The Textbook Case for Industrial Policy: Theory Meets Data
Open accessAbstract
The authors estimate sector-level economies of scale and conclude that gains from optimal industrial policy are on average below 1% of GDP.
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Claims the paper makes
5 of 28 cited sources checked · 3 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Findingcitation
Using Caliendo and Parro (2015) trade elasticity estimates leads to significantly larger gains from industrial policy, equal to 4.81% on average.
“Using these parameter estimates leads, in turn, to significantly larger gains from industrial policy, equal to 4.81% on average.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Caliendo and Parro (2015) source
Section 4 and the trade-elasticity estimation passage show that Caliendo and Parro estimate sectoral trade elasticities. The paper's welfare results concern tariff reductions, not gains from industrial policy; our copy does not support the claimed 4.81% average or the assertion that those estimates produce it. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Findingown data
Estimated gains from industrial policy remain fairly similar for three out of four studies, ranging from 0.68% to 1.84% on average.
“Although there is a wide range of trade elasticity estimates across these four studies (as seen in Table B.3), estimated gains from industrial policy remain fairly similar for three out of four of these studies, ranging from 0.68% to 1.84% on average.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checked- cites Shapiro, 2016 source
- cites Bagwell et al., 2018 source
- cites Caliendo and Parro, 2015 source
The paper’s section “A New Method to Estimate Trade Elasticities” reports trade-elasticity estimates, but the passages found do not address gains from industrial policy. I searched for industrial policy, the 0.68%–1.84% range, and the comparison across four studies; none appears in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.77)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Findingown data
Baseline estimates obtained from pooling across multiple cross-sections are very similar to estimates obtained from each cross-section separately.
“And finally, while our baseline estimates are obtained from pooling across multiple cross-sections, we obtain very similar estimates from each cross-section separately.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Average gains from optimal trade policy in the same environment are equal to 0.95% of GDP.
“To put this number in perspective, the average gains from optimal trade policy that we estimate in the same environment are equal to 0.95% of GDP.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
There is substantial heterogeneity, with sector-level estimates ranging from 0.07 to 0.25.
“There is also substantial heterogeneity, with sector-level estimates ranging from 0.07 to 0.25.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Findingown data
Despite large and pervasive external economies of scale, gains from industrial policy in the baseline calibration are hardly transformative.
“Despite large and pervasive external economies of scale, we find that gains from industrial policy in our baseline calibration are hardly transformative.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Even under an optimistic scenario where governments aim to maximize social welfare and have full knowledge of the structure of externalities across sectors, gains from industrial policies appear relatively modest, somewhat smaller than those from optimal trade policy.
“Our main finding is that even under an optimistic scenario where governments aim to maximize social welfare and have full knowledge of the structure of externalities across sectors, gains from industrial policies appear relatively modest, somewhat smaller than those from optimal trade policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The results are largely invariant to the inclusion of flexible supply-side controls.
“Second, consistent with our demand-based IV, these results are largely invariant to the inclusion of flexible supply-side controls.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Across countries, more open economies-such as Ireland, Luxembourg, or Singapore-tend to benefit disproportionately more from both trade and industrial policies.
“Across countries, Figure 5 shows that more open economies-such as Ireland, Luxembourg, or Singapore-tend to benefit disproportionately more from both trade and industrial policies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The 95% confidence interval for ρ is [0.55, 2.39].
“Table B.2 reports a 95% confidence interval of [0.55, 2.39].”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In the truncation case, average gains from trade policy amount to 3.83%.
“Similarly, the average gains from trade policy amount to 3.83% in this case.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
In each sector, the OLS estimate of γ_k is larger than the corresponding 2SLS estimate.
“Another feature of these estimates is that, in each sector, the OLS estimate of γ k is larger than its corresponding 2SLS estimate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
Smaller countries gain more from optimal trade and industrial policy than larger ones.
“Our quantitative results exhibit substantial heterogeneity across countries.Smaller countries, in particular, gain more from optimal trade and industrial policy than larger ones.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The initial equilibrium observed in the data (2010) features neither taxes nor subsidies, and trade deficits D_i correspond to transfers across countries with sum zero.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
- The authors state this as an assumption: In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
- Findingown data
The 2SLS estimate of the elasticity of substitution across sectors ρ is 1.47.
“In our baseline analysis, we have used our 2SLS estimate ρ = 1.47.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Including controls for institutional quality (contract enforcement and financial development) interacted with sector-year dummies yields only minor changes in estimates of γ_k.
“The results from including this set of controls are reported in Table B.6.We see only minor changes in the estimates of γ k as compared to our baseline estimates.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Including interactions between exporter per capita GDP and sector-year dummies has no appreciable effect on estimates or inference.
“Again, referring to Table B.6, including these additional controls has no appreciable effect on our estimates or inference.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There is widespread heterogeneity in scale elasticities, with estimates ranging from γ_k = 0.07 in Coke/Petroleum Products to γ_k = 0.25 in Rubber and Plastics.
“At the same time, there is widespread heterogeneity, with estimates ranging from γ k = 0.07 in the Coke/Petroleum Products sector to γ k = 0.25 in the Rubber and Plastics sector.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ_k (equation 6).
- The authors state this as an assumption: External economies of scale in sector k are given by E_k(L)=L^γ_k, with elasticity γ_k constant within each sector.
- Findingown data
Gains from industrial policy remain modest relative to gains from trade policy in the same environment.
“policies, Figure 5 shows that gains from industrial policy remain modest relative to the gains from trade policy in the same environment.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The lowest Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistic across the 60 first-stage regressions is 101.8.
“In addition, the lowest SW F-statistic across these 60 first-stage regressions is 101.8.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The gains from optimal policy (column 1) are on average 1.05%.
“The results in Table 2 reveal that the gains from optimal policy (column 1) are on average 1.05%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The initial equilibrium observed in the data (2010) features neither taxes nor subsidies, and trade deficits D_i correspond to transfers across countries with sum zero.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
- The authors state this as an assumption: In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
- Findingown data
OLS estimates of γ_k from equation (10) all imply precisely-estimated economies of scale (γ_k > 0).
“All of these estimates imply precisely-estimated economies of scale (i.e.γ k > 0)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The dataset used in the paper includes only four time periods and 61 countries.
“the dataset we use here includes only four time periods and 61 countries.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The gains from industrial policy are minimized when γ_NM is equal to 0.12, approximately equal to the average of the manufacturing sector γ_k values of 0.13.
“Indeed, the gains are minimized when γ N M is equal to 0.12, or approximately equal to the average of the manufacturing sector γ k values of 0.13.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Estimates of γ_k are very similar when each of the four cross-sections (1995, 2000, 2005, 2010) is considered separately.
“As a first robustness check, we consider each of these cross-sections separately.The new estimates of γ k , displayed in Table B.5, are very similar.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
Countries with higher predicted demand in a sector tend to have larger exports in that sector.
“We see that countries with higher predicted demand in a sector tend to have larger exports in that sector.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The scale elasticity γ_k is statistically significantly different from zero in every manufacturing sector.
“The results point to substantial economies of scale-with an average scale elasticity of 0.13-that are statistically significantly different from zero in every sector.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ_k (equation 6).
- The authors state this as an assumption: External economies of scale in sector k are given by E_k(L)=L^γ_k, with elasticity γ_k constant within each sector.
- Findingown data
Throughout the range of reasonable values for scale elasticities outside manufacturing, the gains from trade policy remain substantially larger than the gains from industrial policy.
“And it continues to be the case that, throughout this range, the gains from trade policy remain substantially larger than the gains from industrial policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The hypothesis of coefficient equality across sectors can be rejected at the 1% level.
“We can easily reject the hypothesis of coefficient equality at the 1% level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ_k (equation 6).
- The authors state this as an assumption: External economies of scale in sector k are given by E_k(L)=L^γ_k, with elasticity γ_k constant within each sector.
- Findingown data
The OLS estimate implies ρ = 3.35.
“The OLS estimate, in column (1), implies that ρ = 3.35”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingreasoning
For any g with finite expectation, then for any k, E_k is identified, up to a normalization.
“for any g with finite expectation, then for any k, E k is identified, up to a normalization.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In practice, with factor and input shares set to global levels, a small number of country-sectors have implied domestic consumption that is negative.
“In practice, with factor and input shares set to their global levels, a small number of country-sectors have implied domestic consumption that is negative.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The 2SLS estimate of ρ is 1.47.
“The OLS estimate, in column (1), implies that ρ = 3.35, whereas our preferred 2SLS estimate in column (2) reveals that ρ = 1.47.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The correlation between sector-specific first-stage coefficients and estimates of γk is -0.94.
“Further, the correlation between these sector-specific first-stage coefficients and the estimates of γ k is -0.94”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The first-stage results for elasticity substitution ρ show that the impact of country size on sector-level prices is negative in all sectors but one.
“Echoing that view, the first-stage results corresponding to the estimation of the elasticity substitution ρ reported in TableB.1 show that the impact of country size on sector-level prices is negative in all sectors but one.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The tension that pure Pigouvian taxes may backfire reflects the fact that empirical estimates of scale elasticities tend to be negatively correlated with trade elasticities.
“This tension reflects the fact that our empirical estimates of scale elasticities tend to be negatively correlated with trade elasticities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning
Under the assumption that demand residuals are uncorrelated with idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the product of demand residuals, in each country-sector pair, and population, in each country, provides a valid and strong instrument for sector size at the country level.
