The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence
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Abstract
Modern legislators are increasingly motivated to serve their constituents in personal ways. Representatives act like ultimate ombudsmen: they keep in close touch with their constituents and try to cultivate a relationship with them based on service and accessibility. The Personal Vote describes the behavior of representatives in the United States and Great Britain and the response of their constituents as well. It shows how congressmen and members of Parliament earn personalized support and how this attenuates their ties to national leaders and parties. The larger significance of this empirical work arises from its implications for the structure of legislative institutions and the nature of legislative action. Personalized electoral support correlates with decentralized governing institutions and special-interest policy making. Such systems tend to inconsistency and stalemate. The United States illustrates a mature case of this development, and Britain is showing the first movements in this direction with the decline of an established two-party system, the rise of a centrist third party, greater volatility in the vote, growing backbench independence and increasing backbench pressure for committees and staff. This book is essential for specialists in American national government, British politics, and comparative legislatures and comparative parties.
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Citations
Cited by
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“This logic is consistent with a substantial body of research covering the United States and Europe on the conditions under which politicians will more easily claim credit for improving access to government services (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Fiorina and Noll 1978a; 1978b; Golden 2003).”
ResultStreet-Level Political Controls Over Federal Bureaucracy
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Women's Access to Political Power in Post-Communist Europe
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“1987 , Carey and Shugart 1995 ), the personal vote earning orientation, if any, of a parliamentarian should be evident from the content of questions asked.”
BackgroundIdeology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament
SLAPIN, J. B., KIRKLAND, J. H., LAZZARO, J. A., LESLIE, P. A., & O’GRADY, T. (2018) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055417000375 · Cited by 84
“…and Garrett 1993), and that British voters value the dyadic link between themselves and their representatives (Bertelli and Dolan 2009; Bowler 2010; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Vivyan and Wagner 2012), including a representative’s independence from the party (Campbell et al. 2016; Vivyan…”
BackgroundLocal News Coverage and the Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. House
SCHAFFNER, B. F. (2006) · Legislative Studies Quarterly · doi:10.3162/036298006x201904 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Cain, B., Ferejohn, J., & Fiorina, M.
- Venue
- Harvard University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Harvard University Press
- Published
- 1987-12-31
- OpenAlex
- W4213357532
- Cited by
- 1,060
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 31.52
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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