Consciousness and Moral Status
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Abstract
It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in Permanent Vegetative State (PVS); debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness; controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia; and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about consciousness. However, though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness. In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but also the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and humans with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status. This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.
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“First, folk psychological attributions of consciousness may mediate future moral concern towards AI, regardless of whether or not they are actually conscious (Shepherd 2018, Mazor et al. 2023).”
From Folk psychological attributions of consciousness to large language models (2024) · cites this paper as Shepherd 2018
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Cited by
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“First, folk psychological attributions of consciousness may mediate future moral concern towards AI, regardless of whether or not they are actually conscious (Shepherd 2018, Mazor et al. 2023).”
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Colombatto, C., & Fleming, S. M. (2023) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/5cnrv · Cited by 96
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“7 Joshua Shepherd (2018) has recently presented a particularly developed account of what he calls ‘phenomenal value’ – in essence, phenomenally grounded prudential value – in terms of ‘affective-evaluative’ phenomenal properties.”
Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals
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“There is also disagreement about which capacities, if any, indicate moral status, with some arguing that consciousness on its own has no moral significance, rather the psychological capacities that enable high-level cognitive sophistication are more important [47]; though it is a minority view, some ground moral statu…”
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Zilio, F., & Lavazza, A. (2023) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2023.2173329 · Cited by 54
“…moral interest in the entity, but rather the possibility that in these processes the entity may feel something.1 It is noteworthy that some scholars (e.g., Shepherd 2018b) take the presence of phenomenal consciousness not to be particularly relevant for the attribution of moral value to an entity.”
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“For example, it has been argued that the most important feature of conscious systems that gives rise to moral status is not general, or domain specific, intelligence, but rather evaluative sophistication – the capacity to have a wide range of valanced subjective experiences(Shepherd, 2018).”
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“(Shepherd 2018, 37) For Shepherd, some mental state is non-derivatively valuable if and only if it contains affective aspects, and in addition it is conscious, thus ‘secur[ing] presence to the subject’ (37).”
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Kreitmair, K. (2023) · Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics · doi:10.1017/s0963180123000063 · Cited by 35
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“It is instantiated in different kinds of experiences, such as perceptual, affective, and cognitive (Kriegel 2015; Feinberg andMallatt 2018; Shepherd 2018).”
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Koplin, J. J. (2019) · The Hastings Center Report · doi:10.1002/hast.1051 · Cited by 30
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Boyd, J. L., & Lipshitz, N. (2023) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-023-09538-x · Cited by 36
The Ethics of Human Brain Organoid Transplantation in Animals
Kataoka, M., Gyngell, C., Savulescu, J., & Sawai, T. (2023) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-023-09532-3 · Cited by 32
“There is controversy as to whether non-valenced experience also deserves protection [17, 18] (see also [19]).”
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Lee, A. Y. (2025) · Philosophers Imprint · doi:10.3998/phimp.1956 · Cited by 52
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Levy, N. L. (2024) · Neuroethics · doi:10.1007/s12152-024-09559-0 · Cited by 26
“In the only full-length book on the value of consciousness, Joshua Shepherd [31] presents an account that might achieve the goal.”
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Perry, M. W. (2024) · The Journal of Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10892-024-09487-4 · Cited by 22
“8 In contrast, a narrower account which reduces sentience to the capacity for pleasure and pain has insufficient explanatory depth to accurately account for a wide range of value-laden experiences (Shepherd 2018: 49–51).”
Niikawa, T., & Kriegel, U. (2024) · The British Journal of Aesthetics · doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayae005 · Cited by 21
“But more recent work has focused increasingly on the epistemic (Smithies, 2019; Ranalli, 2021), prudential (van der Deijl, 2019; Kriegel, forthcoming), and ethical value of consciousness (Niikawa, 2018; Shepherd, 2018; Siewert, 2021; Chalmers, 2022 Chapters 17-18).”
BackgroundResponse to the ISSCR guidelines on human–animal chimera research
Koplin, J. J. (2022) · Bioethics · doi:10.1111/bioe.13104 · Cited by 16
The scientific study of consciousness cannot and should not be morally neutral
Mazor, M., Brown, S., Ciaunica, A., Demertzi, A., Fahrenfort, J., Faivre, N., Francken, J. C., Lamy, D., Lenggenhager, B., Moutoussis, M., et al. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221110222 · Cited by 17
“More recent debates have seen broad agreement that moral status rests, at least in part, on mental capacities (Carruthers, 2019; Danaher, 2020; Levy, 2014; Shepherd, 2018).”
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Johnson, L. S. M. (2021) · doi:10.1093/med/9780190943646.001.0001 · Cited by 56
Is there a tension between AI safety and AI welfare?
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Koplin, J. J., Carter, O. L., & Savulescu, J. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780192894076.003.0015 · Cited by 13
Glannon, W. (2022) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781009086660 · Cited by 13
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“Sentience should therefore be understood as comprising the capacity to experience a range of modi fi able mental states rather than solely pleasure and pain, such as contentment, boredom, grief, affection, and even simply the sensations in one ’ s toes (Kagan, 2019: 13; Shepherd, 2018: 49 – 51).”
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“The authors recognize the moral implications of consciousness assessment, especially since consciousness is often linked to moral status (Shepherd, 2018, 2023).”
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What Is, or Should Be, the Legal Status of Brain Organoids?
