AI-Based Anomaly Detection in Industrial Control and Cyber–Physical Systems: A Data-Type-Oriented Systematic Review
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 132 of the 132 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 149 of the 461 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
A systematic review of anomaly detection in industrial control and cyber-physical systems that highlights benchmark concentration, label sparsity, concept drift, and insufficient consideration of real-time resource-constrained environments.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This PRISMA-based systematic review analyzes 89 primary studies (2021–2025) on AI-based anomaly detection in ICS/CPS, organizing them by five data modalities: network traffic, process, simulation, hybrid, and other auxiliary data. It finds complementary strengths across modalities but persistent limitations in benchmark diversity, zero-day generalization, label sparsity, concept drift, and real-time OT deployment.
Key findings
- The review included 89 studies; publication counts by year were 2021: 12, 2022: 16, 2023: 15, 2024: 23, and 2025: 23; by reference type, 68 journal articles and 21 conference proceedings.
- Network traffic data mainly supports cyber-layer monitoring (e.g., reconnaissance, DoS, MITM), while process data targets physical-layer anomalies (e.g., process disturbances, FDI, stealth deviations); simulation and hybrid data support rare-scenario generation and cyber-physical consistency checking.
- Reported performance examples include ADT achieving F1 scores of 0.995–0.999 on SWaT, WADI, and HAI; Li et al. reporting average F1 above 91% across seven CPS datasets; Wang et al. reporting approximately 90% detection accuracy with 2–4 min average detection delay; and Kus et al. finding recall for unseen attack families as low as 3.2–14.7%.
- Future directions identified are multi-domain dataset development, physics- and control-informed model design, hybrid-data-driven integrated detection, and lightweight edge deployment.
Methods
- PRISMA 2020 systematic literature review; the review protocol was not registered. Searches covered Web of Science, Scopus, IEEE Xplore, and the ACM Digital Library, plus a Google Scholar manual search, for studies published 1 January 2021–31 October 2025.
- Eligibility required English-language, peer-reviewed conference or journal studies presenting an anomaly detection technique based on a specific dataset type and addressing cyber-attack anomaly detection for ICS/CPS; exclusions included studies without objective evaluation, device-fault or physical-behavior anomalies, secondary research, and general IT-only studies.
- Screening began with 225 records; 22 duplicates and 6 out-of-period records were removed, 40 were excluded at title/abstract screening, 37 at full-text evaluation, 120 underwent quality assessment, 31 were excluded for insufficient methodological details, and 89 were included. Data extraction used an EBSE-based form; two authors extracted data and the remaining authors cross-validated.
Limitations
- Stated: heavy reliance on a small number of benchmark datasets and narrowly scoped testbeds; scarcity of long-term, multi-domain datasets; label sparsity and concept drift; and evaluation methodologies that insufficiently account for real-world OT operating conditions and resource constraints.
- Stated: the review protocol was not registered in any database.
- Stated in the PRISMA checklist: no statistical meta-analysis, no formal reporting-bias assessment, and certainty of evidence was not formally graded; risk of bias was not specifically tabulated, only described generally.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
100 Valid · 7 Not valid · 118 Not checked · 132 Own results and interpretations
At least one cited source doesn’t support this claim or points to a different paper, and none confirmed it — see the verdicts below.