“Under the assumption that these demand residuals are uncorrelated with idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the product of demand residuals, in each country-sector pair, and population, in each country, provides a valid (and, in practice, strong) instrument for sector size at the country level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Demand residuals are uncorrelated with idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
- Premisecitation
In sectors subject to external economies of scale, private marginal costs of production are lower than social ones.
“In sectors subject to external economies of scale, private marginal costs of production are lower than social ones.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pigou (1920)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisereasoning
Provided that the demand system is invertible, changes in trade flows reveal changes in the effective prices of labor services.
“Provided that this demand system is invertible, changes in trade flows therefore reveal changes in the effective prices of these services.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Subutility is homothetic, standard Inada conditions hold, and demand for goods within a sector satisfies the connected substitutes property.
- Study design and conductreasoning
Identification requires a demand-side instrumental variable that is positively correlated with sector size yet uncorrelated with productivity shocks.
“Since idiosyncratic productivity differences across countries and sectors affect both sector size and bilateral exports, identification requires a demand-side instrumental variable (IV) that is positively correlated with sector size yet uncorrelated with productivity shocks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
The home-market effect-a positive effect of demand on exports-implies the existence of economies of scale at the sector level.
“Indeed, the home-market effect-that is, a positive effect of demand on exports-implies the existence of economies of scale at the sector level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Premisecitation
Scale economies, when introduced in gravity models, are indirectly calibrated using information about the elasticity of substitution across goods in monopolistically competitive environments.
“Scale economies, when introduced in gravity models, are instead indirectly calibrated using information about the elasticity of substitution across goods in monopolistically competitive environments; see e.g.Balistreri, Hillberry and Rutherford (2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Balistreri, Hillberry and Rutherford (2011) source
- Premisereasoning
In a competitive equilibrium, firms do not internalize the fact that when they increase sector size they raise its quality-adjusted productivity.
“In a competitive equilibrium, firms do not internalize the fact that when they increase sector size they raise its quality-adjusted productivity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: External economies of scale may affect both the physical productivity of firms and the quality of the goods they produce.
- Interpretationreasoning
Given existing estimates of sector-level trade elasticities in the literature, sector-level scale elasticities can be estimated using a log-linear regression of bilateral exports, adjusted by the trade elasticity, on sector size.
“Given existing estimates of sector-level trade elasticities in the literature, we can therefore estimate sector-level scale elasticities using a log-linear regression of bilateral exports, adjusted by the trade elasticity, on sector size.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Productivity is a log-linear function of sector size, so scale elasticities are constant.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Demand for labor services from different countries takes the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form, so trade elasticities are constant.
- Interpretationreasoning
External economies of scale can be non-parametrically identified in this environment from standard data on international trade flows.
“We show that external economies of scale can be non-parametrically identified in this environment from standard data on international trade flows.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Subutility is homothetic, standard Inada conditions hold, and demand for goods within a sector satisfies the connected substitutes property.
- Premisecitation
The quantitative predictions of gravity models hinge on two key elasticities: trade elasticities and scale elasticities.
“As discussed by Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) and Kucheryavyy et al. (2017), the quantitative predictions of these models hinge on two key elasticities: trade elasticities and scale elasticities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) source
- cites Kucheryavyy et al. (2017)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
There is a dearth of work that has tried to combine both theory and empirics in order to estimate the benefits that textbook industrial policy could achieve in practice.
“There is, however, a dearth of work that has tried to combine both theory and empirics in order to estimate the benefits that textbook industrial policy could achieve in practice.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) source
- Interpretationown data
Sectors whose output should be expanded for Pigouvian reasons are also those whose exports should be contracted for market power reasons.
“As a result, sectors whose output should be expanded, for Pigouvian reasons, are also those whose exports should be contracted, for market power reasons.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Trade flows contain information about relative costs of production.
“The starting point of these papers, like ours, is that trade flows contain information about relative costs of production, a point also emphasized by Antweiler and Trefler (2002).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked - Interpretationreasoning
Once the prices of labor services have been revealed, external economies of scale can be estimated by measuring the extent to which an exogenous increase in sector size lowers such prices.
“Once the prices of labor services have been revealed, we can estimate external economies of scale by measuring the extent to which an exogenous increase in sector size lowers such prices.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If free entry holds, firm-level economies of scale are irrelevant for our results.
“If so, as the total number of workers employed to produce a good ω increases, the measure of entering firms increases in a proportional manner, while the number of workers per firm remains unchanged, making firm-level economies of scale irrelevant for our results.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: There is free entry in the production of each good.
- Interpretationreasoning
More open countries gain more from optimal industrial policy because inelastic domestic demand exerts a weaker restraint on labor reallocation in more open economies.
“Being more open also explains why smaller countries gain more from optimal industrial policy.This is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a scatter plot of the gains from industrial policy (vertical axis) against openness measured as exports plus imports over gross output (horizontal axis).Intuitively, inelastic domestic demand exerts a weaker restraint on labor reallocation in more open economies”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Even with aggressive calibration choices, the gains from industrial policy are on the low side.
“Overall, our calibration choices are on the more aggressive side, to give a chance for industrial policy to yield high gains-as we see below, even with these choices, the gains are on the low side.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The initial equilibrium observed in the data (2010) features neither taxes nor subsidies, and trade deficits D_i correspond to transfers across countries with sum zero.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
- The authors state this as an assumption: In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
- Premisecitation
The model is consistent with the existence of internal economies of scale at the firm level, provided that there is free entry in the production of each good.
“As we have already noted, our model is consistent with the existence of internal economies of scale at the firm-level, provided that there is free entry in the production of each good, as in Hopenhayn (1992) and Appendix A.1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Hopenhayn (1992) source
- The authors state this as an assumption: There is free entry in the production of each good.
- Interpretationreasoning
OLS estimates of equation (10) would be biased because sector size L_i,k responds endogenously to idiosyncratic productivity shocks in the error term.
“because sector size L t i,k would respond endogenously to the idiosyncratic productivity shocks that are part of t ij,k , ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation ( 10) would be biased”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
External economies are nonparametrically identified under the same conditions as under perfect competition, regardless of whether good prices are equal to their marginal costs or not.
“Hence, external economies are nonparametrically identified under the same conditions as under perfect competition, regardless of whether good prices are equal to their marginal costs or not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In the model with physical capital and input-output linkages, the optimal production subsidies and trade taxes remain as described in Proposition 1.
“Within this environment, the optimal production subsidies, s j,k , and trade taxes, t x ji,k and t m ij,k , remain as described in Proposition 1, as demonstrated in Appendix A.8.2.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The estimates draw only on demand-side variation to identify the supply-side scale economies γ_k.
“This lends credence to the view that our estimates draw only on demand-side variation in order to identify the supply-side scale economies γ k .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The exclusion restriction for the IV strategy: after conditioning on importer-exporter-year and importer-sector-year fixed effects, predicted demand ln(D_i,k) is mean-independent of supply-side shocks ε_i,j,k.
- Interpretationreasoning
The optimal Pigouvian tax is always given by d ln E_k / d ln L_j,k.
“The optimal Pigouvian tax, in contrast, is always given by d ln E k d ln L j,k .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The 2SLS strategy utilizes variation in sector size driven by factors that appear orthogonal to sources of Ricardian comparative advantage and to differences in overall productivity.
“Put together, these results imply that our 2SLS strategy utilizes variation in sector size driven by factors that appear to be orthogonal both to sources of Ricardian comparative advantage that have featured in prior work and to sources derived from differences in overall productivity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The exclusion restriction for the IV strategy: after conditioning on importer-exporter-year and importer-sector-year fixed effects, predicted demand ln(D_i,k) is mean-independent of supply-side shocks ε_i,j,k.
- Interpretationown data
In practice, researchers have limited data variation, so estimation inevitably needs to proceed parametrically.
“In practice, researchers have limited data variation from which to learn about the relatively aggregate and long-run phenomena involved in external economies of scale.For example, as we discuss below, the dataset we use here includes only four time periods and 61 countries.So, estimation inevitably needs to proceed parametrically.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Estimation of the supply-side parameter γ_k requires demand-side instrumental variables for sector size L_i,k.
“Hence, estimation of the supply-side parameter γ k requires demand-side instrumental variables for sector size L t i,k .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In the baseline calibration, given the low elasticity of demand, the non-trivial gap between social and marginal costs that the paper inferred remains too small to generate large gains from industrial policy, even for the most open economies.
“In our baseline calibration, given the low elasticity of demand, the non-trivial gap between social and marginal costs that we have inferred remains too small to generate large gains from industrial policy, even for the most open economies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The introduction of intermediate goods has little effect on the rest of the conclusions.
“The previous adjustment in absolute levels notwithstanding, the introduction of intermediate goods has little effects on the rest of our conclusions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Stable cross-sectional variation drives the estimates of γ_k.
“These findings highlight how it is fundamentally stable, cross-sectional variation that drives our estimates of γ k .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The demand for domestic factor services is more elastic in an open economy, a version of Le Châtelier's Principle.
“We therefore expect the demand for domestic factor services to be more elastic in the open economy, a version of Le Châtelier's Principle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The larger gains in the model with physical capital and input-output linkages partly reflect that Harberger triangles are proportional to gross output, so expressed as a share of GDP, gains from removing such triangles are mechanically higher.
