The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
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Cited by
How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.005 · Cited by 4,185
Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value
Carter, D. A., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2003) · Financial Review · doi:10.1111/1540-6288.00034 · Cited by 3,353
A review of archival auditing research
DeFond, M., & Zhang, J. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 3,188
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008 · Cited by 3,075
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hermalin, B., & Weisbach, M.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2001-03
- OpenAlex
- W2891717843
- Cited by
- 2,498
- References
- 29
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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