In the paper
“Third, in terms of detection capability and failure modes, the results indicate that prediction-residual-oriented methods are powerful for detecting subtle and coordinated process anomalies, including multi-point stealthy attacks that forge SCADA histories or slowly drive the system toward unsafe states [69,72,73,75,76].”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [69] Li, S., Liu, J., Pan, Z., Lv, S., Si, S., and Sun, L. (2022, January 20–22). Anomaly detection based on robust spatial-temporal modeling for industrial control systems. Proceedings of the 2022 IEEE 19th International Conference on Mobile Ad Hoc and Smart Systems (MASS), Denver, CO, USA. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [72] Xu, 2025, PLC-MDT: A Framework for Detecting Anomalies with Digital Twins of Industrial Control Systems, IEEE Sens. J. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [73] Badihi, 2022, Smart cyber-attack diagnosis and mitigation in a wind farm network operator, IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform. source
- Disputedcites [75] Ndonda, 2022, Exploiting the temporal behavior of state transitions for intrusion detection in ICS/SCADA, IEEE Access sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In the SWaT evaluation results (section labeled “1) Description”; page not provided), the paper says the prediction-based AR-IDS detected only a small number of attacks and was better suited to sudden changes than to attacks that develop slowly. It specifically reports that AR-IDS missed a subtle attack that increased a sensor value slightly each second. The copy does not establish the claim about forged SCADA histories or coordinated multi-point attacks. (LLM, conf=0.90)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
- Could not verifycites [76] Song, Y., Huang, H., Wei, Q., Liu, L., and Wei, Z. (2025, January 14–16). TSMixAD: A Time-Series Anomaly Detection Framework for Industrial Control Systems Incorporating Time-Frequency Domain Data Augmentation Techniques. Proceedings of the 2025 6th International Conference on Computer Information and Big Data Applications, Wuhan, China. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 4.3 reports that TSMixAD detects anomalies on SWaT and WADI, while Section 3.3 describes training with cross-entropy loss. Neither passage addresses the claimed capability of prediction-residual-oriented methods to detect coordinated or stealthy attacks. Searches for prediction residuals, forged SCADA histories, and gradual unsafe-state attacks found no supporting passage in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.77)
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Some cited sources support this claim and some don’t — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“By focusing on joint behavior across multiple sensors and control channels, correlation-based detectors can better separate cyber-physical attacks, which often produce inconsistent or coordinated manipulation patterns, from natural faults that follow typical failure correlations or fault signatures [91,95,96,100,101].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [91] Benson, 2025, Adaptive learning anomaly detection and classification model for cyber and physical threats in industrial control systems, IET Cyber-Phys. Syst. Theory Appl. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
- Partly supportedcites [95] Epiphaniou, 2022, Super learner ensemble for anomaly detection and cyber-risk quantification in industrial control systems, IEEE Internet Things J. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [96] Liu, 2025, Time-Series Multi-Instance Learning for Weakly Supervised Industrial Fault Detection, IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [100] Ulybyshev, D., Yilmaz, I., Northern, B., Kholodilo, V., and Rogers, M. (2021, January 28). Trustworthy data analysis and sensor data protection in cyber-physical systems. Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Cyber-Physical Systems (SaT-CPS ’21), Online. source
- Disputedcites [101] Murugesan, N., Velu, A.N., Palaniappan, B.S., Sukumar, B., and Hossain, M.J. (2024). Mitigating missing rate and early cyberattack discrimination using optimal statistical approach with machine learning techniques in a smart grid. Energies, 17. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 1 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Traditional rule-based detection methods exhibit clear limitations in detecting unknown zero-day attacks or stealthy attacks that exploit dynamic system characteristics [8].”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [8] Khraisat, 2019, Survey of intrusion detection systems: Techniques, datasets and challenges, Cybersecurity sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Signature-based intrusion detection systems section says signature-based methods struggle with zero-day attacks because no matching signature exists, and that polymorphic and targeted attacks further weaken them. The Knowledge-based techniques section says rule-based profiles need regular updates in dynamically changing environments. The paper does not specifically say that stealthy attacks exploit dynamic system characteristics. (LLM, conf=0.82)
