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Cited by 586

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

Open access
Pritchard, Duncan, Journal of Philosophy, Inc.·2012·Journal of Philosophy
DOI 10.5840/jphil201210939
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Abstract

It is argued that there are two ‘master’ intuitions about knowledge⎯an anti-luck intuition and an ability intuition⎯and that these impose distinct epistemic demands. It is claimed that recognising this fact leads one towards a new proposal in the theory of knowledge⎯anti-luck virtue epistemology⎯which can avoid the problems that afflict other theories of knowledge. This proposal is motivated in contrast to two other ways of thinking about knowledge which are shown to be ultimately unsuccessful: anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology. Finally, a diagnosis is offered of why our concept of knowledge should have the kind of structure dictated by anti-luck virtue epistemology.

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Metadata

Authors
Pritchard, D., & Journal of Philosophy, I.
Venue
Journal of Philosophy
Publisher
Philosophy Documentation Center
Published
2012
Volume
109
Issue
3
Pages
247-279
ISSN
0022-362X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.5840/jphil201210939
OpenAlex
W1503848103
Cited by
586
References
29
FWCI
261.05
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.5840/jphil201210939
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Pritchard, D., & Journal of Philosophy, I. (2012). Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil201210939

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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