Why Is Virtual Reality Interesting for Philosophers?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article explores promising points of contact between philosophy and the expanding field of virtual reality research. Aiming at an interdisciplinary audience, it proposes a series of new research targets by presenting a range of concrete examples characterized by high theoretical relevance and heuristic fecundity. Among these examples are conscious experience itself, “Bayesian” and social VR, amnestic re-embodiment, merging human-controlled avatars and virtual agents, virtual ego-dissolution, controlling the reality/virtuality continuum, the confluence of VR and artificial intelligence (AI) as well as of VR and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), VR-based social hallucinations and the emergence of a virtual Lebenswelt, religious faith and practical phenomenology. Hopefully, these examples can serve as first proposals for intensified future interaction and mark out some potential new directions for research.
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Citations
Cites
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 6×
“If we assume a “predictive processing” model of human brain activity (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016; Metzinger and Wiese, 2017), then, for all human beings, C is always counterfactual content because it does not refer to the currently present, actual state of the world.”
BackgroundInfluentialHow do you feel — now? The anterior insula and human awareness
(Bud) Craig, A. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2555 · Cited by 6,657 · cited 1×
“The interoceptive self-model is that layer of bodily self-representation in the brain that is driven by internal signals from the viscera and other areas signaling the state of the body to the brain (Craig, 2009; Barrett and Simmons, 2015).”
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Interoceptive predictions in the brain
Barrett, L. F., & Simmons, W. K. (2015) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3950 · Cited by 1,766 · cited 1×
“The interoceptive self-model is that layer of bodily self-representation in the brain that is driven by internal signals from the viscera and other areas signaling the state of the body to the brain (Craig, 2009; Barrett and Simmons, 2015).”
BackgroundSurfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind
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Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-consciousness
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Blanke, O. (2012) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3292 · Cited by 1,147
Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060
Self-citationThe experimental induction of out-of-body experiences
Ehrsson, H. H. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1142175 · Cited by 959
Cited by
Virtual reality in the diagnostic and therapy for mental disorders: A systematic review
Wiebe, A., Kannen, K., Selaskowski, B., Mehren, A., Thöne, A.-K., Pramme, L., Blumenthal, N., Li, M., Asché, L., Jonas, S., et al. (2022) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2022.102213 · Cited by 223
Artificial suffering: an argument for a global moratorium on synthetic phenomenology
Metzinger, T. (2021) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s270507852150003x · Cited by 182
Self-citationEmbodying Metaverse as artificial life: At the intersection of media and 4E cognition theories
Uspenski, I., & Guga, J. (2022) · Filozofija i drustvo · doi:10.2298/fid2202326u · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Metzinger, T. K.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Robotics and AI
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2018-09-13
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 101-101
- ISSN
- 2296-9144 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2889995610
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 5.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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