states a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“In these scenarios, coarse-grained traffic statistics and entropy measures are sufficient to expose abnormal behavior without requiring deep protocol parsing [13,21,28,32].”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] Malathi, 2024, Enhancing trustworthiness among iot network nodes with ensemble deep learning-based cyber attack detection, Expert Syst. Appl. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [21] Zhang, 2024, Unsupervised Real-time Communication Traffic Anomaly Detection for Multi-dimensional Industrial Networks, IEEE Trans. Ind. Cyber-Phys. Syst. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [28] Yang, 2022, Stacked one-class broad learning system for intrusion detection in industry 4.0, IEEE Trans. Ind. Inform. source
- Partly supportedcites [32] Sekaran, Y., Debnath, T., Assadi, T.A., Suvvari, S.D., and Oswal, S. (2022, January 23–24). Using machine learning to detect abnormalities on modbus/TCP networks. Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Information Management & Machine Intelligence, Jaipur, India. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Preprocessing Step describes basic packet fields and two-second flow features, and the Conclusion reports high accuracy for feature sets containing packet-flow information. This supports using coarse-grained traffic features to detect anomalies in the paper’s Modbus/TCP setting. The copy does not describe entropy measures or establish that they are sufficient, and it does not explicitly compare this approach with deep protocol parsing. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, they primarily organize the literature along algorithmic, pipeline-oriented, or domain-specific dimensions and do not explicitly structure the ICS/CPS anomaly detection landscape according to the type of data used for detection.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [4] Abshari, D., and Sridhar, M. (2025). A survey of anomaly detection in cyber-physical systems. arXiv. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page unavailable) says existing surveys typically focus on specific technical approaches or application domains, supporting the algorithmic and domain-specific parts of the claim. The cited passages do not establish that existing surveys are primarily pipeline-oriented or that they lack an explicit organization by the type of data used for detection. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Partly supportedcites [5] Ji, I.H., Lee, J.H., Kang, M.J., Park, W.J., Jeon, S.H., and Seo, J.T. (2024). Artificial intelligence-based anomaly detection technology over encrypted traffic: A systematic literature review. Sensors, 24. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction (page not provided) describes this review as focused on encrypted traffic and organized around datasets, processing steps, algorithms, and performance indicators. The Discussion, §4.1 (page not provided), mentions ICS as an area lacking suitable datasets, but the paper does not assess how existing ICS/CPS surveys organize their literature. It therefore supports an example of a domain- and pipeline-oriented review, not the broader claim about existing surveys. (LLM, conf=0.82)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [6] Gaggero, 2025, Artificial intelligence and physics-based anomaly detection in the smart grid: A survey, IEEE Access source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
179 more claims · 56 with their cited sources checked
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 69
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Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ 4.4.1. Prediction-Residual-Based Anomaly Detection Study
“| | [68] | D | Uns | MLP + LSTM | DoS Malicious Command, Script Injection Parameter Injection | SWaT |”
§ 4.4.1. Prediction-Residual-Based Anomaly Detection Study
“the predictions of multiple base classifiers-such as Random Forest and XGBoost-are combined by a meta-classifier (logistic regression)”
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ 4.4.2. Reconstruction-Error-Based Anomaly Detection Studies
“| | [85] | D | Uns | KNN, Linear SVM, AE | Physical intrusion devices onCAN fieldbus | Custom-built dataset |”
§ 4.4.2. Reconstruction-Error-Based Anomaly Detection Studies
“For edge gateways in smart-grid substations and distribution boards, Zhang et al. [85] designed a lightweight CNN-LSTM-based hybrid detector that simultaneously ingests process sensor time-series (e.g., voltage, current) and local event/alarm logs.”
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ 4.4.1. Prediction-Residual-Based Anomaly Detection Study
“| | [69] | D | Uns | 1D-CNN + Multi-head Self-Attention | FDI, Sensor Spoofing, Stealthy Attack | SWaT/WADI |”
§ 4.4.1. Prediction-Residual-Based Anomaly Detection Study
“Li et al. [69] applied a Temporal Graph Convolutional Network (T-GCN) to model complex spatiotemporal correlations among sensors within ICS. The model jointly learns the spatial structure of the system (graph) and temporal dynamics (GRU)”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 4.6.1. Hybrid Data Fusion-Based Anomaly Detection Studies
“Long-Short Period Deterministic Finite Automaton (LSP-DFA)-based cyber-physical integrated anomaly detection scheme”
§ Abbreviations
“| LSP-DFA | Latent State Process-Driven Feature Analysis |”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ 4.1. Search and Study Selection Results
“Atotal of 225 studies related to AI-based anomaly detection for ICS were identified from the bibliographic databases Web of Science, Scopus, and Google Scholar”
§ 4.1. Search and Study Selection Results
“Among them, 54 studies from Web of Science, 42 from Scopus, 96 from IEEE Xplore Digital Library, 30 from the ACM Digital Library, and 3 from Google Scholar (manual search) were selected.”
