The DOI matches its Crossref record; 62 of the 62 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Self-Processing and the Default Mode Network: Interactions with the Mirror Neuron System
Open accessAbstract
Recent evidence for the fractionation of the default mode network (DMN) into functionally distinguishable subdivisions with unique patterns of connectivity calls for a reconceptualization of the relationship between this network and self-referential processing. Advances in resting-state functional connectivity analyses are beginning to reveal increasingly complex patterns of organization within the key nodes of the DMN - medial prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex - as well as between these nodes and other brain systems. Here we review recent examinations of the relationships between the DMN and various aspects of self-relevant and social-cognitive processing in light of emerging evidence for heterogeneity within this network. Drawing from a rapidly evolving social-cognitive neuroscience literature, we propose that embodied simulation and mentalizing are processes which allow us to gain insight into another's physical and mental state by providing privileged access to our own physical and mental states. Embodiment implies that the same neural systems are engaged for self- and other-understanding through a simulation mechanism, while mentalizing refers to the use of high-level conceptual information to make inferences about the mental states of self and others. These mechanisms work together to provide a coherent representation of the self and by extension, of others. Nodes of the DMN selectively interact with brain systems for embodiment and mentalizing, including the mirror neuron system, to produce appropriate mappings in the service of social-cognitive demands.
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A default mode of brain function
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“In thinking about the self and others, mentalizing representations (Barsalou, 1999, 2008) and embodied representations (Goldman and de Vignemont, 2009) serve as the foundations for making inferences about our own mind as well as others’ minds.”
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Self-citationEmpathy: its ultimate and proximate bases
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Empathy for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Components of Pain
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“Physical aspects of the self are typically examined in studies of selfface recognition, body recognition, agency, and perspective taking.”
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Cited by
The Default Mode Network in Autism
Padmanabhan, A., Lynch, C. J., Schaer, M., & Menon, V. (2017) · Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience and Neuroimaging · doi:10.1016/j.bpsc.2017.04.004 · Cited by 375
Anterior insula as a gatekeeper of executive control
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“…that mentalizing abilities are subserved by neural subsystems, namely the mirror neural network and the mentalizing network coding, respectively, for low-level perceptive socio-cognitive processes and high-level reflective processing (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Molnar-Szakacs and Uddin, 2013).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Molnar-Szakacs, I., & Uddin, L. Q.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2013
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 571-571
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2049016991
- Cited by
- 217
- References
- 62
- FWCI
- 7.57
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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