“This partly reflects the fact that Harberger triangles are proportional to gross output.Thus, expressed as a share of GDP, the gains from removing such triangles, whatever their origin, are mechanically higher.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The modest average gains from industrial policy are broadly in line with those predicted by Harberger triangles.
“Going back to the textbook case for industrial policy illustrated in Figure 1, these modest average gains from industrial policy are broadly in line with those predicted by the areas of Harberger triangles.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The welfare losses under globally efficient industrial policy derive from adverse terms-of-trade effects: larger production subsidies in high-scale sectors cause expansion and deterioration of terms-of-trade for countries specializing in them.
“Such welfare losses derive from adverse terms-of-trade effects: larger production subsidies in sectors with high scale elasticities cause an expansion of these sectors and a deterioration of the terms-of-trade of countries specializing in them.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The results offer little support for the notion that transformative gains from industrial policy can arise from the textbook case based on external economies of scale.
“Our results, however, offer little support for the notion that these gains can arise from the textbook case based on external economies of scale.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The fact that χ_j,k is homogeneous of degree zero derives from the fact that the Marshallian demand for goods is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income.
“The fact that χ j,k is homogeneous of degree zero derives from the fact that the Marshallian demand for goods is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
The high correlation between scale elasticities estimated using the two models suggests little omitted variable bias in the baseline estimation of scale elasticities due to other, non-Ricardian sources of comparative advantage that had not been controlled for in equation (10).
“This is reassuring, as this suggests little omitted variable bias in our baseline estimation of scale elasticities due to other, non-Ricardian sources of comparative advantage that had not been controlled for in equation ( 10).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The production functions f_k are Cobb-Douglas, with average shares consistent with the OECD's ICIO tables.
- Interpretationown data
The baseline finding that the gains from optimal industrial policy are relatively modest holds across a wide range of reasonable values for scale elasticities outside manufacturing.
“Our baseline finding that the gains from optimal industrial policy are relatively modest therefore appears to hold across a wide range of reasonable values for scale elasticities outside manufacturing.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premiseown data
Trade elasticities shape the gains from optimal policy for any given value of γ_k.
“and second, they shape the gains from optimal policy for any given value of γ k .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In the economic environment considered in Section 2.1, there may not exist a single-output technology at the country-sector level because different goods may be sold by the same country to different destinations.
“However, in the economic environment that we consider in Section 2.1, there may not exist a single-output technology at the country-sector level because, within a sector, different goods may be sold by the same country to different destinations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
In an economy that exports all output without γkθk=1, production subsidies would perfectly replicate the effect of both production subsidies and export taxes in the unconstrained policy case, with subsidies equal to (1+γk)θk/(1+θk)-1.
“In this case production subsidies would perfectly replicate the effect of both the production subsidies and export taxes in the unconstrained policy case, with the subsidies now equal to (1 + γ k ) θ k 1+θ k -1.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Although the large economy case complicates the characterization of optimal trade policy, it is irrelevant for optimal industrial policy.
“Although this complicates the characterization of the optimal trade policy, it is irrelevant for the optimal industrial policy: comparing the first-order conditions of the two problems, we still have”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Differences in factor endowments may act as a source of comparative advantage.
“Hence, differences in factor endowments may now also act as a source of comparative advantage.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Sector-level production functions f_k are constant across countries.
- Interpretationreasoning
Perfect competition is not critical for the empirical strategy.
“This establishes that perfect competition is not critical for our empirical strategy, not that there does not exist imperfectly competitive models under which variation in markups would affect our inferences about the magnitude of external economies of scale.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
In Costinot et al. (2019)'s model, an increase in the number of firms producing in a given origin country and sector lowers the markup charged by those firms everywhere, leading to a decrease in prices faced by importing countries, absent any external economies of scale.
“In their model, an increase in the number of firms producing in a given origin country and sector lowers the markup charged by those firms everywhere, leading to a decrease in the prices faced by importing countries, absent any external economies of scale.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Costinot et al. (2019)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
In an imperfectly competitive retail sector, trade shares can still be expressed as a function of factor prices, χ_j,k(c_1j,k, ..., c_Ij,k).
“In this alternative environment, we have argued that we can still express trade shares as a function of factor prices, χ j,k (c 1j,k , ..., c I j,k ).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In such cases, there is no theoretically grounded expenditure function that the measured price index would be a first-order approximation to.
“In such cases, there is no theoretically grounded expenditure function that the measured price index would be a first-order approximation to.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The fact that χ_j,k is invertible derives from the fact that demand for goods within a sector satisfies the connected substitutes property and standard Inada conditions hold, as in Adao et al. (2017).
“The fact that χ j,k is invertible derives from the fact that demand for goods within a sector satisfies the connected substitutes property and standard Inada conditions hold, as in Adao et al. (2017).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Adao et al. (2017) source
- Premisecitation
Within standard gravity models, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) find that the terms-of-trade manipulation channel is extremely weak even for the largest countries.
“However, within the class of standard gravity models,Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) find that this channel is extremely weak even for the largest countries.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) source
- Study design and conductnone given
The auxiliary gravity regression only identifies sectoral price indices up to unobserved destination-time and industry-time shifters.
“Second, the auxiliary gravity regression described in Appendix B.1 only identifies the sectoral price indices up to unobserved destination-time and industry-time shifters.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning
Clustering standard errors at the exporter-sector level poses no difficulties of interpretation or inference for the 2SLS system despite first-stage being more aggregate than second-stage.
“However, this poses no difficulties of interpretation or inference given that we cluster the standard errors in all of the following regressions (first-stage and second-stage) at the exporter-sector level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Under quasi-linear preferences and autarky, the empirical estimate ρ=1.47 corresponds to the common elasticity of demand in each manufacturing sector.
“Under these assumptions, our empirical estimate of ρ = 1.47 corresponds to the (common) elasticity of demand in each manufacturing sector.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The Harberger formula assumes quasi-linear preferences and autarky.
- Interpretationown data
The -0.94 correlation is strongly consistent with the negative correlation expected if sectors with stronger scale economies see larger price reductions due to scale.
“which is strongly consistent with the negative correlation one would again expect to obtain if sectors with stronger scale economies see larger price reductions due to scale.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Focusing on trade in factor services circumvents the concern about the lack of a theoretically grounded expenditure function.
“Focusing on trade in factor services circumvents this concern.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The assumption of a common fk across countries rules out extreme patterns of international specialization across countries.
“In our simulations, the assumption of a common f k across countries rules out extreme patterns of international specialization across countries.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Sector-level production functions f_k are constant across countries.
- May combine two claims. 51
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 24
- The quote only partly states this claim. 2
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe estimated scale elasticities are below the inverse of the trade elasticity in all sectors, implying that they are weaker than those implicitly assumed in trade models with monopolistic competition à la Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003).
“Interestingly, the previous numbers are below the inverse of the trade elasticity in all sectors, implying that our estimated scale elasticities are weaker than those implicitly assumed in trade models with monopolistic competition à la Krugman (1980) or Melitz (2003).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites Krugman (1980)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- cites Melitz (2003) source
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataTruncating θ_k in Caliendo and Parro (2015) to values between 1.45 and 16.52 results in more modest gains from industrial policy, equal to 2.03% on average, closer to those obtained using the other three studies.
“This results in more modest gains from industrial policy, equal to 2.03% on average, closer to those obtained using the other three studies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Caliendo and Parro (2015) source
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationFor the baseline analysis, trade elasticities θ_k in manufacturing sectors are taken as the median estimate within each sector from Bagwell, Staiger and Yurukoglu (2018), Caliendo and Parro (2015), Giri, Yi and Yilmazkuday (2018), and Shapiro (2016).
“For our baseline analysis, we take the median estimate, within each sector, from the following recent studies: Bagwell, Staiger and Yurukoglu (2018), Caliendo and Parro (2015), Giri, Yi and Yilmazkuday (2018), and Shapiro (2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 3 sources checkedMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataDrawing on a dataset comprising 61 of the world's largest countries from 1995-2010, results point to statistically significant scale elasticities in every 2-digit manufacturing sector, with an average of 0.13.
“Drawing on a dataset comprising 61 of the world's largest countries from 1995-2010, our results point to statistically significant scale elasticities in every 2-digit manufacturing sector, with an average of 0.13.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningIn every sector, the demand-based IV estimate is lower than its corresponding OLS estimate, consistent with expected simultaneity bias in an open economy under elastic demand.
“First, consistent with expected simultaneity bias in an open economy under elastic demand, in which sector size responds positively to productivity, in every sector we find that our demand-based IV estimate is lower than its corresponding OLS estimate.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataGains from industrial policy range from 0.40% of GDP for the United States to 1.36% for Luxembourg, with larger gains for more open economies.
“They range from 0.40% of GDP for the United States to 1.36% for Luxembourg, with larger gains for more open economies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataExtensions allowing for multiple factors of production and input-output linkages across sectors predict significantly larger gains from policy interventions, but all point towards gains from industrial policy that are modest relative to the gains from trade policy.
“Though some of these extensions predict significantly larger gains from policy interventions, they all point towards gains from industrial policy that are modest relative to the gains from trade policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataOn average, gains from optimal industrial policy are equal to 0.69% of GDP.
“On average, gains from optimal industrial policy are equal to 0.69%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningPure Pigouvian taxes may backfire, with Ireland experiencing a welfare loss of 1.49% when Pigouvian taxes are not accompanied by optimal export taxes.
