Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0)
Open accessAbstract
As directed by the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-283), the goal of the AI RMF is to offer a resource to the organizations designing, developing, deploying, or using AI systems to help manage the many risks of AI and promote trustworthy and responsible development and use of AI systems. The Framework is intended to be voluntary, rights-preserving, non-sector specific, and use-case agnostic, providing flexibility to organizations of all sizes and in all sectors and throughout society to implement the approaches in the Framework. The AI RMF is intended to be practical, to adapt to the AI landscape as AI technologies continue to develop, and to be operationalized by organizations in varying degrees and capacities so society can benefit from AI while also being protected from its potential harms.
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- Premisecitation
NIST has identified three major categories of AI bias to be considered and managed: systemic, computational and statistical, and human-cognitive.
“NIST has identified three major categories of AI bias to be considered and managed: systemic, computational and statistical, and human-cognitive.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites NIST Special Publication 1270
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Systems in which harmful biases are mitigated are not necessarily fair.
“Systems in which harmful biases are mitigated are not necessarily fair.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
AI systems bring a set of risks that are not comprehensively addressed by current risk frameworks and approaches.
“AI systems also bring a set of risks that are not comprehensively addressed by current risk frameworks and approaches.”
- Also stated in: § Appendix B: How AI Risks Differ from Traditional Software Risks · plain
“At the same time, guidance available before publication of this AI RMF does not comprehensively address many AI system risks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § Appendix B: How AI Risks Differ from Traditional Software Risks · plain
- Interpretationnone given
Each of the three major categories of AI bias can occur in the absence of prejudice, partiality, or discriminatory intent.
“Each of these can occur in the absence of prejudice, partiality, or discriminatory intent.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The best intentions within one dimension of the AI lifecycle can be undermined via interactions with decisions and conditions in other, later activities.
“As a result, the best intentions within one dimension of the AI lifecycle can be undermined via interactions with decisions and conditions in other, later activities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Interpretationreasoning
The interdependencies between AI lifecycle activities, and among the relevant AI actors, can make it difficult to reliably anticipate impacts of AI systems.
“The interdependencies between these activities, and among the relevant AI actors, can make it difficult to reliably anticipate impacts of AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 97
- May combine two claims. 37
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningThese practices can increase the likelihood that risks arising in social contexts are managed appropriately.
“These practices can increase the likelihood that risks arising in social contexts are managed appropriately.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenDeployment of AI systems which are inaccurate, unreliable, or poorly generalized to data and settings beyond their training creates and increases negative AI risks and reduces trustworthiness.
“Deployment of AI systems which are inaccurate, unreliable, or poorly generalized to data and settings beyond their training creates and increases negative AI risks and reduces trustworthiness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningDealing with tradeoffs requires taking into account the decision-making context.
“Dealing with tradeoffs requires taking into account the decision-making context.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningUnderstanding and managing the risks of AI systems will help to enhance trustworthiness, and in turn, cultivate public trust.
“Understanding and managing the risks of AI systems will help to enhance trustworthiness, and in turn, cultivate public trust.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenRepresenting complex human phenomena with mathematical models can come at the cost of removing necessary context.
“Representing complex human phenomena with mathematical models can come at the cost of removing necessary context.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenBiases can stem from end-user decision-making tasks and be introduced across the AI lifecycle via human assumptions, expectations, and decisions during design and modeling tasks.
“Biases can stem from end-user decision-making tasks and be introduced across the AI lifecycle via human assumptions, expectations, and decisions during design and modeling tasks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Decisions that go into the design, development, deployment, evaluation, and use of AI systems reflect systemic and human cognitive biases.
- Rests on an assumption: AI actors bring their cognitive biases, both individual and group, into the process.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenImplementation of the MAP function is enhanced by incorporating perspectives from a diverse internal team and engagement with those external to the team that developed or deployed the AI system.
“Implementation of this function is enhanced by incorporating perspectives from a diverse internal team and engagement with those external to the team that developed or deployed the AI system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThis broader collective perspective creates opportunities for surfacing problems and identifying existing and emergent risks.
“This broader collective perspective creates opportunities for surfacing problems and identifying existing and emergent risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenWhere tradeoffs among the trustworthy characteristics arise, measurement provides a traceable basis to inform management decisions.
“Where tradeoffs among the trustworthy characteristics arise, measurement provides a traceable basis to inform management decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenTrustworthy AI depends upon accountability.
“Trustworthy AI depends upon accountability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIdentifying and managing AI risks and potential impacts -both positive and negative -requires a broad set of perspectives and actors across the AI lifecycle.
“Identifying and managing AI risks and potential impacts -both positive and negative -requires a broad set of perspectives and actors across the AI lifecycle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenAccuracy and robustness contribute to the validity and trustworthiness of AI systems, and can be in tension with one another in AI systems.
“Accuracy and robustness contribute to the validity and trustworthiness of AI systems, and can be in tension with one another in AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenWhen variations in human-AI interaction are judiciously taken into account in organizing human-AI teams, they can result in complementarity and improved overall performance.
“When these variations are judiciously taken into account in organizing human-AI teams, however, they can result in complementarity and improved overall performance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Human-AI interaction results vary.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenSafe operation of AI systems is improved through responsible design, development, and deployment practices; clear information to deployers on responsible use; responsible decision-making by deployers and end users; and explanations and documentation of risks based on empirical evidence of incidents.
