The Measurement Problem of Consciousness
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 74 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 11 of the 55 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases—what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem. The first is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences between conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. nonconscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency to the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to nonhuman animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid causing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyze and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness.
Overview
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TL;DR
This paper argues that the most pressing challenge for consciousness science is the measurement problem of consciousness: how to determine the presence and properties of consciousness. It distinguishes the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem, arguing that current human-derived indicators cannot be confidently applied to nonhuman animals and especially machines, and recommends a precautionary principle under uncertainty.
Key findings
- The paper identifies three related problems within the measurement problem of consciousness: (i) the indicator validity problem, (ii) the extrapolation problem, and (iii) the moral problem.
- Indicator validity is especially problematic because current indicators are validated on the conscious/unconscious distinction in humans, but are then used to detect the conscious/non-conscious distinction in other entities; the paper argues this background assumption lacks sufficient justification and is likely incorrect.
- Extrapolation to nonhuman animals may be partly supported by biological analogy and shared evolutionary history, but these justifications do not apply to machines, which lack shared history and analogous anatomical or physiological structures; the paper describes an “n=1 problem” because all known consciousness cases come from Earth-based evolved life.
- The paper cites an informal survey indicating about 78% of experts and non-experts think there is progress in consciousness science, while noting a complete lack of consensus on how consciousness can and should be measured; it advocates a precautionary principle and pluralistic robustness analysis using multiple independent lines of evidence.
Methods
- Conceptual and philosophical analysis, combined with a literature review of consciousness measurement methods, including objective measures, subjective self-report, masking, trace conditioning, multisensory learning, neural correlates of consciousness, and Integrated Information Theory’s Φ.
- No new empirical data are collected; the paper uses examples and arguments about humans, nonhuman animals, and artificial systems to analyze the measurement problem.
- The paper proposes a precautionary principle for uncertain cases and a robustness/pluralistic approach in which results invariant across different experiments, models, and independent background assumptions are considered more strongly supported.
Limitations
- The paper states that it is not its primary aim to solve the measurement problem of consciousness and that no single paper could do so; it aims instead to clarify how the problem manifests for nonhuman consciousness.
- The paper acknowledges a pessimistic reading: the indicator validity problem may suggest we cannot validate any indicator measures of consciousness because consciousness cannot be directly accessed or measured, and it cites Michel (2019) as concluding we should remain agnostic about fish consciousness.
- Evident from the text: the analysis is conceptual rather than empirical, offers no new experimental validation of indicators, and its proposals for machine consciousness remain provisional and dependent on theoretical commitments such as Integrated Information Theory.
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Claims the paper makes
11 Valid · 5 Not valid · 34 Not checked · 109 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Indeed, many of the perceptual and cognitive processes in the human brain occur without consciousness (Dehaene et al. 2017).”
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Dehaene et al. 2017 matched to “What is consciousness, and could machines have it?” (2017) source
The “C2: Self-monitoring” section (p. 3) explicitly says that complex computations, including face and speech recognition, sentence parsing, and meaning extraction, occur unconsciously in the human brain. The sections on unconscious perceptual processing and decision-making (p. 3) provide further examples. (LLM, conf=0.95)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, when the conditioned stimulus is masked from conscious perception (e.g. through short presentation time, or immediate 'masking' with another stimulus), then the process does not result in learning in any subjects (Knight et al. 2006; Esteves et al. 1994).”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Knight et al. 2006 matched to “The role of awareness in delay and trace fear conditioning in humans” (2006) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Results report no significant differential skin-conductance response on unperceived trace-conditioning trials, supporting the narrower finding that learning was not detected under this study’s conditions. The Conditioned and Unconditioned Stimuli section says perception was varied using perithreshold tone volumes, not immediate masking, and the Discussion cautions that a shorter trace interval might support conditioning without awareness. The paper therefore does not establish that masking prevents learning in every subject or under all trace-conditioning procedures. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Esteves et al. 1994 matched to “Nonconscious associative learning: Pavlovian conditioning of skin conductance responses to masked fear‐relevant facial stimuli” (1994) source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“However, we don't see the problems we have presented as fatal for the measurement of consciousness”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Veit and Huebner 2020 matched to “Drawing the boundaries of animal sentience” (2020) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In the Website section (page not provided), the paper rejects the idea that failure to draw a boundary leaves nothing to say about animal sentience and calls for empirical investigation of what animals feel. That supports the view that these difficulties are not fatal to studying sentience, but the passage does not specifically address measuring consciousness. (LLM, conf=0.78)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A result the paper states — it cites no source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“and we do not know whether these are the same in living organisms as in machines.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The reason for this lower status awarded to consciousness studies is thus more likely conceptual in nature, relating to the particular ways in which we understand consciousness; a fact which deserves proper philosophical attention.”
