Cited by 29Philosophy and Theoretical ScienceEmbodied and Extended CognitionMental Health and Psychiatry

Toward a mature science of consciousness

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Wiese, Wanja·2018·Frontiers in Psychology

Abstract

In \textit{Being No One}, Thomas \citet{Metzinger2003being} introduces an approach to the scientific study of consciousness that draws on theories and results from different disciplines, targeted at multiple levels of analysis. Descriptions and assumptions formulated at, for instance, the phenomenological, representationalist, and neurobiological levels of analysis provide different perspectives on the same phenomenon, which can ultimately yield necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of phenomenal representation. In this way, the ``method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (MICS)'' (as it has been called by Josh Weisberg, \citeyear{Weisberg2005consciousness}) promotes our understanding of consciousness. However, even more than a decade after the first publication of \textit{Being No One}, we still lack a mature science of consciousness. This paper makes the following meta-theoretical contribution: It analyzes the hurdles an approach such as MICS has yet to overcome and discusses to what extent existing approaches solve the problems left open by MICS. Furthermore, it argues that a unifying theory of different features of consciousness is required to reach a mature science of consciousness.

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  • The lack of consensus about the relevant phenomena for a scientific theory of consciousness is likely a product of vastly divergent intuitions about which features of mental life should be included within a scientific conception of consciousness.

    “This lack of consensus is perhaps somewhat surprising given our own intimate acquaintance with conscious experience (Chalmers, 1996; Wiese, 2018), but likely a product of vastly divergent intuitions about which features of mental life should be included within a scientific conception of consciousness (and how they ought to be operationalised for scientific investigation; Irvine, 2017; Phillips, 20”
  • Although the findings of a few experiments are seldom sufficient to definitively refute an entire theory, such data are expected to inform the debate (and future research) by clarifying which theory enjoys the most empirical support.

    “Although the findings of a few experiments are seldom sufficient to definitively refute an entire theory -perhaps no bad thing considering the relative immaturity of consciousness science (Evers et al., 2024; Negro et al., 2024; Wiese, 2018) -such data are expected to inform the debate (and future research) by clarifying which theory enjoys the most empirical support (Corcoran et al., 2023).”

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Research works printed but not linked: 5

  1. Hill C. S. (1991). Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy; Cambridge University Press.
  2. Seth A. K. (2015a). Chapter 35: The cybernetic Bayesian brain: from interoceptive inference to sensorimotor contingencies, in Open MIND, eds Metzinger T. Windt J. M. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group), 1– 24.
  3. Seth A. K. (2015b). Chapter 35: Inference to the best prediction, in Open MIND, eds Metzinger T. K. Windt J. M. (Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group), 1– 8.
  4. Weisberg J. (2005). Consciousness constrained. Psyche 11, 1– 20. Available online at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/bd58/242a97515618c55fa165aaabf5325989ef16.pdf
  5. Yoshimi J. (2016). Phenomenology and philosophy of mind, in Prospects for a Naturalized Phenomenology, eds Dahlstrom D. O. Elpidorou A. Hopp W. (New York, NY; London: Routledge), 287– 309.

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Authors
Wiese, W.
Affiliations
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz (DE)
Corresponding author
Wiese, Wanja
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2018-05-29
Volume
9
Pages
693-693
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2800791222
Cited by
28
References
73
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 7 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 1
FWCI
5.24
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
Keywords
consciousness, levels of analysis, phenomenology, representationalism, neuroscience of consciousness, Thomas Metzinger

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