“Safe operation of AI systems is improved through: • responsible design, development, and deployment practices; • clear information to deployers on responsible use of the system; • responsible decision-making by deployers and end users; and • explanations and documentation of risks based on empirical evidence of incidents.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenOutcomes in the MAP function are the basis for the MEASURE and MANAGE functions.
“Outcomes in the MAP function are the basis for the MEASURE and MANAGE functions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningTreating AI risks along with other critical risks, such as cybersecurity and privacy, will yield a more integrated outcome and organizational efficiencies.
“Treating AI risks along with other critical risks, such as cybersecurity and privacy, will yield a more integrated outcome and organizational efficiencies.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenMaintaining organizational practices and governing structures for harm reduction, like risk management, can help lead to more accountable systems.
“Maintaining organizational practices and governing structures for harm reduction, like risk management, can help lead to more accountable systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenApproaches which enhance AI trustworthiness can reduce negative AI risks.
“Approaches which enhance AI trustworthiness can reduce negative AI risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe relationship between risk and accountability associated with AI and technological systems more broadly differs across cultural, legal, sectoral, and societal contexts.
“The relationship between risk and accountability associated with AI and technological systems more broadly differs across cultural, legal, sectoral, and societal contexts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThis is difficult to systematize since AI systems carry out different tasks -and perform tasks differently -than humans.
“This is difficult to systematize since AI systems carry out different tasks -and perform tasks differently -than humans.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenOrganizations' risk management efforts will be enhanced by identifying and tracking emergent risks and considering techniques for measuring them.
“Organizations' risk management efforts will be enhanced by identifying and tracking emergent risks and considering techniques for measuring them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenPrivacy-related risks may influence security, bias, and transparency and come with tradeoffs with these other characteristics.
“Privacy-related risks may influence security, bias, and transparency and come with tradeoffs with these other characteristics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAccountability presupposes transparency.
“Accountability presupposes transparency.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningStrong governance can drive and enhance internal practices and norms to facilitate organizational risk culture.
“Strong governance can drive and enhance internal practices and norms to facilitate organizational risk culture.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenSystems in which predictions are somewhat balanced across demographic groups may still be inaccessible to individuals with disabilities or affected by the digital divide or may exacerbate existing disparities or systemic biases.
“For example, systems in which predictions are somewhat balanced across demographic groups may still be inaccessible to individuals with disabilities or affected by the digital divide or may exacerbate existing disparities or systemic biases.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThis loss of context may in turn make it difficult to understand individual and societal impacts that are key to AI risk management efforts.
“This loss of context may in turn make it difficult to understand individual and societal impacts that are key to AI risk management efforts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenBias is broader than demographic balance and data representativeness.
“Bias is broader than demographic balance and data representativeness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenContextual information gleaned from expert consultation and input from relevant AI actors, established in GOVERN and carried out in MAP, is utilized in the MANAGE function to decrease the likelihood of system failures and negative impacts.
“Contextual information gleaned from expert consultation and input from relevant AI actors -established in GOVERN and carried out in MAP -is utilized in this function to decrease the likelihood of system failures and negative impacts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenOrganizations' risk management efforts will be enhanced by recognizing and considering these differences.
“Organizations' risk management efforts will be enhanced by recognizing and considering these differences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese analyses can highlight the existence and extent of tradeoffs between different measures, but they do not answer questions about how to navigate the tradeoff.
“These analyses can highlight the existence and extent of tradeoffs between different measures, but they do not answer questions about how to navigate the tradeoff.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningExplainable and interpretable AI systems offer information that will help end users understand the purposes and potential impact of an AI system.
“Explainable and interpretable AI systems offer information that will help end users understand the purposes and potential impact of an AI system.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Perceptions of negative risk stem from a lack of ability to make sense of, or contextualize, system output appropriately.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningSecurity and resilience are related but distinct characteristics.
“Security and resilience are related but distinct characteristics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenNeglecting these characteristics can increase the probability and magnitude of negative consequences.
“Neglecting these characteristics can increase the probability and magnitude of negative consequences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe inability to appropriately measure AI risks does not imply that an AI system necessarily poses either a high or low risk.
“The inability to appropriately measure AI risks does not imply that an AI system necessarily poses either a high or low risk.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenWhile bias is not always a negative phenomenon, AI systems can potentially increase the speed and scale of biases and perpetuate and amplify harms to individuals, groups, communities, organizations, and society.
“While bias is not always a negative phenomenon, AI systems can potentially increase the speed and scale of biases and perpetuate and amplify harms to individuals, groups, communities, organizations, and society.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThese biases, which are not necessarily always harmful, may be exacerbated by AI system opacity and the resulting lack of transparency.
“These biases, which are not necessarily always harmful, may be exacerbated by AI system opacity and the resulting lack of transparency.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Decisions that go into the design, development, deployment, evaluation, and use of AI systems reflect systemic and human cognitive biases.
- Rests on an assumption: AI actors bring their cognitive biases, both individual and group, into the process.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenSystemic bias can be present in AI datasets, the organizational norms, practices, and processes across the AI lifecycle, and the broader society that uses AI systems.
