Cited by 1,288Statistical Methods and Bayesian InferenceMeta-analysis and systematic reviewsProbability and Statistical Research

The Bayesian New Statistics: Hypothesis testing, estimation, meta-analysis, and power analysis from a Bayesian perspective

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Kruschke, John K., Liddell, Torrin M.·2018·Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

Abstract

In the practice of data analysis, there is a conceptual distinction between hypothesis testing, on the one hand, and estimation with quantified uncertainty on the other. Among frequentists in psychology, a shift of emphasis from hypothesis testing to estimation has been dubbed "the New Statistics" (Cumming 2014). A second conceptual distinction is between frequentist methods and Bayesian methods. Our main goal in this article is to explain how Bayesian methods achieve the goals of the New Statistics better than frequentist methods. The article reviews frequentist and Bayesian approaches to hypothesis testing and to estimation with confidence or credible intervals. The article also describes Bayesian approaches to meta-analysis, randomized controlled trials, and power analysis.

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  • A Bayesian approach was selected because it estimates the full probability distribution of treatment effects rather than relying on binary significance testing, allowing more informative interpretation of effect sizes and uncertainty, and is well suited to small or imbalanced evidence networks.

    “A Bayesian approach was selected because it estimates the full probability distribution of treatment effects rather than relying on binary significance testing, allowing more informative interpretation of effect sizes and associated uncertainty [40, 41].”

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  1. Jeffreys, H. (1961). Theory of probability Oxford. UK: Oxford Univer- sity Press.
  2. Mayo, D.G. (2016). Don't throw out the error control baby with the bad statistics bathwater: A commentary. The American Statistician. Retrieved from doi:10.1080/00031305.2016.1154108#tabModule. · DOI
  3. Meehl, P.E. (1997). The problem is epistemology, not statistics: Replace significance tests by confidence intervals and quantify accuracy of risky numerical predictions, What if there Were no Significance Tests, 395-425, Mahwah, NJ, Erlbaum Harlow, L.L., Mulaik, S.A., & Steiger, J.H. (Eds.)
  4. Ntzoufras, I. (2009). Bayesian modeling using WinBUGHoboken S. NJ: Wiley.

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Authors
Kruschke, J. K., & Liddell, T. M.
Affiliations
Indiana University Bloomington (US)
Corresponding author
Kruschke, John K.
Venue
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
Published
2017-02-07
Volume
25
Issue
1
Pages
178-206
ISSN
  • 1069-9384 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-5320
OpenAlex
W3124625789
Cited by
1,288
References
104
Citations by year
2026: 137 · 2025: 171 · 2024: 156 · 2023: 133 · 2022: 153 · 2021: 186 · 2020: 133 · 2019: 98 · 2018: 88 · 2017: 32 · 2015: 1
FWCI
66.75
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Psychonomic Bulletin & Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • OSF Preprints (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Statistical Methods and Bayesian Inference
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty › Meta-analysis and systematic reviews
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Statistics and Probability › Probability and Statistical Research
Keywords
new statistics, Bayesian analysis, hypothesis testing, confidence intervals, credible intervals, meta-analysis, power analysis, randomized controlled trials
MeSH terms
Bayes Theorem, Humans, Research Design, Statistics as Topic, Meta-Analysis as Topic, Uncertainty

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