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Citations
Cites
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Developing Realistic Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Attack Dataset and Taxonomy
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Cited by
Zhukabayeva, T., Ahmad, Z., Karabayev, N., et al. (2026) · Intelligence & Robotics · doi:10.20517/ir.2026.30
TGLDA: Tail-Guided Low-Density Normal Data Augmentation for Industrial Control Systems
Lee, J. H., Ji, I., Jeon, S., & Seo, J. T. (2026) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s26185948
Self-citationRadovanović, D., Marković, D., Kresoja, P., Cvetković, A. S., Radojčić, V., Šarac, M., & Savanović, N. (2026) · Machine Learning and Knowledge Extraction · doi:10.3390/make8090276 · Cited by 1
Urs, P. G., & Mureşan, V. (2026) · Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy · doi:10.3390/jcp6050158
Al-Hija’a, A. A., Szekeres, B. J., & Andó, M. (2026) · The International Journal of Advanced Manufacturing Technology · doi:10.1007/s00170-026-18904-x
Martín-Fraile, J. V., Hornillos, N. B., Sierra-García, J. E., et al. (2026) · Data in Brief · doi:10.1016/j.dib.2026.113146
“In this context, recent studies have highlighted the importance of data representation in anomaly detection for industrial CPS, particularly distinguishing between time-sampled and event-based approaches [ 1 ].”
Lv, M., Sun, X., & Yan, J. (2026) · doi:10.1109/csis-iac70275.2026.11585113
“They endow physical devices with sensing, computing, networking and autonomous capabilities, forming a closed loop of data flow from ”perception” to ”analysis” to ”decision-making, execution” and then ”perception” again, making the operation of the system more efficient and intelligent [2].”
Behavioral Anomaly Detection Framework Using AI for Intrusion Defense in Cyber-Physical Systems
Kumar, M. N., Vijayan, T., & Dr.Karthik, B. (2026) · International Conference on Electronic Systems and Intelligent Computing (ICESIC) · doi:10.1109/icesic67389.2026.11496487
“To start with, numerous methods deal with network traffic analysis without physical process consistency modeling [5].”
Zero-Overhead Covert Telemetry for Small Satellites via Quantized Housekeeping Data
Kumar, G. H., Saini, D. K. J. B., Kumar, Y. D., Prajwalasimha, S. N., Kolekar, S., & Divekar, N. (2026) · International Conference on AI-Driven Smart Systems and Ubiquitous Computing (ICAUC) · doi:10.1109/icauc68182.2026.11440940
“The adversary may compute empirical distributions, correlations, or divergence metrics over long observation windows but does not have access to onboard software or secret keys [14][15].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Seo, J. K., Lee, J., Kim, B., Shim, W., & Seo, J. T.
- Affiliations
- Gachon University (KR)
- Korea Research Institute of Ships and Ocean Engineering (KR)
- Korea Institute of Ships & Ocean Engineering, Daejeon 34103, Republic of Korea
- Corresponding author
- Seo, Jung Taek
- Venue
- Electronics
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2025-12-20
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 20
- ISSN
- 2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W7116652254
- Cited by
- 15
- References
- 115
- Citations by year
- 2026: 15
- FWCI
- 2.19
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Institute of Information & communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (RS-2023-00241376)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Fault Detection and Control Systems
- Keywords
- anomaly detection, industrial control systems, cyber-physical systems, critical infrastructure security, cyberattacks, network traffic data, operational data, simulated data, hybrid data, false data injection attacks, stealthy attacks, denial-of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, reconnaissance attacks, edge deployment, concept drift, label sparsity
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The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-07, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
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Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.