“Systemic bias can be present in AI datasets, the organizational norms, practices, and processes across the AI lifecycle, and the broader society that uses AI systems.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenMany of the data-driven approaches that AI systems rely on attempt to convert or represent individual and social observational and decision-making practices into measurable quantities.
“Many of the data-driven approaches that AI systems rely on attempt to convert or represent individual and social observational and decision-making practices into measurable quantities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThis risk-based approach also enables Framework users to compare their approaches with other approaches and to gauge the resources needed (e.g., staffing, funding) to achieve AI risk management goals in a costeffective, prioritized manner.
“This risk-based approach also enables Framework users to compare their approaches with other approaches and to gauge the resources needed (e.g., staffing, funding) to achieve AI risk management goals in a costeffective, prioritized manner.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenAttempting to eliminate negative risk entirely can be counterproductive in practice because not all incidents and failures can be eliminated.
“Attempting to eliminate negative risk entirely can be counterproductive in practice because not all incidents and failures can be eliminated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA risk management culture can help organizations recognize that not all AI risks are the same, and resources can be allocated purposefully.
“A risk management culture can help organizations recognize that not all AI risks are the same, and resources can be allocated purposefully.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSuccessful risk management depends upon a sense of collective responsibility among AI actors shown in Figure 3.
“Successful risk management depends upon a sense of collective responsibility among AI actors shown in Figure 3.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenBoth AI and traditional software technologies and systems are subject to rapid innovation.
“Both AI and traditional software technologies and systems are subject to rapid innovation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenBias is tightly associated with the concepts of transparency as well as fairness in society.
“Bias is tightly associated with the concepts of transparency as well as fairness in society.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenIt is difficult to determine whether an opaque system possesses such characteristics, and to do so over time as complex systems evolve.
“However, it is difficult to determine whether an opaque system possesses such characteristics, and to do so over time as complex systems evolve.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenAI RMF profiles assist organizations in deciding how they might best manage AI risk that is well-aligned with their goals, considers legal/regulatory requirements and best practices, and reflects risk management priorities.
“AI RMF profiles assist organizations in deciding how they might best manage AI risk that is well-aligned with their goals, considers legal/regulatory requirements and best practices, and reflects risk management priorities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenStandards of fairness can be complex and difficult to define because perceptions of fairness differ among cultures and may shift depending on application.
“Standards of fairness can be complex and difficult to define because perceptions of fairness differ among cultures and may shift depending on application.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenEmploying safety considerations during the lifecycle and starting as early as possible with planning and design can prevent failures or conditions that can render a system dangerous.
“Employing safety considerations during the lifecycle and starting as early as possible with planning and design can prevent failures or conditions that can render a system dangerous.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenPrivacy and cybersecurity risk management considerations and approaches are applicable in the design, development, deployment, evaluation, and use of AI systems.
“Privacy and cybersecurity risk management considerations and approaches are applicable in the design, development, deployment, evaluation, and use of AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe information gathered while carrying out the MAP function enables negative risk prevention and informs decisions for processes such as model management, as well as an initial decision about appropriateness or the need for an AI solution.
“The information gathered while carrying out the MAP function enables negative risk prevention and informs decisions for processes such as model management, as well as an initial decision about appropriateness or the need for an AI solution.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenDifferent types of safety risks may require tailored AI risk management approaches based on context and the severity of potential risks presented.
“Different types of safety risks may require tailored AI risk management approaches based on context and the severity of potential risks presented.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenHaving a diverse team contributes to more open sharing of ideas and assumptions about purposes and functions of the technology being designed, developed, deployed, or evaluated, which can create opportunities to surface problems and identify existing and emergent risks.
“Having a diverse team contributes to more open sharing of ideas and assumptions about purposes and functions of the technology being designed, developed, AI RMF 1.0 deployed, or evaluated -which can create opportunities to surface problems and identify existing and emergent risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenTransparency, explainability, and interpretability are distinct characteristics that support each other.
“Transparency, explainability, and interpretability are distinct characteristics that support each other.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenPrivacy and cybersecurity risks are also considered as part of broader enterprise risk management considerations, which may incorporate AI risks.
“Privacy and cybersecurity risks are also considered as part of broader enterprise risk management considerations, which may incorporate AI risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningThis complexity and varying levels of visibility can introduce uncertainty into risk management practices.
“This complexity and varying levels of visibility can introduce uncertainty into risk management practices.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenRobustness requires not only that the system perform exactly as it does under expected uses, but also that it should perform in ways that minimize potential harms to people if it is operating in an unexpected setting.
“Robustness requires not only that the system perform exactly as it does under expected uses, but also that it should perform in ways that minimize potential harms to people if it is operating in an unexpected setting.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenPrivacy-enhancing technologies ('PETs') for AI, as well as data minimizing methods such as de-identification and aggregation for certain model outputs, can support design for privacy-enhanced AI systems.
“Privacy-enhancing technologies (“PETs”) for AI, as well as data minimizing methods such as de-identification and aggregation for certain model outputs, can support design for privacy-enhanced AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningRisk management can enable AI developers and users to understand impacts and account for the inherent limitations and uncertainties in their models and systems, which in turn can improve overall system performance and trustworthiness and the likelihood that AI technologies will be used in ways that are beneficial.
