Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis
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Abstract
This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there is no singular interpretation of the FEP for thinking about the relation between life and mind. Some FEP formulations express what we call an independence view of life and mind. One independence view is a cognitivist view of the FEP. It turns on information processing with semantic content, thus restricting the range of systems capable of exhibiting mentality. Other independence views exemplify what we call an overly generous non-cognitivist view of the FEP, and these appear to go in the opposite direction. That is, they imply that mentality is nearly everywhere. The paper proceeds to argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its implications for thinking about the relation between life and mind, can be usefully constrained by key ideas in recent enactive approaches to cognitive science. We conclude that the most compelling account of the relationship between life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this continuity is based on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic).
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“This construction implies that a living system is composed of Markov blankets of Markov blankets [8]—reaching all the way down to cellular organelles and DNA [9] and all the way out to elements of the environment [10].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [10]
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Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Wollongong (AU)
- Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (MX)
- Corresponding author
- Kirchhoff, Michael D.
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2017-04-14
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 169
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2606442355
- Cited by
- 114
- References
- 55
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 6
- FWCI
- 6.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Research Online (University of Wollongong) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Australian Research Council (DP170102987)
- John Templeton Foundation
- UNAM-DGAPA-PAPIIT (IA104717)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- free energy principle, autopoiesis, adaptivity, enactive cognition, cognitivism, information processing, semantic content, mentalities
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