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The Moral Status of Conscious Subjects
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The Unity of Consciousness and the Practical Ethics of Neural Organoid Research
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“…it is widely agreed that sentience is sufficient for moral standing (Sumner, 1996; McMahan, 2002 ; Singer, 2009a, b, 2023 ; Birch, 2017; Korsgaard, 2018 ; Horta, 2018 ; Shepherd, 2018 ; Sebo, 2018 ; Van der Deijl, 2021 ; Jaworska and Tannenbaum, 2023 ; Andrews et al., 2024 ; Perry, 2024 ).”
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Large Language Models and the Gaming Problem
Birch, J. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0017 · Cited by 4
Two New Doubts about Simulation Arguments
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Hedonic Consciousness and Moral Status
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The Right to Restrict AI Training
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Individuating Artificial Minds
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Remainders of the Self: Consciousness as a Problem for Neuroethics
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WILL THE GREAT PRIMATES BE RECOGNIZED AS NON-HUMAN PERSONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY?
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Moral Status and the Consciousness Criterion
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“…are potentially worthy of moral consideration (unless one understands the ecosystem as a single, conscious, living entity), but also the environment and nonliving entities (or dead entities), such as artefacts and objects of historical and artistic value (Koplin & Massie, 2021; Shepherd, 2018).”
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Degrees of Moral Status: The Problem of Relevance and the Need for a Threshold
Wendler, D. S. (2023) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-023-00737-9 · Cited by 2
“In light of this conclusion, I consider a recently proposed alternative to two-factor accounts which tries to explain why animals and human beings have moral status, but human beings have higher moral status, based on the nature of consciousness (Shepherd, 2018, 2021).”
Birch, J. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0011 · Cited by 1
People with Disorders of Consciousness
Birch, J. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0010 · Cited by 2
Summary of the Framework and Proposals
Birch, J. (2024) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.003.0001 · Cited by 2
The Evolution of Animal Consciousness
Wandrey, M., & Halina, M. (2025) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.70069 · Cited by 1
“For many, the ethical landscape concerning our treatment of animals hinges on their capacity for conscious experience (see Shepherd 2018; Shevlin 2020; Birch 2024).”
Braus, A. J. (2025) · Ethics & bioethics · doi:10.2478/ebce-2025-0011 · Cited by 1
Japanese attitudes toward human brain organoid research: broad support amid ethical concerns
Sawai, T., Koike, M., & Kataoka, M. (2026) · Frontiers in Genetics · doi:10.3389/fgene.2026.1788161 · Cited by 1
“In contrast, although in contexts other than human brain organoids, some ethicists have argued that phenomenal consciousness—that is, the subjective quality of experience—without positive or negative value has no moral significance (Levy and Savulescu, 2009; Shepherd, 2018).”
Boyd, J. L., Jensen, E., Jensen, A. M., & Lipshitz, N. (2026) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niag023 · Cited by 1
“…proposed that it is not consciousness per se but particular dimensions of consciousness that matter for moral status, such as self-awareness, having pleasant or unpleasant conscious states, or having conscious preferences ( Singer 1986; Shepherd 2018; Koplin et al. 2021; Boyd and Lipshitz 2024).”
Growing Human Organs Inside Animals
Koplin, J. J., & Bhatia, N. (2023) · Collaborative bioethics · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-29451-8_33 · Cited by 1
Responding to Uncertainty: Beyond Disorders of Consciousness
Johnson, L. S. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780190943646.003.0009 · Cited by 1
Deference, development, and large language models: Issues at the edge of sentience
Bayne, T. (2025) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12537 · Cited by 1
“Sentience matters, but it is arguably not the only form of consciousness that matters (Shepherd, 2018).”
Disorders of Consciousness and the Disability Critique
Johnson, L. S. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780190943646.003.0008
Johnson, L. S. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780190943646.003.0004
Johnson, L. S. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780190943646.003.0001
Johnson, L. S. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780190943646.003.0002
Johnson, L. S. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780190943646.003.0005
Johnson, L. S. M. (2021) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/med/9780190943646.003.0003
McCall, I. C. (2022) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2022.2126552
“Particular Consciousness Criterion: Personhood requires a particular type of consciousness (Levy and Savulescu 2009; Shepherd 2018).”
BackgroundConsciousness and its place in epistemology
Berger, J. (2022) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2153660
Kapitel 2: Ethik und Ästhetik der tierlichen Singularität
Zenker, F. (2023) · Human-animal studies · doi:10.14361/9783839466186-005
Zenker, F. (2023) · transcript Verlag eBooks · doi:10.14361/9783839466186-001
Zenker, F. (2023) · Human-animal studies · doi:10.14361/9783839466186-003
Zenker, F. (2023) · transcript Verlag eBooks · doi:10.14361/9783839466186-009
Zenker, F. (2023) · transcript Verlag eBooks · doi:10.14361/9783839466186-008
Kapitel 1: Der Begriff des singulären Tiers
Zenker, F. (2023) · Human-animal studies · doi:10.14361/9783839466186-004
Metadata
- Authors
- Shepherd, J.
- Corresponding author
- Shepherd, Joshua
- ORCID
- Shepherd, Joshua
- Venue
- Routledge eBooks
- Publisher
- Routledge
- Published
- 2018-05-23
- OpenAlex
- W2889767263
- Cited by
- 161
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 32 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 26 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 11.93
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Routledge eBooks (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Directory of Open access Books (OAPEN Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- BiblioBoard Library Catalog (Open Research Library) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- Directory of Open access Books (OAPEN Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- OAPEN (The OAPEN Foundation) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- OAPEN (The OAPEN Foundation) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (104347)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophical Ethics and Theory
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health › Ethics and bioethics in healthcare
- Keywords
- phenomenal consciousness, moral status, disorders of consciousness, permanent vegetative state, affect, valence, end-of-life care, advanced dementia, embryo, fetus, non-human animals
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.