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Cited by 309

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 87 of the 87 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud

Kang, Eugene · 2008 · Academy of Management Journal

Abstract

I examined the spillover of reputational penalties between firms in the context of financial reporting fraud. Drawing from signaling and attribution theories, I used financial event study methodology and found significant reputational penalties in 45 (18.4%) out of 244 firms with director interlocks to 30 firms accused of financial reporting fraud in the United States. Furthermore, logistic regression analysis suggested that firms thus associated with accused firms were more likely to experience significant reputational penalties when the interlocking directors held audit or governance chair positions in them. This likelihood decreased when these firms' observable governance structures signaled effective corporate governance.

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Metadata

Authors
Kang, E.
Venue
Academy of Management Journal
Published
2008-06
Volume
51
Issue
3
Pages
537-555
ISSN
  • 0001-4273 (ISSN-L)
  • 1948-0989
OpenAlex
W2150441143
Cited by
309
References
87
FWCI
25.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5465/amj.2008.32626007
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Kang, E. (2008). Director Interlocks and Spillover Effects of Reputational Penalties From Financial Reporting Fraud. Academy of Management Journal. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2008.32626007

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.