Integrated Information Theory and Isomorphic Feed-Forward Philosophical Zombies
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Any theory amenable to scientific inquiry must have testable consequences. This minimal criterion is uniquely challenging for the study of consciousness, as we do not know if it is possible to confirm via observation from the outside whether or not a physical system knows what it feels like to have an inside—a challenge referred to as the “hard problem” of consciousness. To arrive at a theory of consciousness, the hard problem has motivated development of phenomenological approaches that adopt assumptions of what properties consciousness has based on first-hand experience and, from these, derive the physical processes that give rise to these properties. A leading theory adopting this approach is Integrated Information Theory (IIT), which assumes our subjective experience is a “unified whole”, subsequently yielding a requirement for physical feedback as a necessary condition for consciousness. Here, we develop a mathematical framework to assess the validity of this assumption by testing it in the context of isomorphic physical systems with and without feedback. The isomorphism allows us to isolate changes in Φ without affecting the size or functionality of the original system. Indeed, the only mathematical difference between a “conscious” system with Φ > 0 and an isomorphic “philosophical zombie” with Φ = 0 is a permutation of the binary labels used to internally represent functional states. This implies Φ is sensitive to functionally arbitrary aspects of a particular labeling scheme, with no clear justification in terms of phenomenological differences. In light of this, we argue any quantitative theory of consciousness, including IIT, should be invariant under isomorphisms if it is to avoid the existence of isomorphic philosophical zombies and the epistemological problems they pose.
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Citations
Cites
I.—COMPUTING MACHINERY AND INTELLIGENCE
TURING, A. M. (1950) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/lix.236.433 · Cited by 10,290 · cited 2×
“uishable from conscious systems, but nonetheless, lack subjective experience as a consequence of their internal architecture. The existence of philosophical zombies is epistemologically controversial [11,12] and therefore poses a challenge to any candidate theory of consciousness that admits them, including IIT. In re…”
BackgroundFacing up to the problem of consciousness
Chalmers, D. J. (1996) · Toward a Science of Consciousness · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6860.003.0003 · Cited by 1,966
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi, G. (2004) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-5-42 · Cited by 1,958 · cited 1×
“As such, it is possible for one to accept the phenomenological axioms of the theory without accepting Φ as the correct quantification of these axioms and, indeed IIT has undergone several revisions in an attempt to better reflect the phenomenological axioms in the proposed construction of Φ [5,8,9].”
BackgroundConsciousness as integrated information: a provisional manifesto
Tononi, G. (2008) · The Biological Bulletin · doi:10.2307/25470707 · Cited by 1,529
From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: integrated information theory 3.0
Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tononi, G. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588 · Cited by 1,128
Neural correlates of consciousness in humans
Rees, G., Kreiman, G., & Koch, C. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn783 · Cited by 742
Integrated information in discrete dynamical systems: motivation and theoretical framework
Balduzzi, D., & Tononi, G. (2008) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000091 · Cited by 419 · cited 1×
“As such, it is possible for one to accept the phenomenological axioms of the theory without accepting Φ as the correct quantification of these axioms and, indeed, IIT has undergone several revisions in an attempt to better reflect the phenomenological axioms in the proposed construction of Φ [5,8,9].”
BackgroundAlgebraic Theory of Machines. I. Prime Decomposition Theorem for Finite Semigroups and Machines
Krohn, K., & Rhodes, J. (1965) · Transactions of the American Mathematical Society · doi:10.1090/s0002-9947-1965-0188316-1 · Cited by 327 · cited 2×
“In what follows, we point to the Krohn-Rhodes [14,15] theorem and other feed-forward decomposition techniques [13], which prove that there is nothing inherently special about feedback from a functional perspective, aside from the fact that it often allows for a more efficient representation.”
BackgroundMethodThe unfolding argument: Why IIT and other causal structure theories cannot explain consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., Hess, K., & Herzog, M. H. (2019) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2019.04.002 · Cited by 140 · cited 1×
“Because feed-forward NNs can act as universal approximators, they can emulate the behavior of any system with feedback in a way that qualifies as a philosophical zombie [6,13].”
BackgroundImproved measures of integrated information
Tegmark, M. (2016) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005123 · Cited by 128 · cited 1×
“As Tegmark [18] points out, mathematical measures of integrated information, including Φ , quantify the inability to decompose a transition probability matrix M into two independent processes M A and M B .”
Background
Cited by
Hard criteria for empirical theories of consciousness
Doerig, A., Schurger, A., & Herzog, M. H. (2021) · Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/17588928.2020.1772214 · Cited by 194
“As a consequence, the unfolding argument challenges causal structure theories because, if one accepts that two functionally identical systems can have different consciousness, these ToCs cannot be addressed empirically, and are therefore outside the realm of science (see Doerig, Schurger, et al. (2019) for a detailed…”
BackgroundBrain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument.
Kleiner, J. (2019) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/jdcfh · Cited by 37
Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument
Kleiner, J. (2020) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2020.102981 · Cited by 37
First-person experience cannot rescue causal structure theories from the unfolding argument
Herzog, M. H., Schurger, A., & Doerig, A. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2021.103261 · Cited by 14
“First, the UA applies not only to entire human brains, but also to sub-parts of the brain (see DR1 and Doerig et al., 2019), and to smaller systems easily implementable with unrolled networks, such as our robots example or the examples of Hanson and Walker (2020).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialFormalizing falsification for theories of consciousness across computational hierarchies
Hanson, J. R., & Walker, S. I. (2021) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niab014 · Cited by 16
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Hanson, J. R., & Walker, S. I.
- Venue
- Entropy
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2019-11-02
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 1073
- ISSN
- 1099-4300 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2986131527
- Cited by
- 8
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 1.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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