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Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools
Open accessAbstract
The recent federal education bill, No Child Left Behind, requires states to test students in grades three to eight each year, and to judge school performance on the basis of these test scores.While intended to maximize student learning, there is little empirical evidence about the effectiveness of such policies.This study examines the impact of an accountability policy implemented in the Chicago Public Schools in 1996-97.Using a panel of student-level, administrative data, I find that math and reading achievement increased sharply following the introduction of the accountability policy, in comparison to both prior achievement trends in the district and to changes experienced by other large, urban districts in the mid-west.I demonstrate that these gains were driven largely by increases in test-specific skills and student effort, and did not lead to comparable gains on a state-administered, low-stakes exam.I also find that teachers responded strategically to the incentives along a variety of dimensions-by increasing special education placements, preemptively retaining students and substituting away from low-stakes subjects like science and social studies.
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Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on Earnings
Ashenfelter, O. (1978) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1924332 · Cited by 1,515
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- Authors
- Jacob, B.
- Venue
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Publisher
- National Bureau of Economic Research
- Published
- 2002-05
- OpenAlex
- W2107615409
- Cited by
- 168
- References
- 2
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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