“Consistent with the importance of terms-of-trade considerations, we also find that pure Pigouvian taxes may backfire, with Ireland, for instance, experiencing a welfare loss of 1.49% when Pigouvian taxes are not accompanied by optimal export taxes.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe gains from optimal industrial policy (column 5) are smaller than those from optimal trade policy (column 4); unweighted averages are 0.69% and 0.95%, respectively.
“The gains from optimal industrial policy (column 5) are smaller than those from optimal trade policy (column 4): focusing on the unweighted average across countries, these gains are 0.69% and 0.95%, respectively.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The initial equilibrium observed in the data (2010) features neither taxes nor subsidies, and trade deficits D_i correspond to transfers across countries with sum zero.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
- The authors state this as an assumption: In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataUnder the second scenario (Pareto-efficient production subsidies), the GDP-weighted average gains from industrial policy are 0.22%, with gains of 1.36% in Vietnam and losses of 1.81% in Ireland.
“The GDP-weighted average of the gains associated with this policy is 0.22%, but with (gross of transfer) gains of 1.36% in Vietnam and losses of 1.81% in Ireland.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The initial equilibrium observed in the data (2010) features neither taxes nor subsidies, and trade deficits D_i correspond to transfers across countries with sum zero.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
- The authors state this as an assumption: In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataAll observations in Figure 4 are close to the 45-degree line, with a correlation between scale elasticities estimated using the two models equal to 0.91.
“All observations are close to the 45-degree line (illustrated in red), with a correlation between the scale elasticities estimated using the two models equal to 0.91.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The production functions f_k are Cobb-Douglas, with average shares consistent with the OECD's ICIO tables.
May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningA back-of-the-envelope Harberger triangle calculation implies gains from industrial policy of 0.42%, not too far from the 0.69% estimated with general equilibrium effects and trade.
“This implies that ∆W Y = 1 2 × (0.28) × (0.13) 2 (1/1.47)-(0.13/1.13)0.42%, not too far from the 0.69% (unweighted world average) estimated taking into account general equilibrium effects and trade.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataEven under the optimistic assumption that governments maximize welfare and have full knowledge of the underlying economy, the baseline analysis points towards gains from optimal industrial policy that are, on average across all countries, equal to just 0.69% of GDP, and only amount to 1.36% for the country that gains the most.
“Yet, even under our optimistic assumption that governments maximize welfare and have full knowledge of the underlying economy, our baseline analysis points towards gains from optimal industrial policy that are, on average across all countries, equal to just 0.69% of GDP, and only amount to 1.36% for the country that gains the most.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Governments maximize welfare and have full knowledge of the underlying economy.
May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataThe same extreme variation in trade elasticities leads to gains from trade policy that are also much larger, equal to 19.08% on average, almost four times the gains from industrial policy.
“The same extreme variation in trade elasticities leads to gains from trade policy that are also much larger, equal to 19.08% on average”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAs γ_NM increases from zero, the relative size of manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in the competitive equilibrium gets closer to its optimal value and the gains from industrial policy fall.
“surprisingly, as we start raising γ N M from zero, the relative size of manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors in the competitive equilibrium gets closer to its optimal value and the gains from industrial policy fall.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningIn the model with physical capital and input-output linkages, the average gains from industrial policy are 4.14%, whereas the average gains from trade policy are 11.49%.
“For both policies, we see that the gains in the model with physical capital and input-output linkages are much larger: the average gains from industrial policy are now equal to 4.14%, whereas the average gains from trade policy go all the way to 11.49%.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The production functions f_k are Cobb-Douglas, with average shares consistent with the OECD's ICIO tables.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataCountries with a higher correlation between L_k/L and γ_k have higher gains from optimal industrial policy, but this channel explains only a small fraction of variation compared to openness.
“Our quantitative results are also consistent with this prediction: countries with a higher correlation between L k /L and γ k do indeed have higher gains from optimal industrial policy.However, compared to the variation in openness across countries, this channel only explains a small fraction of the variation in the gains from industrial policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataSector-level economies of scale exist and differ substantially across sectors, ranging from an elasticity of 0.07 to 0.25.
“Empirically, we find that sector-level economies of scale indeed exist and do differ substantially across sectors, ranging from an elasticity of 0.07 to 0.25.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataUnder the first trade-agreement scenario (zero trade taxes), the unweighted world average gains from constrained industrial policy are 0.56%, lower than the 0.69% baseline, but gains remain smaller than optimal trade policy and higher for more open countries.
“On average, the gains from this type of constrained industrial policy are a bit lower than those from the optimal industrial policy reported in our baseline, with the unweighted world average decreasing from 0.69% to 0.56%, but the basic message is the same: the gains are smaller than those from optimal trade policy, and are higher for more open countries.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The initial equilibrium observed in the data (2010) features neither taxes nor subsidies, and trade deficits D_i correspond to transfers across countries with sum zero.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
- The authors state this as an assumption: In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataThe largest relative change in scale elasticities across sector-year estimates is for Mineral Products, from 0.13 baseline to 0.16 for 2005.
“The largest relative change in scale elasticities, across all sector and year estimates, is that for the Mineral Products sector which changes from 0.13 in the baseline to 0.16 for 2005.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningThe IV estimate of the elasticity of substitution between manufacturing sectors ρ is 1.47, lower than the OLS estimate of 3.35.
“The IV estimate is ρ = 1.47, which is lower than the OLS estimate (of ρ = 3.35) as is consistent with the presence of increasing returns at the sector level.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Upper-level preferences are CES with constant elasticity of substitution ρ across all sectors (equation 8).
May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningIreland has gains from optimal policy almost three times higher than the United States (1.56% vs 0.55%); the gap is particularly large for trade policy (3.05% vs 0.34%) and also holds for industrial policy (1.31% vs 0.40%).
“As an example, Ireland has gains from optimal policy that are almost three times higher than those of the United States (1.56% vs 0.55%).The gap is particularly large for the gains from trade policy (3.05% vs 0.34%), but the pattern also holds for the gains from industrial policy (1.31% vs 0.40%).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: The initial equilibrium observed in the data (2010) features neither taxes nor subsidies, and trade deficits D_i correspond to transfers across countries with sum zero.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
- The authors state this as an assumption: In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataEven for ρ = 2.39, the average gains from industrial policy are only 0.93%, still below the gains from trade policy.
“Quantitatively, however, we see that even for ρ = 2.39, the average gains from industrial policy are only 0.93%, still below the gains from trade policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThese modest gains from industrial policy are slightly smaller than the average gains from optimal trade policy alone, which are equal to 0.95% of GDP.
“These modest gains from industrial policy are slightly smaller than the average gains from optimal trade policy alone, which are equal to 0.95% of GDP.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe 2SLS estimates point to substantial economies of scale, with an average scale elasticity of 0.13 across manufacturing sectors.
“The results point to substantial economies of scale-with an average scale elasticity of 0.13-that are statistically significantly different from zero in every sector.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ_k (equation 6).
- The authors state this as an assumption: External economies of scale in sector k are given by E_k(L)=L^γ_k, with elasticity γ_k constant within each sector.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe demand residual-based IV for any given sector has a strong correlation with its own sector size and a far weaker correlation with any other sector's size.
“Specifically, TableB.4 reports, for each first-stage regression, that the demand residual-based IV for any given sector has a strong correlation with its own sector size and a far weaker correlation with any other sector's size.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingcitationIn a small number of cases the procedure results in γkθk ≥ 1, leading to multiplicity of equilibria.
“In a small number of cases this procedure results in γ k θ k ≥ 1, which leads to multiplicity of equilibria, as pointed out byKucheryavyy et al. (2017).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kucheryavyy et al. (2017)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe conventional F-statistic from the 15 instruments in each first-stage equation is large, and the Sanderson-Windmeijer F-statistic is considerably larger.
“Consequently, as seen in column (4) of Table1, the conventional F-statistic from the 15 instruments in each first-stage equation is large and the Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016) F-statistic in column (5), which assesses the extent to which each first-stage is affected by independent variation in the instruments from that in the other 14 first-stages, is considerably larger.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sanderson and Windmeijer (2016)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenThe number of observations for columns (2) and (3) is 169,483.
“The number of observations for columns (2) and (3) is 169,483.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataUsing country-varying value-added and input use shares makes very little difference to the resulting estimates of γk.
“This turns out to make very little difference to the resulting estimates of γ k .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingnone givenThe number of observations is 207,542.
“The number of obserations is 207,542.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenIn each destination and within each sector, trade flows from different origins reflect the optimal demand for labor services from these countries.
“The starting point of our empirical strategy is the observation that in each destination and within each sector, trade flows from different origins reflect the optimal demand for labor services from these countries.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningUnder parametric restrictions, the log of the price of labor services from a country is proportional to the log of its sector size, with a slope given by the scale elasticity; and the revealed log of the price of labor services is proportional to the log of its bilateral exports, with a slope given by the inverse of the trade elasticity.
“Under these restrictions, the (log of the) price of labor services from a country is proportional to (the log of) its sector size, with a slope given by the scale elasticity; and the revealed (log of the) price of labor services is proportional to (the log of) its bilateral exports, with a slope given by the inverse of the trade elasticity.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Productivity is a log-linear function of sector size, so scale elasticities are constant.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Demand for labor services from different countries takes the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form, so trade elasticities are constant.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenThe empirical relevance of the textbook case for industrial policy remains unclear.
