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Cited by 84Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEpistemology, Ethics, and MetaphysicsMental Health and Psychiatry

Why are dreams interesting for philosophers? The example of minimal phenomenal selfhood, plus an agenda for future research1

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Metzinger, Thomas·2013·Frontiers in Psychology
DOI 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00746PMC PMC3813926
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Abstract

This metatheoretical paper develops a list of new research targets by exploring particularly promising interdisciplinary contact points between empirical dream research and philosophy of mind. The central example is the MPS-problem. It is constituted by the epistemic goal of conceptually isolating and empirically grounding the phenomenal property of "minimal phenomenal selfhood," which refers to the simplest form of self-consciousness. In order to precisely describe MPS, one must focus on those conditions that are not only causally enabling, but strictly necessary to bring it into existence. This contribution argues that research on bodiless dreams, asomatic out-of-body experiences, and full-body illusions has the potential to make decisive future contributions. Further items on the proposed list of novel research targets include differentiating the concept of a "first-person perspective" on the subcognitive level; investigating relevant phenomenological and neurofunctional commonalities between mind-wandering and dreaming; comparing the functional depth of embodiment across dream and wake states; and demonstrating that the conceptual consequences of cognitive corruption and systematic rationality deficits in the dream state are much more serious for philosophical epistemology (and, perhaps, the methodology of dream research itself) than commonly assumed. The paper closes by specifying a list of potentially innovative research goals that could serve to establish a stronger connection between dream research and philosophy of mind.

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  • Active inference as planning, due to its inherently epistemic notion and the implied importance of self priors, seems most closely related to the concept of an EAM, which in SMT is one particular kind of PSM, transparently equipped with attentional agency.

    “Finally, active inference as planning, due to its inherently ‘epistemic’ notion and the implied importance of ‘self’ priors, seems to us most closely related to the concept of an EAM (see above; Metzinger, 2013), which in SMT is one particular kind of PSM, transparently equipped with attentional agency.”

    From 'Seeing the Dark': Grounding Phenomenal Transparency and Opacity in Precision Estimation for Active Inference (2018) · cites this paper as Metzinger, 2013

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Authors
Metzinger, T.
Affiliations
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
Corresponding author
Metzinger, Thomas
ORCID
Metzinger, Thomas
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2013
Volume
4
Pages
746-746
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00746
PMC
PMC3813926
OpenAlex
W2147617226
Cited by
84
References
133
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 8 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 9 · 2014: 6 · 2013: 1
FWCI
9.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
dreams, self-consciousness, philosophy of mind, out-of-body experiences, full-body illusion, first-person perspective, mind wandering, embodiment, interdisciplinary research agenda

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