Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness
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Abstract
Leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the representational theory of consciousness and the higher-order monitoring theory. In this pioneering collection of essays, leading theorists examine the self-representational theory of consciousness, which holds that consciousness always involves some form of self-awareness. The self-representational theory of consciousness stands as an alternative to the two dominant reductive theories of consciousness, the representational theory of consciousness (RTC) and the higher-order monitoring (HOM) theory, combining elements of both RTC and HOM theory in a novel fashion that may avoid the fundamental deficiencies of each. Although self-representationalist views have been common throughout the history of both Western and Eastern philosophy, they have been largely neglected in the recent literature on consciousness. This book approaches the self-representational theory from a range of perspectives, with contributions from scholars in analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and history of philosophy, as well as two longer essays by Antonio Damasio and David Rudrauf and Douglas Hofstadter. The book opens with six essays that argue broadly in favor of self-representationalist views, which are followed by five that argue broadly against them. Contributors next consider connections to such philosophical issues as the nature of propositional attitudes, knowledge, attention, and indexical reference. Finally, Damasio and Rudrauf link consciousness as lived with consciousness as described in neurobiological terms; and Hofstadter compares consciousness to the "strange loop" of mathematical self-reference brought to light by Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Contributors Andrew Brook, Peter Carruthers, Antonio Damasio, John J. Drummond, Jason Ford, Rocco J. Gennaro, George Graham, Christopher S. Hill, Douglas R. Hofstadter, Terry Horgan, Tomis Kapitan, Uriah Kriegel, Keith Lehrer, Joseph Levine, Robert W. Lurz, David Rudrauf, David Woodruff Smith, John Tienson, Robert Van Gulick, Kathleen Wider, Kenneth Williford, Dan Zahavi Bradford Books imprint
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Cited by
Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy: a dynamic reference work
Nodelman, U., Allen, C., & Zalta, E. N. (2002) · Proceedings of the 2nd ACM/IEEE-CS joint conference on Digital libraries · doi:10.1145/544220.544327 · Cited by 1,988
Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience
Block, N. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07002786 · Cited by 1,146
The Unreliability of Naive Introspection
Schwitzgebel, E. (2008) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.1215/00318108-2007-037 · Cited by 658
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144
“Lycan tells me he was never an ambitious theorist. awareness of itself (Brentano 1874/1924, Burge 1997, 2006, Byrne 2004, Caston 2002, Uriah Kriegel 2005, Uriah Kriegel & Williford 2006, Levine 2001, 2006, Metzinger 2003, Ross 1961, Smith 1986).”
Philippi, C. L., Feinstein, J. S., Khalsa, S. S., Damasio, A., Tranel, D., Landini, G., Williford, K., & Rudrauf, D. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0038413 · Cited by 144
Metadata
- Venue
- The MIT Press eBooks
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2006-03-31
- OpenAlex
- W1898542359
- Cited by
- 355
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.59
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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