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“One problem is that in building AI systems we are likely to discover new ways to achieve behavioral capabilities, which may not involve consciousness, since biological constraints do not app ly [ 21,39].”
From Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems (2026) · cites this paper as [21]
Citations
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“One possible marker of consciousness that does not rely on biological assumptions or tests using the conscious/unconscious distinction, comes from Integrated Information Theory (IIT) (Tononi 2004).”
InfluentialAffective consciousness: core emotional feelings in animals and humans.
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“There are multiple proposed types of consciousness, such as phenomenal and access consciousness (Block 1995), self- awareness (Carruthers 2003), and cognitive and affective consciousness (Panksepp 2005).”
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“Trace conditioning can still result in learning only in cases where the conditioned stimulus is available to conscious processing; it “requires the acquisition and retention of conscious knowledge across a considerable time span” (Clark and Squire 1998, 79).”
Blake, R., & Logothetis, N. K. (2002) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn701 · Cited by 1,027
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“Though work by Merker (2007) disputes that the neocortex is necessary for consciousness.”
What is consciousness, and could machines have it?
Dehaene, S., Lau, H., & Kouider, S. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aan8871 · Cited by 855 · cited 1×
“Indeed, many of the perceptual and cognitive processes in the human brain occur without consciousness (Dehaene et al. 2017).”
Deep homology and the origins of evolutionary novelty
Shubin, N., Tabin, C., & Carroll, S. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature07891 · Cited by 842 · cited 1×
“Think of the evolution of animal eyes: once thought of as separate events of convergent evolution, but now understood as a result of deep homology at the level of the PAX6 gene (Shubin et al. 2009).”
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Cited by
Seth, A. K., & Bayne, T. (2022) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-022-00587-4 · Cited by 880
Browning, H., & Birch, J. (2022) · Philosophy Compass · doi:10.1111/phc3.12822 · Cited by 138
“Scientists in this area often take it for granted that, in studying welfare, the goal is to access (albeit indirectly) experienced affective states (e.g. Browning, 2020; Duncan, 2002; Kirkwood, 2006; Mellor et al., 2020).”
Self-citationHow Should We Study Animal Consciousness Scientifically?
Birch, J., Broom, D. M., Browning, H., Crump, A., Ginsburg, S., Halina, M., Harrison, D., Jablonka, E., Lee, A. Y., Kammerer, F., et al. (2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.29.3.008 · Cited by 87
“Use of these indicators relies on possibly problematic background assumptions about the shared functions of consciousness between humans and other animals (Browning and Veit, 2020) and can’t tell us about the type of experience an animal has — the what it”
BackgroundSelf-citationWhat Is It Like to Be a Bass? Red Herrings, Fish Pain and the Study of Animal Sentience
Mason, G. J., & Lavery, J. M. (2022) · Frontiers in Veterinary Science · doi:10.3389/fvets.2022.788289 · Cited by 69
The sentience shift in animal research
Browning, H., & Veit, W. (2022) · The New Bioethics · doi:10.1080/20502877.2022.2077681 · Cited by 76
Self-citationSentience criteria to persuade the reasonable sceptic
Butlin, P. (2022) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1741 · Cited by 36
Identifying indicators of consciousness in AI systems
Butlin, P., Long, R., Bayne, T., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Chalmers, D., Constant, A., Deane, G., Elmoznino, E., Fleming, S. M., et al. (2026) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2025.10.011 · Cited by 56
Natural kind reasoning in consciousness science: An alternative to theory testing
Mckilliam, A. (2024) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12526 · Cited by 37
Animal sentience research: Synthesis and proposals
Crump, A., Browning, H., Schnell, A., Burn, C. C., & Birch, J. (2022) · Animal Sentience · doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1770 · Cited by 33
Self-citationAssessing tests of animal consciousness
Dung, L. (2022) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103410 · Cited by 38
“2 I have the same reply to the “measurement problem of consciousness” characterized by Browning and Veit (2020).”
BackgroundTowards a Comparative Study of Animal Consciousness
Veit, W. (2022) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1007/s13752-022-00409-x · Cited by 34
“While the scientific assessment of consciousness in nonhu - man animals has methodological roadblocks (Browning and Veit 2020b), I hope to have made clear in this article that it is precisely in such comparatively “simple” animals that we have to begin an evolutionary investigation of consciousness.”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe Measurability of Subjective Animal Welfare
Browning, H. (2022) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.29.3.150 · Cited by 36
“There is a long history of disagreement about the measurability of psychological properties and sensations, frequently centred around whether or not subjective states are accessible to science at all, i.e. whether they are detectable (Browning and Veit, 2020).”