“Risk management can enable AI developers and users to understand impacts and account for the inherent limitations and uncertainties in their models and systems, which in turn can improve overall system performance and trustworthiness and the likelihood that AI technologies will be used in ways that are beneficial.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenIdentifying contextual factors in the MAP function will assist AI actors in determining the level of risk and potential management efforts.
“Identifying contextual factors in the MAP function will assist AI actors in determining the level of risk and potential management efforts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSystemic biases at the organizational level can influence how teams are structured and who controls the decision-making processes throughout the AI lifecycle.
“Systemic biases at the organizational level can influence how teams are structured and who controls the decision-making processes throughout the AI lifecycle.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Decisions that go into the design, development, deployment, evaluation, and use of AI systems reflect systemic and human cognitive biases.
- Rests on an assumption: AI actors bring their cognitive biases, both individual and group, into the process.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenGOVERN is a cross-cutting function that is infused throughout AI risk management and enables the other functions of the process.
“GOVERN is a cross-cutting function that is infused throughout AI risk management and enables the other functions of the process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenMaintaining the provenance of training data and supporting attribution of the AI system's decisions to subsets of training data can assist with both transparency and accountability.
“Maintaining the provenance of training data and supporting attribution of the AI system's decisions to subsets of training data can assist with both transparency and accountability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenTransparency is often necessary for actionable redress related to AI system outputs that are incorrect or otherwise lead to negative impacts.
“Transparency is often necessary for actionable redress related to AI system outputs that are incorrect or otherwise lead to negative impacts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenEffective risk management is realized through organizational commitment at senior levels and may require cultural change within an organization or industry.
“Effective risk management is realized through organizational commitment at senior levels and may require cultural change within an organization or industry.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenExplainable systems can be debugged and monitored more easily, and they lend themselves to more thorough documentation, audit, and governance.
“Explainable systems can be debugged and monitored more easily, and they lend themselves to more thorough documentation, audit, and governance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Perceptions of negative risk stem from a lack of ability to make sense of, or contextualize, system output appropriately.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Interpretationnone givenComparing Current and Target Profiles likely reveals gaps to be addressed to meet AI risk management objectives.
“Comparing Current and Target Profiles likely reveals gaps to be addressed to meet AI risk management objectives.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenRisk management of AI systems that are intended to augment or replace human activity, for example decision making, requires some form of baseline metrics for comparison.
“Risk management of AI systems that are intended to augment or replace human activity, for example decision making, requires some form of baseline metrics for comparison.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAddressing AI trustworthiness characteristics individually will not ensure AI system trustworthiness; tradeoffs are usually involved, rarely do all characteristics apply in every setting, and some will be more or less important in any given situation.
“Addressing AI trustworthiness characteristics individually will not ensure AI system trustworthiness; tradeoffs are usually involved, rarely do all characteristics apply in every setting, and some will be more or less important in any given situation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningAnticipating, assessing, and otherwise addressing potential sources of negative risk can mitigate this uncertainty and enhance the integrity of the decision process.
“Anticipating, assessing, and otherwise addressing potential sources of negative risk can mitigate this uncertainty and enhance the integrity of the decision process.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenSystematic documentation practices established in GOVERN and utilized in MAP and MEASURE bolster AI risk management efforts and increase transparency and accountability.
“Systematic documentation practices established in GOVERN and utilized in MAP and MEASURE bolster AI risk management efforts and increase transparency and accountability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenUnder certain conditions such as data sparsity, privacy-enhancing techniques can result in a loss in accuracy, affecting decisions about fairness and other values in certain domains.
“Under certain conditions such as data sparsity, privacyenhancing techniques can result in a loss in accuracy, affecting decisions about fairness and other values in certain domains.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenFramework users will have enhanced capacity to manage the risks of deployed AI systems and to allocate risk management resources based on assessed and prioritized risks.
“Framework users will have enhanced capacity to manage the risks of deployed AI systems and to allocate risk management resources based on assessed and prioritized risks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenEarly decisions in identifying purposes and objectives of an AI system can alter its behavior and capabilities, and the dynamics of deployment setting (such as end users or impacted individuals) can shape the impacts of AI system decisions.
“For example, early decisions in identifying purposes and objectives of an AI system can alter its behavior and capabilities, and the dynamics of deployment setting (such as end users or impacted individuals) can shape the impacts of AI system decisions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenUltimately, trustworthiness is a social concept that ranges across a spectrum and is only as strong as its weakest characteristics.
“Ultimately, trustworthiness is a social concept that ranges across a spectrum and is only as strong as its weakest characteristics.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenMeasurement of validity, accuracy, robustness, and reliability contribute to trustworthiness and should take into consideration that certain types of failures can cause greater harm.
“Measurement of validity, accuracy, robustness, and reliability contribute to trustworthiness and should take into consideration that certain types of failures can cause greater harm.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThese biases can also influence downstream decisions by end users, decision makers, and policy makers and may lead to negative impacts.
“These biases can also influence downstream decisions by end users, decision makers, and policy makers and may lead to negative impacts.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Decisions that go into the design, development, deployment, evaluation, and use of AI systems reflect systemic and human cognitive biases.
- Rests on an assumption: AI actors bring their cognitive biases, both individual and group, into the process.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenEffectively managing the risk of potential harms could lead to more trustworthy AI systems and unleash potential benefits to people, organizations, and systems/ecosystems.