“The empirical relevance of this argument, however, remains unclear.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pigou (1920)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningExternal economies of scale create a rationale for Pigouvian subsidies equal to the difference between private and social marginal costs, with welfare gains equal to the area of the Harberger triangle between demand and social marginal cost curves.
“This creates a rationale for Pigouvian subsidies equal to the difference between the two, with the associated welfare gains equal to the area of the Harberger triangle located between the demand and social marginal cost curves, as illustrated in Figure 1.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningThe identification strategy deliberately draws on cross-sectional variation alone, so as to isolate the long-run notion of scale economies that animates the textbook case for industrial policy.
“Importantly, our identification strategy deliberately draws on cross-sectional variation alone, so as to isolate the longrun notion of scale economies that animates the textbook case for industrial policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFor a small open economy, the optimal policy consists of a mix of trade and industrial policy: sector-specific export taxes equal to the inverse of one plus the trade elasticity, and sector-specific production subsidies equal to the scale elasticity.
“For such a small open economy, the optimal policy consists of a mix of trade and industrial policy: sector-specific export taxes-equal to the inverse of one plus the trade elasticity-to improve the country's terms-of-trade, as well as sector-specific production subsidies-equal to the scale elasticity-to address external economies of scale.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Country j is small in the sense that it can affect the price of its own good relative to goods from other countries, but cannot affect relative prices, sector-level employment, or sector-level expenditure in the rest of the world.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSetting γ_k = 0 for non-manufacturing sectors implies welfare gains from reallocating resources from non-manufacturing to manufacturing sectors with γ_k > 0, and makes overall gains from industrial policy higher than if γ_k in non-manufacturing were positive.
“This implies that there are welfare gains from reallocating resources from non-manufacturing to manufacturing sectors which have γ k > 0, and so the overall gains from industrial policy will be higher than if we had set γ k in non-manufacturing to some positive value.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe unit cost on the right-hand side is constant and identical to the one that one would obtain starting from the constant returns to scale good-level production function in Section 2.1.
“The unit cost on the right-hand side is constant and identical to the one that one would obtain starting from the constant returns to scale good-level production function in Section 2.1.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningThe baseline analysis, focusing on the median of trade elasticities across studies, is purposefully designed to attenuate the potential effects of outliers.
“Our baseline analysis, which focuses on the median of trade elasticities across studies, is purposefully designed to attenuate the potential effects of outliers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningUnder the small open economy normalization, optimal industrial policy is a production subsidy s_j,k = γ_k, optimal export tax is t_x = 1/(1+θ_k), and optimal import tax is zero.
“By Proposition 1, optimal industrial and trade policy are therefore given by s j,k = γ k , for all k, (11) t x ji,k = 1 1 + θ k , for all k and i = j,(12) t m ij,k = 0, for all k and i,”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenA higher ρ leads to larger reallocations in response to optimal industrial policy and, in turn, larger welfare gains.
“As discussed above, we expect that a higher ρ would lead to larger reallocations in response to optimal industrial policy and, in turn, larger welfare gains.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningWhen supply curves slope downwards, positive demand shocks lead to reductions in prices; hence the OLS estimate of the impact of prices on expenditure shares is an underestimate of 1/ρ, leading to an overestimate of ρ.
“When supply curves slope downwards, positive demand shocks lead to reductions in prices.Hence, the OLS estimate of the impact of prices on expenditure shares, which confounds a truly downward-sloping demand curve with the negative correlation between demand shocks and prices, will be an underestimate of 1ρ, leading to an overestimate of ρ.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe introduction of input-output linkages tends to make supply more elastic, increasing the size of Harberger triangles and the absolute levels of the gains from policy.
“In addition, the introduction of input-output linkages tends to make supply more elastic, again increasing the size of Harberger triangles and the absolute levels of the gains from policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataAll estimates of γ_k remain statistically significant at the 5% level and the instruments remain strong by conventional standards, with the lowest first-stage SW F-statistic equal to 203.6.
“All estimates of γ k remain statistically significant at the 5% level and the instruments remain strong by conventional standards (with the lowest first-stage SW F-statistic equal to 203.6).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe identification results in Section 3 are asymptotic and require an infinite sequence of economies to point-identify external economies of scale E_k in all sectors.
“The identification results presented in Section 3 are asymptotic in nature.They reveal conditions under which, in theory, one could point-identify external economies of scale, E k , in all sectors with a dataset that includes an infinite sequence of economies.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSmaller countries gain more from optimal trade policy because such policy improves terms-of-trade and small countries tend to trade more.
“The reason why smaller countries gain more from optimal trade policy is simple: such a policy improves a country's terms-of-trade, and since small countries tend to trade more, they benefit more from that improvement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe functional forms in equations (6)-(9) imply that all level-shifters can change over time, but the elasticities {θ_k}, {γ_k}, and ρ cannot.
“One feature to note about the functional forms in equations ( 6)-( 9) is that all level-shifters can change over time, but the elasticities {θ k }, {γ k }, and ρ cannot.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ_k (equation 6).
- The authors state this as an assumption: External economies of scale in sector k are given by E_k(L)=L^γ_k, with elasticity γ_k constant within each sector.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Upper-level preferences are CES with constant elasticity of substitution ρ across all sectors (equation 8).
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe downward OLS bias is expected in an open economy where countries specialize in sectors of comparative advantage, and is consistent with ρ > 1.
“This downward OLS bias is to be expected in an open economy in which countries specialize in sectors where they have a comparative advantage; further, it is consistent with our finding that the elasticity of substitution between sectors, ρ, is greater than one, which magnifies the impact of productivity differences on specialization.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFor gains from industrial policy to be large, one would need demand to be elastic or countries to produce highly substitutable and tradable goods.
“In addition, one would need demand to be elastic or countries to produce highly substitutable and tradable goods-such that a country can simultaneously expand scale in one sector and find useful domestic or foreign substitutes for the sector that it chooses to shrink.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe non-parametric identification of external economies of scale can proceed following the same steps as in Section 3 given knowledge of the factor demand system and the sector-level production function.
“The non-parametric identification of external economies of scale can proceed following the same steps as in Section 3 given knowledge of the factor demand system, χ j,k , and the sector-level production function f k that maps labor, physical capital, and intermediate goods into a country-and-sector specific composite factor.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAbsent free entry, production functions at the good level may no longer be constant returns and economies of scale estimated at the sector level may reflect a mixture of both internal and external economies of scale.
“Absent free entry, production functions at the good level may no longer be constant returns and economies of scale estimated at the sector level may therefore reflect a mixture of both internal and external economies of scale.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningBecause the elasticities are constant over time, estimation could proceed with data from just one time period; pooling multiple cross-sections only increases statistical precision.
“This implies that, while we use data from multiple time periods, this is not necessary for estimation; we could proceed instead with data from just one time period.Choosing the former over the latter merely allows us to take advantage of the increased statistical precision that comes from pooling the data from multiple cross-sections.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ_k (equation 6).
- The authors state this as an assumption: External economies of scale in sector k are given by E_k(L)=L^γ_k, with elasticity γ_k constant within each sector.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Upper-level preferences are CES with constant elasticity of substitution ρ across all sectors (equation 8).
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataWhile some sensitivity exercises, including the introduction of input-output linkages, open the door for significantly larger gains from industrial policy, the analysis consistently points towards gains from industrial policy that are surprisingly modest relative to the gains from trade policy.
“While some of our sensitivity exercises, including the introduction of input-output linkages, open the door for significantly larger gains from industrial policy, our analysis consistently points towards gains from industrial policy that are surprisingly modest relative to the gains from trade policy.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe positive reduced-form relationship between predicted demand and exports is consistent with increasing returns at the sector level and the home-market effect.
“This is again consistent with the the existence of increasing returns at the sector level, which implies that positive shocks to domestic demand cause lower prices and, in turn, greater exports.This is a manifestation of the home-market effect.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ_k (equation 6).
- The authors state this as an assumption: External economies of scale in sector k are given by E_k(L)=L^γ_k, with elasticity γ_k constant within each sector.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataIn the baseline calibration, ρ is set to 1.47, implying the same elasticity of substitution between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors as within manufacturing.
“In our baseline exercise, we set ρ = 1.47, in line with the 2SLS estimate for manufacturing sectors reported in column (2) of Table B.2.This implies the same elasticity of substitution between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors as within manufacturing sectors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Upper-level preferences are CES with constant elasticity of substitution ρ across all sectors (equation 8).
- The authors state this as an assumption: The elasticity of substitution between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors is the same as within manufacturing sectors (ρ=1.47).
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningUnder the small open economy assumption, all countries have the same ability to manipulate their terms-of-trade.
“Under our small open economy assumption, this implies that all countries have the same ability to manipulate their terms-of-trade.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Country i0 is a small open economy and only country i0 imposes trade taxes and production subsidies.
- The authors state this as an assumption: All countries face the same trade elasticity.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningLinear 2SLS offers the benefit of simplicity and draws on finite-sample theory that is relatively well understood relative to full-information approaches.
“But relative to full-information approaches, which would use the full structure of the model to derive an efficient nonlinear estimator, linear 2SLS offers the benefit of simplicity and draws on finite-sample theory that is relatively well understood.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThese numbers refer to the welfare change in the country implementing the policy in question.
“These numbers refer to the welfare change in the country implementing the policy in question.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenStandard errors in parentheses are clustered at the exporter-sector level.
“Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the exporter-sector level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe CES preferences in equation (8) imply the sector-level expenditure equation.
“The CES preferences in equation ( 8) imply the following sector-level expenditures, ln x t j,k = (1ρ) ln P t j,k + δ t j + δ t k + ε t j,k , (B.1)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningEquation (B.2) recovers estimates of ln P up to a sector-year-specific and an importer-year-specific scale factor only, but this has no bearing on subsequent use because of inclusion of δ.
“Equation (B.2) recovers estimates of ln P t j,k up to a sector-year-specific and an importer-year-specific scale factor only, but this has no bearing on our subsequent use of ln P t j,k in equation (B.1) because of the inclusion of δ t j and δ t k .”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenAll regressions control for importer-sector-year fixed-effects and (asymmetric) trading pair-year effects.
“All regressions control for importer-sector-year fixed-effects and (asymmetric) trading pair-year effects.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAs long as there is some sector in which part of domestic production is sold at home, constrained-optimal production subsidies will deviate from unconstrained and gains will be strictly lower.
“As long as there is some sector in which part of domestic production is sold at home, however, the constrained-optimal production subsidies will deviate from those and the corresponding gains will be strictly lower than those when policy is unconstrained.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningClustering at exporter-sector level corrects for unrestricted forms of serially correlated errors over time and for purely mechanical within-group correlation in the first-stage.
“In addition to correcting for unrestricted forms of serially correlated errors over time, this clustering procedure has the advantage of correcting for the purely mechanical within-group (that is, within-exporter-sector-year) correlation in the first-stage.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenThe first-stage equation involves a more aggregate level of variation than the bilateral second-stage equation.
“One unusual feature of our 2SLS estimation system of equations is that the first-stage equation involves a more aggregate level of variation than the (bilateral) second-stage equation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFrom a global standpoint, trade policy is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, whereas industrial policy is not.
“Of course, from a global standpoint, trade policy is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy, as improvements in one country's terms-of-trade necessarily occur at the expense of another country, whereas industrial policy is not.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningThey cap γk such that γkθk is never higher than 0.975 because the counterfactual equilibrium under optimal policy becomes numerically unstable as γkθk approaches one from below.
“We therefore cap the value of γ k such that γ k θ k is never higher than 0.975 (since the solution of the counterfactual equilibrium under optimal policy becomes numerically unstable as γ k θ k approaches one from below).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningAbsent the small open economy assumption, larger countries would have a greater ability to manipulate their terms-of-trade.
“More generally, absent the small open economy assumption, larger countries would have a greater ability to manipulate their terms-of-trade.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone given2SLS is a limited-information approach to consistent estimation of the scale elasticity parameters γk.
“We note that in this model 2SLS is a limited-information approach to consistent estimation of the scale elasticity parameters γ k .”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenThe baseline analysis rules out cross-sectoral differences in factor intensity and input-output linkages.
“This rules out cross-sectoral differences in either factor intensity or input-output linkages in our baseline analysis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
The authors state this as an assumption.
Productivity is a log-linear function of sector size, so scale elasticities are constant.
“Within each sector, we assume: (i) that productivity is a log-linear function of size, so that we have constant scale elasticities”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Demand for labor services from different countries takes the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form, so trade elasticities are constant.
“and (ii) that the demand for labor services from different countries takes the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form, so that we have constant trade elasticities.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Demand residuals are uncorrelated with idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
“Under the assumption that these demand residuals are uncorrelated with idiosyncratic productivity shocks”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Subutility is homothetic, standard Inada conditions hold, and demand for goods within a sector satisfies the connected substitutes property.
“We assume that subutility U j,k is homothetic, that standard Inada conditions hold, and that demand for goods within a sector satisfies the connected substitutes property, as defined in Arrow and Hahn (1971).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
External effects occur within a given sector in a country; there are no external effects that spill over across sectors or countries.
“To keep the focus of our analysis on the textbook case for industrial policy, we restrict external effects to occur within a given sector in a country and rule out the possibility of external effects that spill over across sectors or countries.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Production at the level of goods has constant returns to scale, but not necessarily at the level of firms.
“The above specification assumes constant returns to scale at the level of goods ω but does not require constant returns to scale at the level of firms.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Country j is small in the sense that it can affect the price of its own good relative to goods from other countries, but cannot affect relative prices, sector-level employment, or sector-level expenditure in the rest of the world.
“We further assume that country j is small in the sense that it can only affect the price of its own good relative to goods from other countries: relative prices, sector-level employment, and sector-level expenditure in the rest of the world are all taken as exogenously given by its government.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The nonparametric identification of external economies of scale is conducted under the assumption of perfect competition, in which prices equal unit costs.
“The nonparametric identification of external economies of scale above is conducted under the assumption of perfect competition, in which prices are equal to unit costs.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
There is free entry in the production of each good.
“provided that there is free entry in the production of each good, as in Hopenhayn (1992) and Appendix A.1.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
External economies of scale may affect both the physical productivity of firms and the quality of the goods they produce.
“Within each sector, external economies of scale may affect both the physical productivity of firms as well as the quality of the goods that they produce.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ_k (equation 6).
“Equation ( 6) states that bilateral trade shares between an origin country i and a destination j in any sector k satisfy a gravity equation with trade elasticity θ k .”
The authors state this as an assumption.
External economies of scale in sector k are given by E_k(L)=L^γ_k, with elasticity γ_k constant within each sector.
“Equation ( 7) allows external economies of scale to vary across sectors, as is critical for industrial policy considerations, but restricts the elasticity of external economies γ k to be constant within each sector.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Upper-level preferences are CES with constant elasticity of substitution ρ across all sectors (equation 8).
“We do so under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution across manufacturing sectors is constant as well.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The exclusion restriction for the IV strategy: after conditioning on importer-exporter-year and importer-sector-year fixed effects, predicted demand ln(D_i,k) is mean-independent of supply-side shocks ε_i,j,k.
“The exclusion restriction being imposed is that after conditioning on importer-exporter-year and importer-sector-year fixed effects, predicted demand in country i and sector k at year t, ln( D t j,k ), is mean-independent of the supply-side shocks, { t i j ,k }.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Any discrepancy between population and labor supply in efficiency units is part of the error term in equation (10), and the exclusion restriction applies to this term as well.
“Given this measure of sector size, any discrepancy between population and labor supply in efficiency units is therefore also implicitly part of the error term in equation ( 10).That is, if L t i = ξ t i Lt i , then the error term also includes γ k ln ξ t i , with our exclusion applying to this term as well”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The initial equilibrium observed in the data (2010) features neither taxes nor subsidies, and trade deficits D_i correspond to transfers across countries with sum zero.
“we compute counterfactual equilibria under optimal policies using exact hat algebra under the assumption that the initial equilibrium observed in the data (corresponding to 2010, the final year in our dataset) features neither taxes nor subsidies and that trade deficits D i correspond to transfers across countries, with ∑ i D i = 0.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Each country is treated as a small open economy, with normalization s_j = t_j = 0.
“Following the theoretical analysis of Section 2.3, we treat each country as a small open economy and impose the normalization s j = t j = 0.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
In the baseline calibration, scale economies in non-manufacturing sectors are set to zero (γ_NM = 0).
“Our baseline assumption of γ N M = 0-in which economies of scale are the province of the manufacturing sectors alone-might correspond to the traditional view behind industrial policy.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The elasticity of substitution between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors is the same as within manufacturing sectors (ρ=1.47).
“This implies the same elasticity of substitution between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors as within manufacturing sectors.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Governments maximize welfare and have full knowledge of the underlying economy.
“even under our optimistic assumption that governments maximize welfare and have full knowledge of the underlying economy”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Country i0 is a small open economy and only country i0 imposes trade taxes and production subsidies.
“Under the assumption that country i 0 is a small open economy and that only country i 0 imposes trade taxes and production subsidies”
“Under the assumption that country i 0 is a small open economy and that only country i 0 imposes trade taxes and production subsidies, we follow the same procedure as in Appendix A.7 and”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The production functions f_k are Cobb-Douglas, with average shares consistent with the OECD's ICIO tables.
“further assume that f k is Cobb-Douglas, with average shares consistent with the OECD's ICIO tables.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Profits are single-peaked in l.
“We assume that they are such that profits, π ij,k (l, φ, ω) = p ij,k (ω)A ij,k E A k (L i,k )F(l, φ) -w i l, are single-peaked in l.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The composite input is produced using labor, physical capital, and intermediate goods according to a constant returns-to-scale production function f_i,k.
“We assume that the composite input is produced using labor, l ij,k (ω), physical capital, k ij,k (ω), and intermediate goods from different sectors, {q M ij,sk (ω)} s , according to z ij,k (ω) = f i,k (l ij,k (ω), k ij,k (ω), {q M ij,sk (ω)} s ), where f i,k is a constant returns-to-scale production function.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Production functions are Cobb-Douglas.
“Like in Appendix A.8.3, we assume that production functions are Cobb-Douglas, as described in equation (A.21).”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Sector-level production functions f_k are constant across countries.
“We maintain the assumption that sector-level production functions, f k , are constant across countries, but allow for Hicks-neutral differences across countries and sectors.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The Harberger formula assumes quasi-linear preferences and autarky.
“The Harberger formula displayed above implicitly assumes quasi-linear preferences and autarky.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
All countries face the same trade elasticity.
