The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives, Selection, and Teacher Performance: Evidence from IMPACT
Open accessAbstract
Teachers in the United States are compensated largely on the basis of fixed schedules that reward experience and credentials.However, there is a growing interest in whether performance-based incentives based on rigorous teacher evaluations can improve teacher retention and performance.The evidence available to date has been mixed at best.This study presents novel evidence on this topic based on IMPACT, the controversial teacher-evaluation system introduced in the District of Columbia Public Schools by then-Chancellor Michelle Rhee.IMPACT implemented uniquely high-powered incentives linked to multiple measures of teacher performance (i.e., several structured observational measures as well as test performance).We present regression-discontinuity (RD) estimates that compare the retention and performance outcomes among low-performing teachers whose ratings placed them near the threshold that implied a strong dismissal threat.We also compare outcomes among high-performing teachers whose rating placed them near a threshold that implied an unusually large financial incentive.Our RD results indicate that dismissal threats increased the voluntary attrition of low-performing teachers by 11 percentage points (i.e., more than 50 percent) and improved the performance of teachers who remained by 0.27 of a teacher-level standard deviation.We also find evidence that financial incentives further improved the performance of high-performing teachers (effect size = 0.24).
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Cites
Regression discontinuity designs in economics
Lee, D. S., & Lemieux, T. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.2.281 · Cited by 4,534
Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement
Rivkin, S. G., Hanushek, E. A., & Kain, J. F. (2005) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00584.x · Cited by 4,501
The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data
Rockoff, J. E. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828041302244 · Cited by 2,432
Pianta, R. C., & Hamre, B. K. (2009) · Educational Researcher · doi:10.3102/0013189x09332374 · Cited by 1,331
Teacher-Student Matching and the Assessment of Teacher Effectiveness
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., & Vigdor, J. L. (2006) · Journal of Human Resources · doi:10.3368/jhr.xli.4.778 · Cited by 739
The Effect of Evaluation on Teacher Performance
Taylor, E. S., & Tyler, J. H. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3628 · Cited by 405
Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters
Rothstein, J. (2012) · doi:10.3386/w18419 · Cited by 20
Cited by
Special education teacher attrition and retention: A review of the literature
Billingsley, B., & Bettini, E. (2019) · Review of Educational Research · doi:10.3102/0034654319862495 · Cited by 503
The Effect of Evaluation on Teacher Performance
Taylor, E. S., & Tyler, J. H. (2012) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.102.7.3628 · Cited by 405
The Impact of Performance Management on Performance in Public Organizations: A Meta‐Analysis
Gerrish, E. (2016) · Public Administration Review · doi:10.1111/puar.12433 · Cited by 319
Kraft, M. A., & Gilmour, A. F. (2017) · Educational Researcher · doi:10.3102/0013189x17718797 · Cited by 211
Papay, J. P., Taylor, E. S., Tyler, J. H., & Laski, M. E. (2020) · American Economic Journal: Economic Policy · doi:10.1257/pol.20170709 · Cited by 148
Metadata
- Authors
- Dee, T., & Wyckoff, J.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2013-10
- OpenAlex
- W2102957999
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 7
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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