A Deeper Look at the “Neural Correlate of Consciousness”
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A main goal of the neuroscience of consciousness is: find the neural correlate to conscious experiences (NCC). When have we achieved this goal? The answer depends on our operationalization of "NCC." Chalmers (2000) shaped the widely accepted operationalization according to which an NCC is a neural system with a state which is minimally sufficient (but not necessary) for an experience. A deeper look at this operationalization reveals why it might be unsatisfactory: (i) it is not an operationalization of a correlate for occurring experiences, but of the capacity to experience; (ii) it is unhelpful for certain cases which are used to motivate a search for neural correlates of consciousness; (iii) it does not mirror the usage of "NCC" by scientists who seek for unique correlates; (iv) it hardly allows for a form of comparative testing of hypotheses, namely experimenta crucis. Because of these problems (i-iv), we ought to amend or improve on Chalmers's operationalization. Here, I present an alternative which avoids these problems. This "NCC2.0" also retains some benefits of Chalmers's operationalization, namely being compatible with contributions from extended, embedded, enacted, or embodied accounts (4E-accounts) and allowing for the possibility of non-biological or artificial experiencers.
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Cites
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“According to Kuhn (2012), such “boundary work” (cf. Gieryn, 1983) is a sign of a science’s transformation from a pre-paradigmatic stage to a “normal science.””
BackgroundThe distinct modes of vision offered by feedforward and recurrent processing
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“Recurrent processing of the first stimulus is suppressed by the feedforward sweep elicited by the second stimulus, producing a kind of backward masking (Lamme and Roelfsma, 2000; Lamme et al., 2002).”
BackgroundAn information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 8×
“…theory: “Thus, the theory predicts that a brain where no neurons were activated, but were kept ready to respond in a differentiated manner to different perturbations, would be conscious (perhaps that nothing was going on)” (Tononi, 2004, p. 19) “Inactive elements specify the shape of a quale.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialPlasticity during stroke recovery: from synapse to behaviour
Murphy, T. H., & Corbett, D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2735 · Cited by 1,938 · cited 1×
“…cases of plasticity, where patients regain the capability for certain experiences after a lesion just like they may regain certain cognitive functions (see e.g., Borgstein and Grootendorst, 2002; Stein and Hoffman, 2003; Wieloch and Nikolich, 2006; Murphy and Corbett, 2009; Wittenburg, 2010).”
BackgroundConsciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
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Crick, F., & Koch, C. (2003) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn0203-119 · Cited by 1,492 · cited 3×
“(Crick and Koch, 2003, p. 124) the mere-sufficiency-constraint.11 If we want to capture the intended uniqueness of NCCs, we have to amend Chalmers’s operationalization.”
BackgroundTowards a true neural stance on consciousness
Lamme, V. A. F. (2006) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2006.09.001 · Cited by 1,149 · cited 3×
“…Recurrent Processing Hypothesis (RPH), according to which the occurrence of consciousness depends on recurrent processing (see Supèr et al., 2001; Lamme, 2004, 2006); and the Integrated Information Hypothesis (IIH), according to which the occurrence of consciousness depends on integrated…”
BackgroundFrom the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 · Cited by 1,128
Two neural correlates of consciousness
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Cited by
Predictive processing as a systematic basis for identifying the neural correlates of consciousness
Hohwy, J., & Seth, A. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.ii.64 · Cited by 170
The search for the neural correlate of consciousness: Progress and challenges
Lepauvre, A., & Melloni, L. (2021) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2021.87 · Cited by 38
“…to the description of phenomenal qualities through their invariants, puts forward that the mathematical structure of phenomenal domains ought to be preserved in the NCC proper, thus constraining the NCC proper beyond simple correlation, offering promising empirical perspectives (Fink et al., 2021).”
BackgroundToward a mature science of consciousness
Wiese, W. (2018) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00693 · Cited by 28
Wiese, W., & Friston, K. J. (2021) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2021.81 · Cited by 27
Evolving consciousness: insights from Turing, and the shaping of experience.
Lacalli, T. (2020) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2020.598561 · Cited by 15
Lacalli, T. (2021) · Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnsys.2021.697129 · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Fink, F.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Psychology
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2016
- Volume
- 7
- Pages
- 1044-1044
- ISSN
- 1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2483613126
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 4.93
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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