Where Do We Stand on Locating the Self?
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The subjective location of the Self in the body is a traditionally problematic question, and it can only be addressed from the first-person perspective. However, this does not preclude an empirical approach to the question. In the present study, we examined whether a large sample of participants would be willing and able to determine the perceived location of their Self. The main goal was to assess current beliefs about the nature of the Self and its assumed relation to specific bodily organs. Eighty-seven participants indicated the center of their Self by placing crosshairs on human silhouettes and abstract, non-human silhouettes with varying anatomy. Results show a clearly dominant role of the brain and the heart for Self-location in humans, but only of the brain for Self-location in abstract creatures. Moreover, results reveal that people believe there is one single point inside the human body where their Self is located.
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Citations
Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/58.1.7 · Cited by 6,333 · cited 1×
“The Self and consciousness can be detached from a discrete physical location, they extend into space and time (Clark, 1999; Clark & Chalmers, 1998).”
BackgroundGallagher, S. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0199271941.001.0001 · Cited by 3,311
Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science.
Gallagher, S. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01417-5 · Cited by 2,881 · cited 1×
“We “own” a body (Gallagher, 2000; Blanke & Metzinger, 2008), and we experience our body and Self as unified at a single location in space (Lenggenhager, Mouthon, & Blanke, 2009).”
BackgroundFull-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood
Blanke, O., & Metzinger, T. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.10.003 · Cited by 1,060 · cited 6×
“…part of the difficulty of this question may arise from the fact that the (healthy) body and the Self are experienced as an elementary unity in our everyday lives, with the sense of the body being fundamentally linked to the sense of self (Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2005; Blanke & Metzinger, 2008).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialConsciousness without a cerebral cortex: A challenge for neuroscience and medicine
Merker, B. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000891 · Cited by 868 · cited 7×
“Ono & Angus, 1974; Mapp & Ono, 1999) support the idea and functionality of such a single vantage point, which has been located in the median plane on the Vieth-Müller circle (Hering, 1942), or behind the bridge of the nose (Claparède, 1925; Roelofs, 1959; Merker, 2007).”
BackgroundInfluentialAn embodied cognitive science?
Clark, A. (1999) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01361-3 · Cited by 781 · cited 2×
“Trying to understand the relation between the Self and the body is a task that has proven to be traditionally problematic and has bothered philosophers since Aristotle and Descartes (cf. James, 1890; Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Nagel, 1971; Clark, 1999).”
BackgroundSpatial aspects of bodily self-consciousness.
Lenggenhager, B., Mouthon, M., & Blanke, O. (2009) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.11.003 · Cited by 212
Cited by
Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness.
Blanke, O. (2012) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn3292 · Cited by 1,147
Coupling Inner and Outer Body for Self-Consciousness
Park, H.-D., & Blanke, O. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.02.002 · Cited by 266
Hanley, A. W., Dambrun, M., & Garland, E. L. (2020) · Mindfulness · doi:10.1007/s12671-020-01330-9 · Cited by 66
The integrated information theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity
Merker, B., Williford, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2022) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21000881 · Cited by 49
Hanley, A. W., & Garland, E. L. (2019) · Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice · doi:10.1037/cns0000204 · Cited by 29
Metadata
- Authors
- Limanowski, J., & Hecht, H.
- Venue
- Psychology
- Publisher
- Scientific Research Publishing, Inc.
- Published
- 2011
- Volume
- 02
- Issue
- 04
- Pages
- 312-317
- ISSN
- 2152-7180 (ISSN-L)
- 2152-7199
- OpenAlex
- W2064359123
- Cited by
- 47
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 2.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- diamond
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