“Effectively managing the risk of potential harms could lead to more trustworthy AI systems and unleash potential benefits to people (individuals, communities, and society), organizations, and systems/ecosystems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningUse of the AI RMF alone will not lead to these changes or provide the appropriate incentives.
“Use of the AI RMF alone will not lead to these changes or provide the appropriate incentives.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningBy promoting higher levels of understanding, transparency increases confidence in the AI system.
“By promoting higher levels of understanding, transparency increases confidence in the AI system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenComputational and statistical biases can be present in AI datasets and algorithmic processes, and often stem from systematic errors due to non-representative samples.
“Computational and statistical biases can be present in AI datasets and algorithmic processes, and often stem from systematic errors due to non-representative samples.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenDocumentation can enhance transparency, improve human review processes, and bolster accountability in AI system teams.
“Documentation can enhance transparency, improve human review processes, and bolster accountability in AI system teams.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenProcesses for independent review can improve the effectiveness of testing and can mitigate internal biases and potential conflicts of interest.
“Processes for independent review can improve the effectiveness of testing and can mitigate internal biases and potential conflicts of interest.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenBias exists in many forms and can become ingrained in the automated systems that help make decisions about our lives.
“Bias exists in many forms and can become ingrained in the automated systems that help make decisions about our lives.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenProfiles may illustrate and offer insights into how risk can be managed at various stages of the AI lifecycle or in specific sector, technology, or end-use applications.
“Profiles may illustrate and offer insights into how risk can be managed at various stages of the AI lifecycle or in specific sector, technology, or end-use applications.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenCreating trustworthy AI requires balancing each of these characteristics based on the AI system's context of use.
“Creating trustworthy AI requires balancing each of these characteristics based on the AI system's context of use.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenA transparent system is not necessarily an accurate, privacy-enhanced, secure, or fair system.
“A transparent system is not necessarily an accurate, privacy-enhanced, secure, or fair system.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenSome AI system features that present risks also can be beneficial.
“Some AI system features that present risks also can be beneficial.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Pre-trained models and transfer learning can advance research and increase accuracy and resilience when compared to other models and approaches.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenHuman-cognitive biases are omnipresent in decision-making processes across the AI lifecycle and system use, including the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance of AI.
“Human-cognitive biases are omnipresent in decision-making processes across the AI lifecycle and system use, including the design, implementation, operation, and maintenance of AI.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningFrameworks like the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, NIST Privacy Framework, NIST Risk Management Framework, and Secure Software Development Framework may inform security and privacy considerations in the MAP, MEASURE, and MANAGE functions of the AI RMF.
“While there are significant differences between these frameworks based on the domain addressed -and because AI risk management calls for addressing many other types of risks -frameworks like those mentioned above may inform security and privacy considerations in the MAP, MEASURE, and MANAGE functions of the AI RMF.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningExisting risk management frameworks such as the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, NIST Privacy Framework, NIST Risk Management Framework, and Secure Software Development Framework have some features in common with the AI RMF, are outcome-based rather than prescriptive, and are often structured around a Core set of functions, categories, and subcategories.
“These frameworks have some features in common with the AI RMF.Like most risk management approaches, they are outcome-based rather than prescriptive and are often structured around a Core set of functions, categories, and subcategories.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenUnrealistic expectations about risk may lead organizations to allocate resources in a manner that makes risk triage inefficient or impractical or wastes scarce resources.
“Unrealistic expectations about risk may lead organizations to allocate resources in a manner that makes risk triage inefficient or impractical or wastes scarce resources.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenWithout contextual knowledge, and awareness of risks within the identified contexts, risk management is difficult to perform.
“Without contextual knowledge, and awareness of risks within the identified contexts, risk management is difficult to perform.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenLike safety and security, specific technical features of an AI system may promote or reduce privacy.
“Like safety and security, specific technical features of an AI system may promote or reduce privacy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAddressing, documenting, and managing AI risks and potential negative impacts effectively can lead to more trustworthy AI systems.
“Addressing, documenting, and managing AI risks and potential negative impacts effectively can lead to more trustworthy AI systems.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAI risks or failures that are not well-defined or adequately understood are difficult to measure quantitatively or qualitatively.
“AI risks or failures that are not well-defined or adequately understood are difficult to measure quantitatively or qualitatively.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAI systems can also present new risks to privacy by allowing inference to identify individuals or previously private information about individuals.
“AI systems can also present new risks to privacy by allowing inference to identify individuals or previously private information about individuals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationreasoningTogether, explainability and interpretability assist those operating or overseeing an AI system, as well as users of an AI system, to gain deeper insights into the functionality and trustworthiness of the system, including its outputs.
“Together, explainability and interpretability assist those operating or overseeing an AI system, as well as users of an AI system, to gain deeper insights into the functionality and trustworthiness of the system, including its outputs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- The authors state this as an assumption: Perceptions of negative risk stem from a lack of ability to make sense of, or contextualize, system output appropriately.
The paper relies on this without support.
AI technologies pose risks that can negatively impact individuals, groups, organizations, communities, society, the environment, and the planet.
“AI technologies, however, also pose risks that can negatively impact individuals, groups, organizations, communities, society, the environment, and the planet.”
The paper relies on this without support.
AI systems may be trained on data that can change over time, sometimes significantly and unexpectedly, affecting system functionality and trustworthiness in ways that are hard to understand.
