Where There is Life There is Mind: In Support of a Strong Life-Mind Continuity Thesis
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Abstract
This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there is no singular interpretation of the FEP for thinking about the relation between life and mind. Some FEP formulations express what we call an independence view of life and mind. One independence view is a cognitivist view of the FEP. It turns on information processing with semantic content, thus restricting the range of systems capable of exhibiting mentality. Other independence views exemplify what we call an overly generous non-cognitivist view of the FEP, and these appear to go in the opposite direction. That is, they imply that mentality is nearly everywhere. The paper proceeds to argue that non-cognitivist FEP, and its implications for thinking about the relation between life and mind, can be usefully constrained by key ideas in recent enactive approaches to cognitive science. We conclude that the most compelling account of the relationship between life and mind treats them as strongly continuous, and that this continuity is based on particular concepts of life (autopoiesis and adaptivity) and mind (basic and non-semantic).
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“This construction implies that a living system is composed of Markov blankets of Markov blankets [8]—reaching all the way down to cellular organelles and DNA [9] and all the way out to elements of the environment [10].”
From The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle (2018) · cites this paper as [10]
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Schlicht, T. (2018) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.11 · Cited by 5
Where There Is Life There Is Mind… And Free Energy Minimisation?
Bogotá, J. D. (2024) · Interdisciplinary evolution research · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-70847-3_8 · Cited by 2
Transformative creativity in life: an epigenetic perspective based on biological autonomy
Zong, N. (2025) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04908-1 · Cited by 2
“Biological normativity, regardless of how it is explained, is hypothesized to be continuous with human-level norms (Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017; Oest, 2024).”
Friedrich, J., & Fischer, M. H. (2026) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-026-09773-0 · Cited by 2
“More specifically, under the free-energy formulation (Kirchhoff, 2018 ; Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017), the emergence of cognition is an augmentation in which organisms progress from their phenotype being a model of the environment to the nervous system maintaining a model of the environment.”
Piekarski, M. (2017) · Avant · doi:10.26913/80302017.0112.0001 · Cited by 4
The Natural Philosophy of Experiencing
Prentner, R. (2018) · Philosophies · doi:10.3390/philosophies3040035 · Cited by 4
An instrumentalist take on the models of the Free-Energy Principle
Pisano, N. A. (2023) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04111-8 · Cited by 4
Conscious enactive computationPreprint
Estrada, D. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1812.02578 · Cited by 2
“ems [5,6], with the promise of a consistent and unified explanatory framework across the full range of biological processes, from the biomechanics of single-celled organisms to ecologies and societies [18,26,44]. Despite the emphasis on biological complexity, enactivism has from its inception maintained a robust resear…”
BackgroundConscious artificial intelligence and biological naturalism
Seth, A. (2025) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/tz6an_v2 · Cited by 3
From What Is to What If to Let’s Try: a Treasure-Box for the Playful Academic
Lübbert, A., Heimann, K. S., & Gonzalez-Fernandez, P. (2021) · The Journal of Play in Adulthood · doi:10.5920/jpa.875 · Cited by 1
Phenomenological Anchors: Mapping Experiences of Agency and Ownership
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0007 · Cited by 1
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0001 · Cited by 1
Gallagher, S. (2023) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198873068.003.0002 · Cited by 1
Rethinking normativity with the free energy principle in light of interactivism
Piekarski, M. (2026) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1007/s11097-025-10135-x · Cited by 1
“While critics (e.g., Bickhard, 2015b; Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017) remain skeptical of its status as a general theory of life, the present argument does not rely on such generality.”
It Doesn’t Mean a Thing (If It Ain’t a Living Thing)
Rolla, G., & Figueiredo, N. M. (2026) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s2705078526400047 · Cited by 1
Spór o ciągłość życia i umysłu. Argumenty na rzecz kognitywizmu
Piekarski, M. (2021) · Argument Biannual Philosophical Journal · doi:10.24917/20841043.11.1.4 · Cited by 1
“Ciągłość życia i umysłu jest zatem wynikiem bezpośredniej normatywnej relacji zachodzącej pomiędzy podstawowymi wymiarami życia (autopojetycznymi) a podstawowymi wymiarami umysłowości (bezpośrednio intencjonalnej, pozbawionej treści i semantyki) (Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017: 16).”
BackgroundInfluentialDodig-Crnković, G. (2020) · Proceedings · doi:10.3390/proceedings47010030 · Cited by 1
“Even with contributions of many others working on the EEEE paradigm [11–13], this development is still not adequately reflected in the view of cognition found in major commonly shared knowledge repositories, such as encyclopedias.”
BackgroundDevelopmental Bioelectricity as an Explanatory Framework for Cognition and Meaning
Pietarinen, A., Beni, M. D., & Shumilina, V. (2025) · Biosemiotics · doi:10.1007/s12304-025-09593-2 · Cited by 3
“Peirce’s synechism implies that cognition is, together with habit-taking tendencies, the other explanatory element not altogether absent from whatever form of life one is investigating (see e.g. Paolucci, 2021 ; Kirchhoff & Froese, 2017, for supporting views).”
Krytyka natywizmu jawnego i ukrytego w badaniach nad dziecięcymi teoriami umysłu
Mirski, R. (2019) · Psychologia Rozwojowa · doi:10.4467/20843879pr.19.007.10890 · Cited by 1
A little more social enaction than that: comment on Arango (2019)
McGann, M. (2019) · Adaptive Behavior · doi:10.1177/1059712319830650 · Cited by 1
Autocatakinesis systems in drug discovery
Bueno, J. (2020) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-817613-9.00009-2
Dodig-Crnković, G. (2020) · International Society for the Study of Information Summit (IS4SI Summit) · doi:10.3390/proceedings2020047030
Two Widespread Scientistic ParalogismsPreprint
Derome, D. (2021) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3723038
Worlds Apart: Are We Enclosed Inside Our Heads?
Sepúlveda-Pedro, M. A. (2023) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20282-7_2
Sense-Making as Place-Norms: Inhabiting the World with Others
Sepúlveda-Pedro, M. A. (2022) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20282-7_6
Metadata
- Authors
- Kirchhoff, M. D., & Froese, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Wollongong (AU)
- Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (MX)
- Corresponding author
- Kirchhoff, Michael D.
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2017-04-14
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 169
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2606442355
- Cited by
- 114
- References
- 55
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 9 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 8 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 6
- FWCI
- 6.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Entropy (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Research Online (University of Wollongong) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Australian Research Council (DP170102987)
- John Templeton Foundation
- UNAM-DGAPA-PAPIIT (IA104717)
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- free energy principle, autopoiesis, adaptivity, enactive cognition, cognitivism, information processing, semantic content, mentalities
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.