Is There Something it’s Like to be a Garden Snail
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The question “are garden snails conscious?” or equivalently “is there something it’s like to be a garden snail?” admits of three possible answers: yes, no, and denial that the question admits of a yes-or-no answer. All three answers have some antecedent plausibility, prior to the application of theories of consciousness. All three answers retain their plausibility after the application of theories of consciousness. This is because theories of consciousness, when applied to such a different species, are inevitably question-begging and rely crucially on dubious extrapolation from the introspections and verbal reports of a single species.
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Cites
Nagel, T. (1974) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2183914 · Cited by 7,440
Searle, J. R. (1992) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/5834.001.0001 · Cited by 3,595
Experimental and theoretical approaches to conscious processing
Dehaene, S., & Changeux, J.-P. (2011) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2011.03.018 · Cited by 2,573
Consciousness and Fundamental Reality
Goff, P. (2017) · Oxford Scholarship Online · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190677015.001.0001 · Cited by 657
Prinz, J. (2012) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195314595.001.0001 · Cited by 401
Lamme, V. A. F. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0344 · Cited by 194
What is wrong with the no-report paradigm and how to fix it
Block, N. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2019.10.001 · Cited by 176
The Transition to Minimal Consciousness through the Evolution of Associative Learning
Bronfman, Z. Z., Ginsburg, S., & Jablonka, E. (2016) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.01954 · Cited by 133 · cited 1×
“For a lengthier— but still fundamentally stipulative— treatment of the view articulated in Bronfman et al. 2016, see Ginsburg and Jablonka 2019.”
On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of consciousness
Bayne, T. (2018) · Neuroscience of Consciousness · doi:10.1093/nc/niy007 · Cited by 132
The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts
Gennaro, R. J. (2011) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262016605.001.0001 · Cited by 86
Cited by
The Edge of Sentience: Risk and Precaution in Humans, Other Animals, and AI
Birch, J. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780191966729.001.0001 · Cited by 236
Non-human consciousness and the specificity problem: a modest theoretical proposal
Shevlin, H. (2021) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12338 · Cited by 111
“All animals are conscious”: Shifting the null hypothesis in consciousness science
Andrews, K. (2024) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/mila.12498 · Cited by 40
Non-Human Moral Status: Problems with Phenomenal Consciousness
Shepherd, J. (2023) · AJOB Neuroscience · doi:10.1080/21507740.2022.2148770 · Cited by 39
How to deal with risks of AI suffering
Dung, L. (2025) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2023.2238287 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Schwitzgebel, E., & University of Arkansas Press
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 39-63
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3209269626
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 2.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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