Internally directed cognition and mindfulness: an integrative perspective derived from predictive and reactive control systems theory
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 83 of the 83 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In the present paper, we will apply the predictive and reactive control systems (PARCS) theory as a framework that integrates competing theories of neural substrates of awareness by describing the "default mode network" (DMN) and anterior insula (AI) as parts of two different behavioral and homeostatic control systems. The DMN, a network that becomes active at rest when there is no external stimulation or task to perform, has been implicated in self-reflective awareness and prospection. By contrast, the AI is associated with awareness and task-related attention. This has led to competing theories stressing the role of the DMN in self-awareness vs. the role of interoceptive and emotional information integration in the AI in awareness of the emotional moment. In PARCS, the respective functions of the DMN and AI in a specific control system explains their association with different qualities of awareness, and how mental states can shift from one state (e.g., prospective self-reflection) to the other (e.g., awareness of the emotional moment) depending on the relative dominance of control systems. These shifts between reactive and predictive control are part of processes that enable the intake of novel information, integration of this novel information within existing knowledge structures, and the creation of a continuous personal context in which novel information can be integrated and understood. As such, PARCS can explain key characteristics of mental states, such as their temporal and spatial focus (e.g., a focus on the here and now vs. the future; a first person vs. a third person perspective). PARCS further relates mental states to brain states and functions, such as activation of the DMN or hemispheric asymmetry in frontal cortical functions. Together, PARCS deepens the understanding of a broad range of mental states, including mindfulness, mind wandering, rumination, autobiographical memory, imagery, and the experience of self.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348 · Cited by 11,929
How do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 13×
“PARCS suggests the DMN (together with the dorsal executive network) – beyond being involved with such inactive states – to be part of a predictive control system.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialBarsalou, L. W. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639 · Cited by 5,936 · cited 2×
“Indeed, in Section “The Wandering Mind,” we discriminated ruminative and prospective mind wandering purely on the basis of different (and sometimes even opposite) correlates.”
BackgroundWhatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 2×
“This reactive control from the let IFG/AI hijacks areas that have access to internal models for elaborate processing.”
BackgroundSaliency, switching, attention and control: a network model of insula function
Menon, V., & Uddin, L. Q. (2010) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-010-0262-0 · Cited by 5,592
The reorienting system of the human brain: from environment to theory of mind
Corbetta, M., Patel, G., & Shulman, G. L. (2008) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.04.017 · Cited by 3,889 · cited 3×
“Some of those signals may be detected in the IFG/AI that subsequently interrupts predictive control (cf. Tucker et al.,2003; Corbetta et al.,2008; Menon and Uddin, 2010).”
BackgroundResultConflict monitoring and anterior cingulate cortex: an update
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.003 · Cited by 3,623
Etkin, A., & Wager, T. D. (2007) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.2007.07030504 · Cited by 3,391 · cited 2×
“This may explain why individuals with anxiety disorders exhibit elevated right AI activity (Etkin and Wager, 2007).”
BackgroundThe effect of emotion on cue utilization and the organization of behavior
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0047707 · Cited by 3,090 · cited 2×
“However, activity in this area is inversely correlated in functional-imaging studies with the activation in the AI that is associated with 2At high arousal, increased narrowing of attentional focus may induce an objectcentered instead of first person perspective (Easterbrook, 1959; Tucker, 2001).”
BackgroundPhilosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 6×
“By contrast, PARCS suggests that prospective mind wandering reflects predictive control function, while rumination sometimes reflects elaborative reappraisal that aims to facilitate future predictive control by resolving incongruence of information with internal models (Andrews and Thomson, 2009).”
BackgroundInfluential
Cited by
Kanske, P., Böckler, A., Trautwein, F.-M., & Singer, T. (2015) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.07.082 · Cited by 421
“…similarity of the empathy and ToM related networks with the so called task-control and default mode network, respectively, would suggest that the task-based activation peaks are embedded in these domain-general networks (Buckner et al., 2011; Tops et al., 2014; Wen et al., 2012; Yeo et al., 2011).”
InfluentialLippelt, D. P., Hommel, B., & Colzato, L. S. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01083 · Cited by 278
Being someone: the integrated self as a neuropsychological system.
Kuhl, J., Quirin, M., & Koole, S. L. (2015) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12162 · Cited by 180
Self-citationOttaviani, C., Shahabi, L., Tarvainen, M., Cook, I., Abrams, M., & Shapiro, D. (2015) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2014.00433 · Cited by 140
Berry, M. P., Lutz, J., Schuman-Olivier, Z., Germer, C., Pollak, S., Edwards, R. R., Gardiner, P., Desbordes, G., & Napadow, V. (2020) · Pain Medicine · doi:10.1093/pm/pnaa178 · Cited by 45
Metadata
- Authors
- Tops, M., Boksem, M. A. S., Quirin, M., IJzerman, H., & Koole, S. L.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2014-05-20
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 429-429
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2081113714
- Cited by
- 83
- References
- 83
- FWCI
- 16.41
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.