Self-citationConsciousness Is Motor: William James on Mind and Action
Klein, A. M. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.001.0001 · Cited by 29
The Origins of Consciousness or the War of the Five Dimensions
Veit, W. (2022) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1007/s13752-022-00408-y · Cited by 26
“2 That is, even if the measurement of consciousness suffers from conceptual and methodological difficulties (Browning and Veit 2020; Browning 2022).”
BackgroundSelf-citationSigns of consciousness in AI: Can GPT-3 tell how smart it really is?
Bojić, L., Stojković, I., & Jolić Marjanović, Z. (2024) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-024-04154-3 · Cited by 19
“Browning and Veit (2020) argue that we cannot afford to wait for absolute certainty about the consciousness of nonhuman animals or intelligent machines before acting.”
Consciousness, complexity, and evolution
Veit, W. (2022) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x21001825 · Cited by 22
Self-citationWhy the Epistemic Objection Against Using Sentience as Criterion of Moral Status is Flawed
Dung, L. (2022) · Science and Engineering Ethics · doi:10.1007/s11948-022-00408-y · Cited by 23
“The first is to rely on precautionary principles (e.g., Birch, 2017; Browning & Veit, 2020).”
BackgroundA Biophilosophical Approach to the Determination of Brain Death
Sulmasy, D. P., DeCock, C. A., Tornatore, C., et al. (2024) · CHEST Journal · doi:10.1016/j.chest.2023.12.011 · Cited by 14
“52 Testing should ensure that enough of the function of the brain has been lost that alternate neural integration pathways and connections would not sustain any form of consciousness.”
BackgroundStudying Animal Feelings: Integrating Sentience Research and Welfare Science
Browning, H., & Veit, W. (2023) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.30.7.196 · Cited by 16
Self-citationDefending the Pathological Complexity Thesis
Veit, W. (2023) · Biological Theory · doi:10.1007/s13752-023-00430-8 · Cited by 17
Self-citationThe welfare of brain organoids
Browning, H., & Veit, W. (2023) · Molecular Psychology Brain Behavior and Society · doi:10.12688/molpsychol.17523.1 · Cited by 8
Self-citationModel diversity and the embarrassment of riches
Veit, W. (2021) · Journal of Economic Methodology · doi:10.1080/1350178x.2021.1898660 · Cited by 7
“…& Veit, 2020a, 2020b), cognitive enhancements (Veit et al., 2020), health and disease (Veit 2021a, 2021b, forthcoming), animal welfare (Veit & Browning 2020a, forthcoming), consciousness (Browning & Veit, 2021; Veit, 2021c), and conceptual engineering more generally (Veit & Browning, 2020b).”
Self-citationSeven Challenges for the Science of Animal Minds
Dacey, M. (2025) · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.001.0001 · Cited by 6
The “Slicing Problem” for Computational Theories of Consciousness
Gómez-Emilsson, A., & Percy, C. (2022) · Open Philosophy · doi:10.1515/opphil-2022-0225 · Cited by 10
A credence-based theory-heavy approach to non-human consciousness
de Weerd, C. R. (2024) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04539-6 · Cited by 26
“Setting aside some roadblocks to the measurements of consciousness (Browning & Veit, 2020; Michel, 2019b; Seth et al., 2008), empirical evidence can help calibrate likelihoods by, for instance, finding that a system is conscious despite lacking a full-fledged implementation of the candidate mechanism.”
Confidence Levels or Degrees of Sentience?
Veit, W. (2022) · Asian Bioethics Review · doi:10.1007/s41649-022-00230-5 · Cited by 6
“A plurality of methods ensures greater accuracy and confidence, and I very much see this methodological pluralism embodied in the multiple lines of evidence in Crump et al. (2022). Indeed, it is my hope that the work of Crump et al. (2022) will help us to make this methodological pluralism accepted within the interdis…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationIntroducing individual sentience profiles in nonhuman primate neuroscience research
Kaufmann, A. (2023) · Current Research in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.crneur.2023.100104 · Cited by 3
“Despite empirical uncertainties, NHP neuroscience researchers should adhere to precautionary principles of protection legislation where there is credible evidence of sentience (Browning and Veit, 2020; Birch, 2017).”
