E., Bound, J., & Griliches, Z. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118467 · Cited by 1,870
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466269 · Cited by 1,740
The polarization of the U.S. labor market
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., & Kearney, M. S. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282806777212620 · Cited by 1,594
Incentive contracts and performance measurement
Baker, G. P. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261831 · Cited by 1,085
Executive Pay, Hidden Compensation and Managerial Entrenchment
Kuhnen, C. M., & Zwiebel, J. H. (2007) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.972622 · Cited by 116
Cited by
(2014) · Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) · Cited by 464
Larkin, I., Pierce, L., & Gino, F. (2012) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.1974 · Cited by 291
When Performance Trumps Gender Bias: Joint vs. Separate Evaluation
Bohnet, I., van Geen, A., & Bazerman, M. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2186 · Cited by 270
Boarding a Sinking Ship? An Investigation of Job Applications to Distressed Firms
BROWN, J., & MATSA, D. A. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12367 · Cited by 262
Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity
Pierce, L., Snow, D. C., & McAfee, A. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2103 · Cited by 251
Metadata
- Authors
- Oyer, P., & Schaefer, S.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2010-05
- OpenAlex
- W2125163882
- Cited by
- 104
- References
- 10
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3386/w15977
- The paper
- Oyer, P., & Schaefer, S. (2010). Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives. National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w15977
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.