The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance Deviance
Abstract
We develop the concept of corporate governance deviance and seek to understand why, when, and how a firm adopts governance practices that do not conform to the dominant governance logic. Drawing on institutional theory, coupled with both the entrepreneurship and corporate governance literature, we advance a middle-range theory of the antecedents of corporate governance deviance that considers both the institutional context and firm-level agency. Specifically, we highlight the centrality of a firm’s entrepreneurial identity as it interacts with the national governance logic to jointly create corporate governance discretion (i.e., the latitude of accessible governance practices) within the firm. We argue that as a firm’s governance discretion increases, it will be more likely to adopt overconforming or underconforming governance practices that deviate from established norms and practices. Moreover, we propose that adopting a deviant corporate governance practice is contingent on the governance regulatory environment and a firm’s corporate governance capacity. We conclude by advancing a new typology of corporate governance deviance based on a firm’s over- or underconformity with the dominant national logic, as well as its entrepreneurial identity motives. This globally relevant study refines and extends comparative corporate governance research and enriches our current understanding of the institutional logics perspective.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
North, D. C. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808678 · Cited by 32,691
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 1×
“The liberal country type endorses a shareholder-oriented governance logic where the market defines the firm’s primary goal and its governance, prioritizing the maximization of shareholder value (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) to provide firms with legitimacy.”
Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes
Oliver, C. (1991) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1991.4279002 · Cited by 8,950
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848 · cited 1×
“Although previous comparative corporate governance research has traditionally focused on the influence of the type of legal system (La Porta et al., 2000), more recent studies note that the extent of regulatory enforcement may be a more important determinant of corporate behavior.”
Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process
Miles, R. E., Snow, C. C., Meyer, A. D., & Coleman, H. J. (1978) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1978.4305755 · Cited by 4,527
Multiple Institutional Logics in Organizations: Explaining Their Varied Nature and Implications
Besharov, M. L., & Smith, W. K. (2014) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2011.0431 · Cited by 1,571 · cited 2×
“When this boundary condition is relaxed, we are faced with the potential existence of multiple institutional logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014; Greenwood et al., 2011).”
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, EXPROPRIATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF GROUP-AFFILIATED COMPANIES IN KOREA.
Chang, S. J. (2003) · Academy of Management Journal · doi:10.2307/30040617 · Cited by 550
Metadata
- Authors
- Aguilera, R. V., Judge, W. Q., & Terjesen, S. A.
- Venue
- Academy of Management Review
- Publisher
- Academy of Management
- Published
- 2018-01
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 87-109
- ISSN
- 0363-7425 (ISSN-L)
- 1930-3807
- OpenAlex
- W2482716579
- Cited by
- 246
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 29.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate Governance Deviance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5465/amr.2014.0394
- The paper
- Aguilera, R. V., Judge, W. Q., & Terjesen, S. A. (2018). Corporate Governance Deviance. Academy of Management Review. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2014.0394
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.