Why Is Virtual Reality Interesting for Philosophers?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This article explores promising points of contact between philosophy and the expanding field of virtual reality research. Aiming at an interdisciplinary audience, it proposes a series of new research targets by presenting a range of concrete examples characterized by high theoretical relevance and heuristic fecundity. Among these examples are conscious experience itself, “Bayesian” and social VR, amnestic re-embodiment, merging human-controlled avatars and virtual agents, virtual ego-dissolution, controlling the reality/virtuality continuum, the confluence of VR and artificial intelligence (AI) as well as of VR and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), VR-based social hallucinations and the emergence of a virtual Lebenswelt, religious faith and practical phenomenology. Hopefully, these examples can serve as first proposals for intensified future interaction and mark out some potential new directions for research.
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Citations
Cites
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Background
Cited by
Virtual reality in the diagnostic and therapy for mental disorders: A systematic review
Wiebe, A., Kannen, K., Selaskowski, B., Mehren, A., Thöne, A.-K., Pramme, L., Blumenthal, N., Li, M., Asché, L., Jonas, S., et al. (2022) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2022.102213 · Cited by 223
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Self-citationEmbodying Metaverse as artificial life: At the intersection of media and 4E cognition theories
Uspenski, I., & Guga, J. (2022) · Filozofija i drustvo · doi:10.2298/fid2202326u · Cited by 11
Metadata
- Authors
- Metzinger, T. K.
- Venue
- Frontiers in Robotics and AI
- Publisher
- Frontiers Media SA
- Published
- 2018-09-13
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 101-101
- ISSN
- 2296-9144 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2889995610
- Cited by
- 81
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 5.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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