Fictionalism about Chatbots
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
According to widely accepted views in metasemantics, the outputs of chatbots and other artificial text generators should be meaningless. They aren’t produced with communicative intentions and the systems producing them are not following linguistic conventions. Nevertheless, chatbots have assumed roles in customer service and healthcare, they are spreading information and disinformation and, in some cases, it may be more rational to trust the outputs of bots than those of our fellow human beings. To account for the epistemic role of chatbots in our society, we need to reconcile these observations. This paper argues that our engagement with chatbots should be understood as a form of prop-oriented make-believe; the outputs of chatbots are literally meaningless but fictionally meaningful. With the make-believe approach, we can understand how chatbots can provide us with knowledge of the world through quasi-testimony while preserving our metasemantic theories. This account also helps to connect the study of chatbots with the epistemology of scientific instruments.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Searle, J. R. (1969) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173438 · Cited by 11,718
Grice, H. P. (1957) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2182440 · Cited by 2,824
A primer in BERTology: What we know about how BERT works
Rogers, A., Kovaleva, O., & Rumshisky, A. (2020) · Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics · doi:10.1162/tacl_a_00349 · Cited by 1,552
Climbing towards NLU: On Meaning, Form, and Understanding in the Age of Data
Bender, E. M., & Koller, A. (2020) · Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics · doi:10.18653/v1/2020.acl-main.463 · Cited by 1,082
What BERT Is Not: Lessons from a New Suite of Psycholinguistic Diagnostics for Language Models
Ettinger, A. (2020) · Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics · doi:10.1162/tacl_a_00298 · Cited by 511
Chatbots in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic
Miner, A. S., Laranjo, L., & Kocaballi, A. B. (2020) · npj Digital Medicine · doi:10.1038/s41746-020-0280-0 · Cited by 322
The Next Decade in AI: Four Steps Towards Robust Artificial Intelligence
Marcus, G. (2020) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2002.06177 · Cited by 297
Cited by
Hicks, M. T., Humphries, J., & Slater, J. (2024) · Ethics and Information Technology · doi:10.1007/s10676-024-09775-5 · Cited by 456
Grodniewicz, J. P., & Hohol, M. (2023) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2023.1190084 · Cited by 100
Why we need to be careful with LLMs in medicine
Bélisle-Pipon, J.-C. (2024) · Frontiers in Medicine · doi:10.3389/fmed.2024.1495582 · Cited by 91
Hallucinating with AI: Distributed Delusions and “AI Psychosis”
Osler, L. (2026) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-026-01034-3 · Cited by 21
Are Attributions of Consciousness to AI Chatbots Epistemically Innocent?
Peters, U. (2026) · Minds and Machines · doi:10.1007/s11023-026-09795-8
Metadata
- Authors
- Mallory, F.
- Venue
- Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy
- Publisher
- University of Michigan Library
- Published
- 2023-11-17
- Volume
- 10
- Issue
- 0
- ISSN
- 2330-4014 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4388751616
- Cited by
- 44
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 78.97
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fictionalism about Chatbots. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3998/ergo.4668
- The paper
- Mallory, F. (2023). Fictionalism about Chatbots. Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.4668
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.