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Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics
Abstract
Economic policy as a game. Part 1: Commitment versus discretion in monetary policy reputation and sequential rationality reputation and signalling elections and monetary policy. Part 2: Commitment versus discretion in wealth taxation social institutions and credible tax policy credibility and public debt management the political economy of government debt.
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- Routledge eBooks
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2012-11-12
- OpenAlex
- W1493329463
- Cited by
- 692
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 33.83
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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