“AI systems, for example, may be trained on data that can change over time, sometimes significantly and unexpectedly, affecting system functionality and trustworthiness in ways that are hard to understand.”
The paper relies on this without support.
AI systems and the contexts in which they are deployed are frequently complex, making it difficult to detect and respond to failures when they occur.
“AI systems and the contexts in which they are deployed are frequently complex, making it difficult to detect and respond to failures when they occur.”
The paper relies on this without support.
AI systems are inherently socio-technical in nature, meaning they are influenced by societal dynamics and human behavior.
“AI systems are inherently socio-technical in nature, meaning they are influenced by societal dynamics and human behavior.”
The paper relies on this without support.
AI risks and benefits can emerge from the interplay of technical aspects combined with societal factors related to how a system is used, its interactions with other AI systems, who operates it, and the social context in which it is deployed.
“AI risks -and benefitscan emerge from the interplay of technical aspects combined with societal factors related to how a system is used, its interactions with other AI systems, who operates it, and the social context in which it is deployed.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Without proper controls, AI systems can amplify, perpetuate, or exacerbate inequitable or undesirable outcomes for individuals and communities.
“Without proper controls, AI systems can amplify, perpetuate, or exacerbate inequitable or undesirable outcomes for individuals and communities.”
The paper relies on this without support.
With proper controls, AI systems can mitigate and manage inequitable outcomes.
“With proper controls, AI systems can mitigate and manage inequitable outcomes.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The current lack of consensus on robust and verifiable measurement methods for risk and trustworthiness, and applicability to different AI use cases, is an AI risk measurement challenge.
“The current lack of consensus on robust and verifiable measurement methods for risk and trustworthiness, and applicability to different AI use cases, is an AI risk measurement challenge.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Risk tolerance and the level of risk that is acceptable to organizations or society are highly contextual and application and use-case specific.
“Risk tolerance and the level of risk that is acceptable to organizations or society are highly contextual and application and use-case specific.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Different AI actors have different responsibilities and awareness depending on their roles in the lifecycle.
“Different AI actors have different responsibilities and awareness depending on their roles in the lifecycle.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Perceptions of negative risk stem from a lack of ability to make sense of, or contextualize, system output appropriately.
“The underlying assumption is that perceptions of negative risk stem from a lack of ability to make sense of, or contextualize, system output appropriately.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
A governance structure is in place.
“Assuming a governance structure is in place, functions may be performed in any order across the AI lifecycle as deemed to add value by a user of the framework.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Pre-trained models and transfer learning can advance research and increase accuracy and resilience when compared to other models and approaches.
“For example, pre-trained models and transfer learning can advance research and increase accuracy and resilience when compared to other models and approaches.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Presenting AI system information to humans is complex; humans perceive and derive meaning from AI system output and explanations in different ways, reflecting different individual preferences, traits, and skills.
“Presenting AI system information to humans is complex.Humans perceive and derive meaning from AI system output and explanations in different ways, reflecting different individual preferences, traits, and skills.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Decisions that go into the design, development, deployment, evaluation, and use of AI systems reflect systemic and human cognitive biases.
“Decisions that go into the design, development, deployment, evaluation, and use of AI systems reflect systemic and human cognitive biases.”
The paper relies on this without support.
AI actors bring their cognitive biases, both individual and group, into the process.
“AI actors bring their cognitive biases, both individual and group, into the process.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Human-AI interaction results vary.
“Human-AI interaction results vary.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The framework operationalizes integration between narrow and broad auditing as described by Mökander.
“Moreover, this procedural feature operationalizes the integration between what Mökander [44] refers to as 'narrow' and 'broad' auditing, where 'narrow' is exemplified by technology-focused testing or assessments and 'broad' is characterized by process-focused review of management of the technology.”
From A Framework for Assurance Audits of Algorithmic Systems (2024) · cites this paper as [44]
Section 5.1, Govern, connects technical aspects of AI systems to organizational policies and processes, while the MEASURE passages describe testing and assessment. This supports the claimed integration in substance, but our copy does not describe it using Mökander’s ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ auditing distinction. (LLM, conf=0.82)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredEncapsulating the guardrails in versioned skills also makes them auditable, since any change to a constraint is reviewed and tracked in the same repository as the proposals themselves.
“Encapsulating the guardrails in versioned skills also makes them auditable, since any change to a constraint is reviewed and tracked in the same repository as the proposals themselves [10].”
From A Workflow for Grant Discovery and Proposal Development Using Large Language Models: Development and Formative Evaluation (2026) · cites this paper as [10]
Section 5.1 Govern says documentation can improve human review and accountability, and MANAGE 4.1 includes change management. The framework does not describe versioned skills or say that every constraint change is reviewed and tracked in the same repository as proposals. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe increased data volume and complexity of generative AI threatens data integrity because errors and biases are prone to occur.
“Unintentionally, the increased data volume and complexity of generative AI threatens data integrity because errors and biases are prone to occur [63].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
Appendix B (page unavailable) identifies increased training-data volume and complexity, as well as harmful bias and other data-quality issues, as AI risks. It does not specifically say that generative AI’s increased data volume and complexity cause errors and biases or threaten data integrity; its mention of generative AI risks is separate. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredAI responsibility is centered on the uniqueness of AI, especially generative AI, in "human centricity, social responsibility, and sustainability".
