Cited by 327Philosophy, Science, and HistoryPhilosophy and History of ScienceHistory and Theory of Mathematics

Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge

Popper, Karl·2014·Routledge eBooks

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.4324/9780203538074

Cites

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  • Without clarity about its commitments, the Bayesian brain hypothesis risks becoming an unfalsifiable metaphysical research program.

    “Without this clarity, the hypothesis risks becoming what philosopher Karl Popper would call a “metaphysical research program” (Popper 2014)—influential but ultimately unfalsifiable.”

    From The myth of the Bayesian brain (2025) · cites this paper as Popper 2014

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Sorted by citations

Authors
Popper, K.
Corresponding author
Popper, Karl
Venue
Routledge eBooks
Publisher
Routledge
Published
2014-05-01
Volume
19
Issue
2
OpenAlex
W3126953938
Cited by
327
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 22 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 23 · 2020: 14 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 16 · 2017: 9 · 2016: 10 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 5 · 2012: 8
FWCI
14.52
Type
book
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy, Science, and History
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Physical Sciences › Mathematics › Theoretical Computer Science › History and Theory of Mathematics
Keywords
conjecture, refutation, scientific reasoning, hypothesis testing

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

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