“In our model, like in any standard gravity model, all countries face the same trade elasticity.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The exclusion restriction requires that countries with large populations do not have systematically greater demand, relative to smaller countries, in some sectors than others.
“The exclusion restriction requires that countries with large populations do not have systematically greater demand, relative to smaller countries, in some sectors than others.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
The conclusion labels a conditional trade-policy gain as trade policy alone
MajorThe conclusion calls 0.95% the average gain from trade policy alone. In Table 2, trade policy alone averages 0.36%; 0.95% is the gain from adding trade policy when production subsidies are already in place.
“These modest gains from industrial policy are slightly smaller than the average gains from optimal trade policy alone, which are equal to 0.95% of GDP.”
“Avg., Unweighted 1.05% 0.10% 0.36% 0.95% 0.69%”
Germany's results differ across the two policy tables
MajorTable 2 reports Germany's industrial-policy-only gain as −0.13% and its gain from adding trade policy as 1.04%. Table B.8 instead reports −0.17% and 1.08%, respectively, for the same country and policies.
“Germany 0.91% -0.13% 0.18% 1.04% 0.73%”
“Germany 0.91% -0.17% 0.18% 1.08% 0.73%”
The stated marginal-cost ordering is reversed
MinorThe introduction says private marginal cost is below social marginal cost. Its description of a positive subsidy as MC minus SMC, together with output below the social optimum, implies the opposite ordering.
“In sectors subject to external economies of scale, private marginal costs of production are lower than social ones.”
“The optimal industrial policy is a subsidy s = MC(Q * ) -SMC(Q * ), which would give rise to gains equal to the area of the grey triangle.”
OLS bias is described in the wrong direction
MinorThe paper says every OLS estimate exceeds its 2SLS counterpart, then calls this a downward OLS bias. Relative to the preferred 2SLS estimates, the stated pattern is upward bias.
“This downward OLS bias is to be expected in an open economy in which countries specialize in sectors where they have a comparative advantage”
“in each sector, the OLS estimate of γ k is larger than its corresponding 2SLS estimate.”
First-stage F-statistics differ between corresponding tables
MinorTables 1 and B.4 describe the same first-stage regressions, but give different F-statistics for the Food, Beverages and Tobacco sector: 87.20 and 394.3 in Table 1 versus 77.00 and 388.8 in Table B.4.
“Food, Beverages and Tobacco 0.19 0.16 0.10 87.20 394.3 (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)”
“Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1.05 -0.01 77.00 388.8 (0.04) (0.01)”
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Lashkaripour, A., & Volodymyr Lugovskyy, A. (2023) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20210419 · Cited by 96 · see citing works
Trade wars and industrial policy competitions: Understanding the US-China economic conflicts
Ju, J., Ma, H., Wang, Z., et al. (2023) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2023.10.012 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
The US-China Trade War and Global Reallocations
Fajgelbaum, P., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P., et al. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29562 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
Clayton, C. R. I., Maggiori, M., & Schreger, J. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31852 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
The Who, What, When, and How of Industrial Policy: A Text-Based ApproachPreprint
Juhász, R., Lane, N., Oehlsen, E., & Pérez, V. C. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.31235/osf.io/uyxh9 · Cited by 89 · see citing works
The US-China Trade War and Global Reallocations
Fajgelbaum, P., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P., Khandelwal, A. K., & Taglioni, D. (2022) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-9894 · Cited by 57 · see citing works
The New Economics of Industrial PolicyPreprint
Juhász, R., Lane, N., & Rodrik, D. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4533252 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Cognitive Hubs and Spatial Redistribution
Rossi‐Hansberg, E., Sarte, P.-D. G., & Schwartzman, F. (2019) · American Economic Journal Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.20230013 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Grounded by Gravity: A Well-Behaved Trade Model with Industry-Level Economies of Scale
Kucheryavyy, K., Lyn, G., & Rodrı́guez-Clare, A. (2023) · American Economic Journal Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.20190156 · Cited by 46 · see citing works
Self-citationCaliendo, L., & Parro, F. (2022) · Handbook of international economics · doi:10.1016/bs.hesint.2022.02.004 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
The Long-Term Effects of Industrial PolicyPreprint
Choi, J., & Levchenko, A. A. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3926944 · Cited by 36 · see citing works
The Long-Term Effects of Industrial Policy
Choi, J., & Levchenko, A. A. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29263 · Cited by 35 · see citing works
Propagation and Amplification of Local Productivity Spillovers
Giroud, X., Lenzu, S., Maingi, Q., & Mueller, H. M. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29084 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
The Environmental Bias of Trade Policy
Shapiro, J. (2020) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w26845 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Bo, S., Liu, C., & Zhou, Y. (2022) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2022.103015 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
An industrial policy framework for OECD countries
Criscuolo, C., Gonne, N., Kitazawa, K., & Lalanne, G. (2022) · OECD science, technology and industry policy papers · doi:10.1787/0002217c-en · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Trade Spillovers of Domestic Subsidies
Rotunno, L., & Ruta, M. (2024) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.5089/9798400269486.001 · Cited by 26 · see citing works
Colantone, I., Ottaviano, G. I. P., & Stanig, P. (2022) · Handbook of international economics · doi:10.1016/bs.hesint.2022.02.007 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
The role of trade in economic development
Atkin, D., & Donaldson, D. (2022) · Handbook of international economics · doi:10.1016/bs.hesint.2022.02.001 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Self-citationGlobalization and the Ladder of Development: Pushed to the Top or Held at the Bottom?
Atkin, D., Costinot, A., & Fukui, M. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29500 · Cited by 24 · see citing works
Self-citationCognitive Hubs and Spatial Redistribution
Rossi‐Hansberg, E., Sarte, P.-D. G., Richmond, F. R. B. O., Schwartzman, F., & Richmond, F. R. B. O. (2019) · Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers · doi:10.21144/wp19-16 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
(Trade) War and peace: How to impose international trade sanctions
de Souza, G., Hu, N., Li, H., et al. (2024) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2024.103572 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Goldberg, P. K., & Reed, T. (2023) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta20787 · Cited by 38 · see citing works
The Us-China Trade War and Global ReallocationsPreprint
Fajgelbaum, P., Goldberg, P. K., Kennedy, P., et al. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3983916 · Cited by 21 · see citing works
Migration, Specialization, and Trade: Evidence from Brazil's March to the West
Pellegrina, H. S., & Sotelo, S. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w28421 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
Caliendo, L., & Parro, F. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29051 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Slicing the Pie: Quantifying the Aggregate and Distributional Effects of TradePreprint
Galle, S., Rodrı́guez-Clare, A., & Yi, M. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3086510 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Self-citationWelfare gains in the Armington, Krugman and Melitz models: Comparisons grounded on gravity
Balistreri, E. J., & Tarr, D. G. (2022) · Economic Inquiry · doi:10.1111/ecin.13082 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
A second-best argument for low optimal tariffs on intermediate inputs
Caliendo, L., Feenstra, R. C., Romalis, J., et al. (2023) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103824 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Market Size and Trade in Medical Services
Dingel, J. I., Gottlieb, J. D., Lozinski, M., et al. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31030 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Entrepôt: Hubs, Scale, and Trade CostsPreprint
Ganapati, S., Wong, W. F., & Ziv, O. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3571905 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Trade Policy and Global Sourcing: An Efficiency Rationale for Tariff Escalation
Antràs, P., Fort, T., Gutiérrez, A., & Tintelnot, F. (2023) · Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics · doi:10.1086/728993 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
“The Krugman model further highlights the distinctions between the social planner ’ s motives for an input versus final-good tariff.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialEntrepôt: Hubs, Scale, and Trade Costs
Ganapati, S., Wong, W. F., & Ziv, O. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29015 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
International Trade and Earnings Inequality: A New Factor Content Approach
Adão, R., Carrillo, P. E., Costinot, A., Donaldson, D., & Pomeranz, D. (2020) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w28263 · Cited by 14 · see citing works
Self-citationIndustrial Policy Coverage in IMF Surveillance— Broad Considerations
Fund, I. M. (2024) · MF Policy Paper · doi:10.5089/9798400266683.007 · Cited by 12 · see citing works
“…these improvements, the microeconometric evidence using within-country variations is mixed across empirical techniques (difference-in-difference, regression discontinuity design, propensity score matching, natural experiments) or recent multi-sector general equilibrium models (Bartelme et al 2019).”
The small open economy in a generalized gravity model
Demidova, S., Kucheryavyy, K., Naito, T., et al. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103997 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Self-citationREGULATORY PROTECTION AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Mei, Y. (2023) · International Economic Review · doi:10.1111/iere.12676 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Do preferential trade agreements stimulate high-tech exports for low-income countries?
