The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Recommendation for pair-wise key-establishment schemes using discrete logarithm cryptography
Open accessAbstract
This publication has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in accordance with its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014, 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq., Public Law (P.L.) 113-283.NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems.This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority.Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering
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“NIST changed this recommendation in the 3rd revision of SP800-56A [4], and are now advocating using a fixed set of safe-prime groups with moduli of length up to 8192 bits, with short or full length exponents.”
From How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits (2021) · cites this paper as [4]
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“Note that an n bit prime order elliptic curve group provides approximately n/ 2 bits of classical security (see Appendix D to [4]), since the best classical attacks are cycle-finding attacks, whilst RSA-1024, RSA-2048 and RSA-3072 provide approximately 80 , 112 and 128 bits of classical security, respectively, according to the model used by NIST (see Appendix D to [5]).”
From How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits (2021) · cites this paper as [4]
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Cites
SHA-3 standard: permutation-based hash and extendable-output functions
National Institute of Standards and Technology (US) (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.fips.202 · Cited by 783
(2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.fips.180-4 · Cited by 542
Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths
Barker, E. B., & Roginsky, A. L. (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-131ar1 · Cited by 198
Self-citationElliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Blake-Wilson⋆⋆, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., & Moeller, B. (2006) · doi:10.17487/rfc4492 · Cited by 169
Security requirements for cryptographic modules
Security, C. C., Evans, D. L., Brown, K. H., Director, A., & Director, W. M. (2001) · doi:10.6028/nist.fips.140-2 · Cited by 160
SHA-3 derived functions: cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash and ParallelHash
Kelsey, J. M., Change, S.-J., & Perlner, R. A. (2016) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-185 · Cited by 154
Recommendation for block cipher modes of operation :
Dworkin, M. J. (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-38b · Cited by 114
Recommendation for key derivation using pseudorandom functions (revised)
Chen, L. (2009) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-108 · Cited by 76
Self-citationMcKay, K. A., & Cooper, D. A. (2019) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-52r2 · Cited by 66
Recommendation for Cryptographic Key Generation
Barker, E. B., & Roginsky, A. L. (2012) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-133 · Cited by 54
Self-citationRecommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Dworkin, M. J. (2012) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-38f · Cited by 45
On Session Key Construction in Provably-Secure Key Establishment Protocols
Choo, K. R., Boyd, C., & Hitchcock, Y. (2005) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/11554868_9 · Cited by 42
Recommendation for existing application-specific key derivation functions
Dang, Q. H. (2011) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-135r1 · Cited by 30
Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key-Establishment Schemes Using Integer Factorization Cryptography
Barker, E. B., Chen, L., & Moody, D. (2014) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-56br1 · Cited by 26
Self-citationElliptic Curve Groups modulo a Prime (ECP Groups) for IKE and IKEv2
Fu, D., & Solinas, J. A. (2010) · doi:10.17487/rfc5903 · Cited by 19
Reusing Static Keys in Key Agreement Protocols
Chatterjee, S., Menezes, A., & Ustaoğlu, B. (2009) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10628-6_3 · Cited by 9
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- S. Blake-Wilson, A. Menezes, Unknown Key-Share Attacks on the Station- to-Station (STS) Protocol, Technical Report CORR 98-42, University of Waterloo, 1998. Available at: http://cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca.
- A. Menezes, Another look at HMQV. Journal of Mathematical Cryptology, Vol.1(1), pp. 47-64, 2007
- Section 5.7.2.3: Clarified error handling in step 3. This publication is available free of charge from: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Ar3 47. Section 6.2.1.1-6.2.1.4: Clarified error handling. 48. Section 6.2.2: Modified the first assumption to refer to Section 5.5.1 for the domain parameter information. Now refer to Section 5.9.3 for the minimum MacKey and Mac tag lengths. 49. Section 6.2.2.1-6.2.2.2: Clarified error handling. · DOI
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How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits
Gidney, C., & Ekerå, M. (2021) · Quantum · doi:10.22331/q-2021-04-15-433 · Cited by 830
Status report on the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process
Alagic, G., Apon, D., Cooper, D. A., Dang, Q. H., Dang, T., Kelsey, J. M., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C. A., Moody, D., et al. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8413 · Cited by 492
Status report on the first round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process
Alagic, G., Alperin-Sheriff, J., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., Moody, D., Peralta, R., Perlner, R., et al. (2019) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8240 · Cited by 364
Status report on the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process
Alagic, G., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., Moody, D., et al. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8413-upd1 · Cited by 301
Status report on the second round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process
Moody, D., Alagic, G., Apon, D. C., Cooper, D. A., Dang, Q. H., Kelsey, J. M., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C. A., Peralta, R. C., Perlner, R. A., et al. (2020) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8309 · Cited by 296
Metadata
- Authors
- Barker, E., Chen, L., Roginsky, A., Vassilev, A., & Davis, R.
- Affiliations
- Information Technology Laboratory (US)
- National Institute of Standards and Technology (US)
- Published
- 2018-04
- OpenAlex
- W4298016935
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 17
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 14 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 19 · 2020: 35 · 2019: 19 · 2018: 3
- Type
- report
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Funders
- Information Technology Laboratory
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
- Keywords
- pairwise key establishment, key exchange, public-key cryptography, cryptographic standards, digital signatures
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