Cognitive Processes in Decisions Under Risk are not the Same as in Decisions Under Uncertainty
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We deal with risk versus uncertainty, a distinction that is of fundamental importance for cognitive neuroscience yet largely neglected. In a world of risk ("small world"), all alternatives, consequences, and probabilities are known. In uncertain ("large") worlds, some of this information is unknown or unknowable. Most of cognitive neuroscience studies exclusively study the neural correlates for decisions under risk (e.g., lotteries), with the tacit implication that understanding these would lead to an understanding of decision making in general. First, we show that normative strategies for decisions under risk do not generalize to uncertain worlds, where simple heuristics are often the more accurate strategies. Second, we argue that the cognitive processes for making decisions in a world of risk are not the same as those for dealing with uncertainty. Because situations with known risks are the exception rather than the rule in human evolution, it is unlikely that our brains are adapted to them. We therefore suggest a paradigm shift toward studying decision processes in uncertain worlds and provide first examples.
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Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 1×
“Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy”
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 · Cited by 4,037
Self-citationReasoning the fast and frugal way: Models of bounded rationality.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1996) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.103.4.650 · Cited by 3,504 · cited 1×
“Experimental studies indicate that a large proportion of subjects rely on it in uncertain situations, such as when predicting which tennis player will win in Wimbledon or which political candidate to vote for, and by animals when choosing food (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 2011).”
Self-citationPayne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173933 · Cited by 3,487
Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences
Gigerenzer, G., & Brighton, H. (2009) · Topics in Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2008.01006.x · Cited by 1,801
Self-citationModels of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.1.75 · Cited by 1,352
Self-citationBayes in the Brain—On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience
Colombo, M., & Seriès, P. (2012) · The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science · doi:10.1093/bjps/axr043 · Cited by 164 · cited 2×
“In the words of Colombo and Seriès (2012): “that the brain is a Bayesian machine does not follow from the fact that Bayesian models are used to study the brain and the behavior it generates” (p. 2).”
Cited by
Beyond stereotypes of adolescent risk taking: Placing the adolescent brain in developmental context
Romer, D., Reyna, V. F., & Satterthwaite, T. D. (2017) · Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.dcn.2017.07.007 · Cited by 407
Maitland, E., & Sammartino, A. (2015) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2297 · Cited by 276
Communicating Health Risks With Visual Aids
Garcia-Retamero, R., & Cokely, E. T. (2013) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721413491570 · Cited by 275
Foraging for foundations in decision neuroscience: insights from ethology
Mobbs, D., Trimmer, P. C., Blumstein, D. T., & Dayan, P. (2018) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-018-0010-7 · Cited by 264
Schiebener, J., & Brand, M. (2015) · Neuropsychology Review · doi:10.1007/s11065-015-9285-x · Cited by 168
“External influences”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Volz, K. G., & Gigerenzer, G.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2012
- Volume
- 6
- Pages
- 105-105
- ISSN
- 1662-453X (ISSN-L)
- 1662-4548
- OpenAlex
- W2066829492
- Cited by
- 152
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 8.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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