BackgroundExtrapolating Consciousness in Isolated Hemispheres. Hemispherotomy as a New Challenge
Gauvry, C., & Rüber, T. (2024) · Revue de métaphysique et de morale · doi:10.3917/rmm.241.0047 · Cited by 17
Dendritic Integration Theory as a Cellular Bridge for the Current Major Consciousness Theories
Čorlukić, M., Krpan, J., & Stojanović, M. (2023) · Psihologijske teme · doi:10.31820/pt.32.3.7 · Cited by 2
Veit, W. (2023) · THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science · doi:10.1387/theoria.23849 · Cited by 1
Self-citationDacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0008 · Cited by 1
Sample Size and Generalizability
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0007 · Cited by 1
The Origins of Consciousness or the War of the Five Dimensions
Veit, W. (2023) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781003321729-3
Self-citationAnesthesia for non-traditional consciousness
Deverett, B. (2023) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2023.1146242
Spytska, L. V. (2024) · Salud Ciencia y Tecnología - Serie de Conferencias · doi:10.56294/sctconf2024.766 · Cited by 1
Johnstone, C., & Alegaonkar, P. S. (2024) · Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness · doi:10.1142/s2705078524300019 · Cited by 2
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.002.0007
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0009
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.002.0006
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0010
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0011
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0006
Introduction: Warp and Weft in William James
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0001
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0005
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0003
Biographical & Historical Preliminaries
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0002
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0007
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0008
Klein, A. M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780190085872.003.0004
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0001
Conclusion: Of a Different Mind
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0009
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0002
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0004
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0003
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0006
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.003.0005
Dacey, M. (2025) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780198928102.002.0006
On the measurability of consciousness
Pradhan, S. (2025) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2025.1470722 · Cited by 1
“The following is a list of common measurement questions that researchers attempt to answer (Browning and Veit, 2020; Hunt et al., 2022; Seth et al., 2008).”
Reid, C. H., Midwood, J. D., Vandergoot, C. S., Stevens, D., & Cooke, S. J. (2026) · Reviews in Fisheries Science & Aquaculture · doi:10.1080/23308249.2026.2641693
“…and (2) if so, is it even possible to measure these in a robust and replicable manner, based on current understandings of consciousness and hypotheses of the physiological mechanisms underlying psychological pain (Michel 2019; Browning et al. 2020; Melloni et al. 2021; Diggles et al. 2024).”
Prakash, A. V. (2026) · IIMT Journal of Management · doi:10.1108/iimtjm-04-2026-095
A Bundle of Mysteries: Approaching Phenomenal Consciousness
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0002
Losing Your Religion: Ethics After Illusionism
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0010
House of Mirrors: The Illusion of Phenomenal Consciousness
Kammerer, F. (2026) · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.001.0001 · Cited by 8
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0001
Approaching the House of Mirrors: The Illusion Problem
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0005
Mapping the House of Mirrors: Introducing Meta-Cartesianism
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0006
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0004
The Science of Sirens: Illusionism and Consciousness Science
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0009
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.002.0006
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0008
Leaving the House of Mirrors: Solving the Illusion Problem
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0007
Coda: Consciousness, Illusion, and Reality
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0012
Illusionism About Phenomenal Consciousness
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0003
Shedding Our Cartesian Scales: Illusionism and Epistemology
Kammerer, F. (2026) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/9780197840283.003.0011
Is the Problem of Artificial Consciousness a Scientific Problem?
Bayne, T. (2026) · Journal of Consciousness Studies · doi:10.53765/20512201.33.7.209 · Cited by 1
Polishing the meta-problem of consciousness: empirical evidence for non-English speakers
Celka, K., Wyrwa, M., & Raś, M. (2026) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2026.2710862
Spatola, N., & Cohen, L. (2026) · AI & Society · doi:10.1007/s00146-026-03314-0
Metadata
- Authors
- Browning, H., Veit, W., & University of Arkansas Press
- Venue
- Philosophical Topics
- Publisher
- Philosophy Documentation Center
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 85-108
- ISSN
- 0276-2080 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3134558418
- Cited by
- 78
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 27 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 1
- FWCI
- 5.80
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- Locations
- Philosophical Topics (publishedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (acceptedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
- PhilSci-Archive (University of Pittsburgh) (submittedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- London School of Economics and Political Science Theses Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (submittedVersion)
- Project Muse (Johns Hopkins University) (submittedVersion)
- ePrints Soton (University of Southampton) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- European Commission (851145)
- Australian Research Council (FL170100160)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Keywords
- consciousness assessment, artificial consciousness, precautionary principle, moral status of animals
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-05, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-05 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.