Varieties of Epistemic Injustice 1
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The idea of "epistemic injustice" draws together three branches of philosophy - political philosophy, ethics, and epistemology - to consider how epistemic practices and institutions may be deployed and structured in ways that are simultaneously infelicitous toward certain epistemic values (such as truth, aptness, and understanding) and unjust with regard to particular knowers. This chapter seeks to convey knowledge concerning the varieties of epistemic injustice does, by definition, engage in epistemic activity. It provides some initial examples of epistemic injustices so that readers may begin to understand the grammar of the term &s;epistemic injustice&s; for future and new uses. The chapter then presents four lenses with which to think about varieties of epistemic injustice. It also provides readers a sense of some ways epistemic injustices can take shape without foreclosing the possibility of thinking about epistemic injustices along other trajectories, and especially along trajectories that may be more readily noticed by those who are differently located than the author.
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“show how algorithmic profiling can prevent individuals from accessing and meaningfully interpreting important aspects of their experiences (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2017; Pohlhaus, 2017).”
From Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice (2025) · cites this paper as Pohlhaus, 2017
In the citing paper
“Following Pohlhaus [42], we can distinguish (next to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, which will be discussed below), four lenses that make visible the origins of epistemic injustice, three of which are discriminatory and one of which is distributive.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [42]
In the citing paper
“As is noted in the work of Pohlhaus [42], Wanderer [50] and Medina [28], there are points of disagreement about Fricker's proposal, but the general lines along which she distinguished epistemic injustice have solidified into acceptance.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [42]
In the citing paper
“Pohlhaus' fourth lens is distributive and concerns the roles of epistemic labor, agency, and knowledge production.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [42]
In the citing paper
“The third lens makes visible forms of epistemic injustice that belong purely to epistemic systems.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [42]
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Citations
Cites
Philosophy and Philosophical Practice
Alcoff, L. M. (2017) · Research Bank (Australian Catholic University) · doi:10.4324/9781315212043.ch37 · Cited by 25
Philosophy and philosophical practice: eurocentrism as an epistemology of ignorance
Alcoff, L. (2017) · Research Bank (Australian Catholic University) · Cited by 23
Cited by
Charging Others with Epistemic Vice
Kidd, I. J. (2016) · The Monist · doi:10.1093/monist/onv035 · Cited by 125
Citizen Knowledge: Markets, Experts, and the Infrastructure of Democracy
Herzog, L. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197681718.001.0001 · Cited by 80
Toward a Harm-Based Account of Microaggressions
Freeman, L., & Stewart, H. (2021) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916211017099 · Cited by 83
Bringing injustice back in: Secondary victimization as epistemic injustice
Pemberton, A., & Mulder, E. (2023) · Criminology & Criminal Justice · doi:10.1177/17488958231181345 · Cited by 95
Failures and possibilities of epistemic justice, with some implications for higher education
Walker, M. (2018) · Critical Studies in Education · doi:10.1080/17508487.2018.1474774 · Cited by 65
Metadata
- Authors
- Pohlhaus, G.
- Corresponding author
- Pohlhaus, Gaile
- Venue
- The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2017-03-31
- Pages
- 13-26
- OpenAlex
- W4242300518
- Cited by
- 240
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 21 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 60 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 39 · 2021: 20 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 34.50
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Political Science and International Relations › Political Philosophy and Ethics
- Keywords
- epistemic injustice, epistemic practices, epistemic institutions, epistemic value, truth, aptness, understanding
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- The paper
- Pohlhaus, G. (2017). Varieties of Epistemic Injustice 1. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315212043-2
Data sources
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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