Beyond the “urge to moveâ€: objective measures for the study of agency in the post-Libet era
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The investigation of human volition is a longstanding endeavor from both philosophers and researchers. Yet because of the major challenges associated with capturing voluntary movements in an ecologically relevant state in the research environment, it is only in recent years that human agency has grown as a field of cognitive neuroscience. In particular, the seminal work of Libet et al. (1983) paved the way for a neuroscientific approach to agency. Over the past decade, new objective paradigms have been developed to study agency, drawing upon emerging concepts from cognitive and computational neuroscience. These include the chronometric approach of Libet's study which is embedded in the "intentional binding" paradigm, optimal motor control theory and most recent insights from active inference theory. Here we review these principal methods and their application to the study of agency in health and the insights gained from their application to neurological and psychiatric disorders. We show that the neuropsychological paradigms that are based upon these new approaches have key advantages over traditional experimental designs. We propose that these advantages, coupled with advances in neuroimaging, create a powerful set of tools for understanding human agency and its neurobiological basis.
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Citations
Cites
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InfluentialWhatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
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Optimal feedback control as a theory of motor coordination
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“Optimization balances performance accuracy and the motor costs (Todorov and Jordan, 2002; Scott, 2004), while a forward model uses an “efference copy” of the motor command (von Holst, 1954) to predict the sensory effect of an action.”
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Cited by
Baek, K., Doñamayor, N., Morris, L. S., Strelchuk, D., Mitchell, S., Mikheenko, Y., Yeoh, S. Y., Phillips, W., Zandi, M., Jenaway, A., et al. (2017) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291717000071 · Cited by 87
Metacognition of intentions in mindfulness and hypnosis
Lush, P., Naish, P., & Dienes, Z. (2016) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niw007 · Cited by 69
Nielsen, T. (2017) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/nix001 · Cited by 56
“While the merits of Libet’s findings—and especially the limitations of his phenomenological measures—continue to be debated (Lau et al., 2006; Wolpe and Rowe, 2014), their application here is clearly speculative.”
BackgroundWolpe, N., Nombela, C., & Rowe, J. B. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01514 · Cited by 18
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Metadata
- Authors
- Wolpe, N., & Rowe, J. B.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2014-06-20
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 450-450
- ISSN
- 1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2098996686
- Cited by
- 59
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 1.87
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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