Cheong, J. (2023) · Economic Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106465 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Trade Policy and Global Sourcing: An Efficiency Rationale for Tariff Escalation
Antràs, P., Fort, T., Gutierrez, A., & Tintelnot, F. (2022) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w30225 · Cited by 10 · see citing works
Entrepôt: Hubs, Scale, and Trade Costs
Ganapati, S., Wong, W. F., & Ziv, O. (2024) · American Economic Journal Macroeconomics · doi:10.1257/mac.20220250 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
The unequal effects of trade and automation across local labor markets
Galle, S., & Lorentzen, L. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103912 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
How infrastructure shapes comparative advantage
Baldomero-Quintana, L. (2025) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2025.104083 · Cited by 8 · see citing works
Lin, J., Wang, X., & Xu, M. (2024) · Economic Modelling · doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2024.106897 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
The Exchange Rate as an Industrial Policy
Ottonello, P., Perez, D. J., & Witheridge, W. (2024) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w32522 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Foundation of the small open economy model with product differentiation
Caliendo, L., & Feenstra, R. C. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103820 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
A Framework for GeoeconomicsPreprint
Clayton, C., Maggiori, M., & Schreger, J. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4473883 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Entry vs. Rents: Aggregation with Economies of ScalePreprint
Baqaee, D., & Farhi, E. (2020) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.3386/w27140 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Trade and technology adoption in distorted economies
Farrokhi, F., Lashkaripour, A., & Pellegrina, H. S. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103922 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Market Size and Trade in Medical ServicesPreprint
Dingel, J. I., Gottlieb, J. D., Lozinski, M., et al. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4391865 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“For internationally traded goods, Davis and Weinstein (2003), Hanson and Xiang (2004), and Bartelme et al. (2019) link market size to export patterns, in line with the home-market effect laid out in Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). For intranational trade in goods, Dingel (2017) shows that market-size ef…”
BackgroundInfluentialUnilateral Carbon Pricing and Heterogeneous FirmsPreprint
Sogalla, R. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4668184 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Propagation and Amplification of Local Productivity SpilloversPreprint
Giroud, X., Lenzu, S., Maingi, R. Q., et al. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3893365 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
The Role of Trade in Economic DevelopmentPreprint
Atkin, D., & Donaldson, D. (n.d.) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Self-citationZhang, Y., Ruan, J., & Zhang, Y. (2025) · China Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.chieco.2025.102505 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Trade and Industrial Policy in Supply Chains: Directed Technological Change in Rare Earths
Alfaro, L., Fadinger, H., Schymik, J., et al. (2025) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w33877 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Sectoral Development Multipliers
Buera, F., & Trachter, N. (2024) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w32230 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
A Theory of Economic Coercion and FragmentationPreprint
Clayton, C. R. I., Maggiori, M., & Schreger, J. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4767131 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Traiberman, S., & Rotemberg, M. (2023) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2023.103836 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Institutions, Comparative Advantage, and the Environment
Shapiro, J. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31768 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Technological Rivalry and Optimal Dynamic Policy in an Open EconomyPreprint
Bai, Y., Jin, K., & Lu, D. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4582320 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
The Backlash of GlobalizationPreprint
Colantone, I., Ottaviano, G. I. P., & Stanig, P. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3918834 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
National Differentiation and Industry-Wide Scale EffectsPreprint
Lashkaripour, A., & Volodymyr Lugovskyy, A. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2954731 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Specialization, market access and real income
Bartelme, D., Lan, T., & Levchenko, A. A. (2024) · Journal of International Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103923 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Self-citationDong, F., Jiao, Y., & Sun, H. (2024) · Review of Economic Dynamics · doi:10.1016/j.red.2024.02.001 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Learn in Order to Practice: The Effect of Political Rotation on Local Comparative Advantage in ChinaPreprint
Lin, J. Y., Liu, S., Xu, M., et al. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4744396 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Market Size and Trade in Medical ServicesPreprint
Dingel, J. I., Gottlieb, J. D., Lozinski, M., et al. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4393370 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
(Trade) War and Peace: How to Impose International Trade SanctionsPreprint
de Souza, G., Hu, N., Li, H., & Mei, Y. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4153921 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“…non-tariff trade barriers (Mei 2021), “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) rules (Bagwell et al. 2021), export subsidies (Beshkar and Lashkaripour 2020), market access concessions (Beshkar et al. 2022), deep trade agreements (Lashkaripour and Lugovskyy 2021), and industrial policies (Bartelme et al. 2021).”
Background(Trade) War and Peace: How to Impose International Trade Sanctions
de Souza, G., Hu, N., Li, H., et al. (2022) · doi:10.21033/wp-2022-49 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
Demand-Side Constraints in Development: The Role of Market Size, Trade, and (In)Equality
Goldberg, P. K., & Reed, T. (2020) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w27286 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
A Theory of Economic Coercion and FragmentationPreprint
Clayton, C. R. I., Maggiori, M., & Schreger, J. (2024) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/j8wgx · Cited by 3 · see citing works
The Exchange Rate as an Industrial PolicyPreprint
Ottonello, P., Perez, D. J., & Witheridge, W. (2024) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4851795 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Technological Rivalry and Optimal Dynamic Policy in an Open Economy
Bai, Y., Jin, K., & Lu, D. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31703 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Market Size and Trade in Medical ServicesPreprint
Dingel, J. I., Gottlieb, J. D., Lozinski, M., et al. (2023) · doi:10.21034/iwp.68 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
A Framework for GeoeconomicsPreprint
Clayton, C. R. I., Maggiori, M., & Schreger, J. (2023) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4631016 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
The Role of Trade in Economic Development
Atkin, D., & Donaldson, D. (2021) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w29314 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Self-citationThe Labor Supply Curve Is Upward Sloping: The Effects of Immigrant-Induced Demand Shocks
Galaasen, S., Kostøl, A., Monràs, J., et al. (2025) · doi:10.17848/wp25-419 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Fajgelbaum, P., & Gaubert, C. (2025) · Handbook of regional and urban economics · doi:10.1016/bs.hesreg.2025.06.005 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Specialization, Market Access and Real Income
Bartelme, D., Lan, T., & Levchenko, A. (2024) · IMF Working Paper · doi:10.5089/9798400269370.001 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Self-citationColantone, I., Ottaviano, G. I. P., & Stanig, P. (2023) · Spatial Economic Analysis · doi:10.1080/17421772.2023.2267613 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The New Economics of Industrial PolicyPreprint
Juhász, R., Lane, N., & Rodrik, D. (2023) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/gsyq4 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Who Benefits From The Export-Import Bank Aid?
Benmelech, E., & Monteiro, J. (2023) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w31562 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Similarly, Bartelme et al. (2019) argue that, for large open economies (such as the United States), the effectiveness of industrial policy may be small.”
BackgroundTrade Policy and Global Sourcing: An Efficiency Rationale for Tarıff EscalationPreprint
Antràs, P., Fort, T., & Tintelnot, F. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4155723 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Demand-Side Constraints in Development
Goldberg, P. K., & Reed, T. (2020) · World Bank, Washington, DC eBooks · doi:10.1596/1813-9450-9342 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The Labor Supply Curve is Upward Sloping: The Effects of Immigrant-Induced Demand Shocks
Galaasen, S., Kostøl, A., Monràs, J., et al. (2025) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w33930 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Sectoral Development Multipliers
Buera, F., Trachter, N., & Richmond, F. R. B. O. (2024) · Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers · doi:10.21144/wp24-02 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
A Framework for GeoeconomicsPreprint
Clayton, C. R. I., Maggiori, M., & Schreger, J. (2023) · doi:10.31235/osf.io/cxwmr · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Armington Elasticities and the Third-Country Effects of Trade WarsPreprint
Li, W., Qiu, B., Wang, Z., et al. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4160488 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Coming to Rescue or Going to Waste? Government Venture Capital in the U.S.-China Trade WarPreprint
Chen, J., Gong, R. K., & Li, J. (2022) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.4218297 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Industrial spillovers from agricultural processing: Evidence from the beet sugar industry
Baek, Y. (2026) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2026.103883
A Unified National Market and Local Industrial Policy Competition
Chen, L., & Li, Y. (2026) · China Finance and Economic Review · doi:10.1515/cfer-2026-0007
“For example, the degree of distortion between sectors (Liu, 2019), the degree of spatial friction (Fajgelbaum et al. , 2019; Fajgelbaum and Gaubert, 2020), and the scale of economies (Bartelme et al. , 2019) can all influence the optimal subsidies and their economic eff ects.”
EU vs. China: battle for trade and investments within a small open economy
Bugarčić, F. Ž., Filipović, S., & Zakić, K. (2026) · Business Management and Economics Engineering · doi:10.3846/bmee.2026.25457
“…on small open economies (Aastveit et al., 2016; Demidova & Rodríguez-Clare, 2013; Justiniano & Pres - ton, 2010a), the formulation of monetary policy (Cushman & Zha, 1997; De Paoli, 2009; Galí & Monacelli, 2005; Justiniano & Preston, 2010b), and optimal industrial policy (Bartelme et al., 2019).”
Qin, R., Ma, H., & Li, K. (2026) · 经济学报. · doi:10.26599/cje.2026.9300106
Trade effects of industrial policies: Are preferential agreements a shield?
Barattieri, A., Mattoo, A., & Taglioni, D. (2025) · Journal of Policy Modeling · doi:10.1016/j.jpolmod.2025.06.015
- Authors
- Bartelme, D., Costinot, A., Donaldson, D., & Rodríguez-Clare, A.
- Affiliations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (US)
- Venue
- NBER Working Paper
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2019-08
- OpenAlex
- W2970984959
- Cited by
- 114
- References
- 57
- Citations by year
- 2026: 5 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 31 · 2022: 16 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 2 · 2017: 2
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- National Bureau of Economic Research (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1559015)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Global trade and economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › General Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economic Theory and Policy
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Innovation Policy and R&D
- Keywords
- industrial policy, economies of scale, manufacturing industry, open economy, trade policy, optimal trade policy, external economies of scale
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