The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Varieties of Hermeneutical Injustice 1
Abstract
Hermeneutical injustice is the phenomenon that occurs when the intelligibility of communicators is unfairly constrained or undermined, when their meaning-making capacities encounter unfair obstacles, or when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair advantage when it comes to making sense of their social experience. This chapter elucidates different versions and dimensions of the concept of hermeneutical injustice and how it relates to issues of epistemic responsibility. It suggests that there are forms of hermeneutical injustices that are so damaging that they can result in hermeneutical death, that is, in phenomena that radically constrain one&s;s hermeneutical capacities and agency such as the following: the loss of one&s;s voice, of one&s;s interpretative capacities, or of one&s;s status as a participant in meaning-making and meaning-sharing practices. The chapter addresses different possible classifications of hermeneutical injustices and how these classifications offer conceptual resources for diagnosing cases of hermeneutical injustices and for identifying ways of resisting hermeneutical marginalization.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“show how algorithmic profiling can prevent individuals from accessing and meaningfully interpreting important aspects of their experiences (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2017; Pohlhaus, 2017).”
From Algorithmic profiling as a source of hermeneutical injustice (2025) · cites this paper as Medina, 2017
In the citing paper
“As is noted in the work of Pohlhaus [42], Wanderer [50] and Medina [28], there are points of disagreement about Fricker's proposal, but the general lines along which she distinguished epistemic injustice have solidified into acceptance.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
In the citing paper
“Not only can this 'being wronged in its capacity as a knower' be distributive as well as discriminatory [28], and structural as well as incidental [50], its empirical manifestations are also fundamentally diverse.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
In the citing paper
“Helpfully, José Medina [28], pp.45-46) distinguishes between semantically and performatively induced hermeneutical injustices.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
In the citing paper
“Medina [28], p. 47) also introduces a 'radical' variant of hermeneutical injustice that is worthy of a subclass in the taxonomy, because it takes hermeneutical injustice to an extremity qua depth.”
From A taxonomy of epistemic injustice in the context of AI and the case for generative hermeneutical erasure (2025) · cites this paper as [28]
In the citing paper
“insofar as this imbalance arises from the design or deployment of such AI systems, we might also speak of 'systemic', 'structural', or 'institutional' epistemic injustices (Medina, 2017;Pohlhaus Jr, 2017)”
From Hidden Risks: Artificial Intelligence and Hermeneutic Harm (2025) · cites this paper as Medina, 2017
Citations
Cites
Sisters, Please, I’d Rather Do It Myself
Antony, L. (1995) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics19952322 · Cited by 130
Flagged first, then by citations
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Epistemic injustice in psychiatric research and practice
Kidd, I. J., Spencer, L. J., & Carel, H. (2022) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2156333 · Cited by 133
Overcoming Hermeneutical Injustice in Mental Health: A Role for Critical Phenomenology
Ritunnano, R. (2022) · Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology · doi:10.1080/00071773.2022.2031234 · Cited by 98
Epistemic injustice and data science technologies
Symons, J., & Alvarado, R. (2022) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-022-03631-z · Cited by 65
Healthcare Practice, Epistemic Injustice, and Naturalism
Kidd, I. J., & Carel, H. (2018) · Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement · doi:10.1017/s1358246118000620 · Cited by 71
Bringing injustice back in: Secondary victimization as epistemic injustice
Pemberton, A., & Mulder, E. (2023) · Criminology & Criminal Justice · doi:10.1177/17488958231181345 · Cited by 70
Metadata
- Authors
- Medina, J.
- Corresponding author
- Medina, José
- ORCID
- Medina, José
- Venue
- The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2017-03-31
- Pages
- 41-52
- OpenAlex
- W4229951751
- Cited by
- 222
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 24 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 44 · 2023: 41 · 2022: 48 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 3
- FWCI
- 31.37
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Hermeneutics and Narrative Identity
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Critical Theory and Philosophy
- Keywords
- hermeneutical injustice, epistemic responsibility, marginalized voices, meaning-making, agency
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