“Moreover, this measure is centered on the uniqueness of AI, especially generative AI, in “human centricity, social responsibility, and sustainability” [63].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
The Executive Summary (page unavailable) explicitly says that core concepts in responsible AI emphasize human centricity, social responsibility, and sustainability. It also describes AI risks as distinctive, and Appendix B mentions challenging risks related to generative AI, but neither passage singles out generative AI in connection with those three concepts. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe current consensus is that AI trustworthiness itself is a complex measurement with multiple dimensions, such as reliability, resilience, accuracy, and completeness.
“The current consensus is that AI trustworthiness itself is a complex measurement with multiple dimensions, such as reliability, resilience, accuracy, and completeness [63,90].”
From Generative AI in medical practice: in-depth exploration of privacy and security challenges (2024) · cites this paper as [63]
Section 3, “AI Risks and Trustworthiness” (page not supplied), describes trustworthiness through multiple characteristics, including reliability and resilience; the framework also says accuracy contributes to trustworthiness. The cited passages do not identify completeness as a characteristic, and “Availability of reliable metrics” says there is currently a lack of consensus on robust, verifiable ways to measure trustworthiness. Thus the multidimensional point is supported, but the claim’s list and measurement-consensus framing are not fully supported. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework provides a general lifecycle process applicable to any AI system in any sector, but by design it does not address the specific division of labor in hiring, where HR procures a tool that IT deploys.
“Standardized risk frameworks such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework provide a general lifecycle process applicable to any AI system in any sector, but by design they do not address the specific division of labor in hiring, where HR procures a tool that IT deploys [22].”
From Rejected by Code: Algorithmic Bias in AI-Driven Recruitment and the Case for HR-IT Governance Frameworks (2026) · cites this paper as [22]
The AI RMF 1.0 introduction describes the framework as non-sector-specific and use-case agnostic, and its Core sets out functions that can be applied across the AI lifecycle. Appendix A distinguishes procurement from deployment tasks, but our copy does not discuss a hiring arrangement in which HR procures a tool and IT deploys it, or state that this division of labor was deliberately excluded. (LLM, conf=0.85)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredRisk-based practices have been extended to healthcare AI/ML in not only the medical device domain, such as with AAMI's Technical Information Report 34971, but more broadly in emerging frameworks such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework, the Whitehouse Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, the Coalition for Health AI Blueprint for Trustworthy AI Implementation Guidance and Assurance for Health
“Risk-based practices have been extended to healthcare AI/ML in not only the medical device domain, such as with AAMI’s Technical Information Report 3497125, but more broadly in emerging frameworks such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework3, the Whitehouse Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights5”
From Implementing quality management systems to close the AI translation gap and facilitate safe, ethical, and effective health AI solutions (2023) · cites this paper as [3]
The NIST AI Risk Management Framework provides a practical structure for identifying and managing risks across the AI lifecycle, and its generative AI profile extends that orientation to risks associated with generative systems.
“The NIST AI Risk Management Framework, for example, provides a practical structure for identifying and managing risks across the AI lifecycle, while its generative AI profile extends that orientation to risks associated with generative systems (Autio et al., 2024;Tabassi, 2023).”
From Hermeneutic Sovereignty under Generative AI: A Humanities Framework for Protecting Human Meaning-Making from Interpretive Foreclosure (2026) · cites this paper as Tabassi, 2023
The NIST risk management approach is lifecycle-oriented and deliberately broad.
“The NIST riskmanagement approach is lifecycle-oriented and deliberately broad (Autio et al., 2024;Tabassi, 2023).”
From Hermeneutic Sovereignty under Generative AI: A Humanities Framework for Protecting Human Meaning-Making from Interpretive Foreclosure (2026) · cites this paper as Tabassi, 2023
Risk-management frameworks provide valuable organisational scaffolding.
“risk-management frameworks provide valuable organisational scaffolding (Autio et al., 2024;Tabassi, 2023)”
From Hermeneutic Sovereignty under Generative AI: A Humanities Framework for Protecting Human Meaning-Making from Interpretive Foreclosure (2026) · cites this paper as Tabassi, 2023
New AI models trained on evolutionary constraints, structural features, or functional data are increasingly used to clarify VUS significance and could help reclassify VUSs in known ADRD risk genes.
“Emerging AI models trained on evolutionary constraints, structural features, or functional data are increasingly used to resolve the significance of VUSs,138,139 and could help reclassify VUSs in known ADRD risk genes (e.g., APP, PSEN1/2, MAPT).140,141”
From Review of Artificial Intelligence for Clinical Use in Alzheimer's Disease and Related Dementias (2026) · cites this paper as [140]
Appendix B discusses general benefits and risks of pretrained AI models, not genetic variant interpretation. Searches for VUS reclassification, ADRD risk genes, evolutionary constraints, structural features, and functional data found no passage addressing the attributed claim in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.78)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe paper provides an actionable method for external compliance and assurance audits that the literature lacks.
“While the idea to follow the financial auditing practices-at least in part-is in itself not new [27,44,57], our paper offers an actionable approach for performing external compliance and assurance audits which is missing in the literature.”
From A Framework for Assurance Audits of Algorithmic Systems (2024) · cites this paper as [44]
The citing sentence describes the actionable external-audit approach as the citing authors’ own contribution, not as something provided by the NIST framework. The citation is attached instead to the statement that following financial auditing practices is not a new idea. Our copy’s discussion of independent assessors (MEASURE function) does not address financial auditing practices or an external compliance-and-assurance audit method; searches for those terms found no supporting passage. (LLM, conf=0.76)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredDisagreements about the proper role of audits create tensions within AI auditing.
“In AI auditing, tensions also arise from disagreements about which role audits ought to play[44].”
From A Framework for Assurance Audits of Algorithmic Systems (2024) · cites this paper as [44]
Appendix A lists auditors among AI actors, while Section 3 discusses tradeoffs in managing AI risks. Neither passage addresses disagreements about what role audits should play or tensions arising from them (searched: audit, audit roles, and disagreements). (LLM, conf=0.72)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredRegulatory authorities, AI coalitions, medical device manufacturers, and the medical informatics community have acknowledged the current gap not only in common standards but also in the maturity of HCOs to develop and/or deploy health AI.
“While regulatory authorities, AI coalitions, medical device manufacturers, and the medical informatics community have acknowledged the current gap not only in common standards but also in the maturity of HCOs to develop and/or deploy health AI, a primary concern for HCOs remains unresolved”
From Implementing quality management systems to close the AI translation gap and facilitate safe, ethical, and effective health AI solutions (2023) · cites this paper as [3]
The Executive Summary discusses general challenges in deploying AI, and Appendix B discusses improving organizations’ AI competency. Neither passage establishes that the named groups acknowledged a gap in common standards or in healthcare organizations’ maturity to develop or deploy health AI. Searches for healthcare-organization readiness, medical-device stakeholders, and common-standards gaps found no passage making that claim. (LLM, conf=0.75)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredNIST's AI RMF includes safety, security, reliability, transparency, explainability, and privacy in addition to fairness, but its guidance for specific evaluation techniques remains fairly broad.
“while NIST's AI RMF includes safety, security, reliability, transparency, explainability, and privacy, in addition to fairness, its guidance for specific evaluation techniques remains fairly broad [17].”
From Towards AI Accountability Infrastructure: Gaps and Opportunities in AI Audit Tooling (2025) · cites this paper as [17]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Reliability is attributed to a different standard despite "same standard" claim
MinorThe preceding definition cites ISO 9000:2015, but the reliability definition says it is from the same standard while citing ISO/IEC TS 5723:2022.
“Reliability is defined in the same standard as the "ability of an item to perform as required, without failure, for a given time interval, under given conditions" (Source: ISO/IEC TS 5723:2022).”
“Validation is the "confirmation, through the provision of objective evidence, that the requirements for a specific intended use or application have been fulfilled" (Source: ISO 9000:2015).”
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Two types of AI existential risk: decisive and accumulative
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Controllable AI - An Alternative to Trustworthiness in Complex AI Systems?
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AI Governance in the Context of the EU AI Act
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AI Governance: A Challenge for Public Health
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Artificial intelligence bias auditing – current approaches, challenges and lessons from practice
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Future Shock: Generative AI and the International AI Policy and Governance Crisis
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Three Challenges to Secure AI Systems in the Context of AI Regulations
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Learning about Responsible AI On-The-Job: Learning Pathways, Orientations, and Aspirations
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Blockchain-Enabled Federated Learning in Healthcare: Survey and State-of-the-Art
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Differential privacy for medical deep learning: methods, tradeoffs, and deployment implications
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Should Users Trust Advanced AI Assistants? Justified Trust As a Function of Competence and Alignment
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Ethics of trustworthy AI in healthcare: Challenges, principles, and practical pathways
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THREATS AND RISKS OF THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
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Field-building and the epistemic culture of AI safety
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Artificial Intelligence for next generation cybersecurity: The AI4CYBER framework
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Deep Learning Safety Concerns in Automated Driving Perception
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Artificial intelligence tools in supporting healthcare professionals for tailored patient care
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AI-Related Risk: An Epistemological Approach
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Inclusive Technology Co-design for Participatory AI
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Responsible Use of AI in Military Systems
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A perspective for adapting generalist AI to specialized medical AI applications and their challenges
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A Framework for Assurance Audits of Algorithmic Systems
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Artificial Intelligence Policymaking: An Agenda for Sociological Research
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Remixing Special Education Practices with Artificial Intelligence: UDL, EBP, and HLPs
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Editorial: Ethical design of artificial intelligence-based systems for decision making
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Responsible AI, ethics, and the AI lifecycle: how to consider the human influence?
Elia, M., Ziethmann, P., Krumme, J., Schlögl-Flierl, K., & Bauer, B. (2025) · AI and Ethics · doi:10.1007/s43681-025-00666-z · Cited by 16 · see citing works
- Authors
- Tabassi, E.
- Corresponding author
- Tabassi, Elham
- ORCID
- Tabassi, Elham
- Published
- 2023-01-26
- OpenAlex
- W4317748910
- Cited by
- 1,136
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 706 · 2025: 226 · 2024: 130 · 2023: 75 · 2022: 1
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- University of North Texas Digital Library (University of North Texas) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- National Institute of Standards and Technology
- Information Technology Laboratory
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Health Informatics › Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare and Education
- Keywords
- AI risk management framework, trustworthy AI, responsible AI development, AI harms, AI governance
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-28.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-28.
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