Individual Interactions, Group Conflicts, and the Evolution of Preferences
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper provides a unified framework for studying the effects of economic (and other) institutions on the evolution of preferences, taking account of conformist cultural transmission, social segregation, and the simultaneous operation of selection processes at the individual and group level. Price's equation (1970) for the decomposition of selection processes into within- and between group-effects is used to take account of inter group conflicts, group extinctions, and the emergence of new groups. The resulting multi-level selection process is illustrated by emergence and consolidation of the modern national state (along with the cultural traits supporting it) through a process of inter group warfare in the four centuries after 1500. In the penultimate section I use the model to study the effects of social institutions (and by implication economic policies) on the evolution of preferences. Some implications for constitutional and policy analysis are addressed in the conclusion.
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Cites
Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against a unanimous majority
Asch, S. E. (1956) · Psychological Monographs: General and Applied · doi:10.1037/h0093718 · Cited by 4,267 · cited 2×
“Asch, Solomon E. "Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority," Psychological Monographs, 1956, 70(9), pp. 1-70.”
BackgroundFairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.159 · Cited by 3,239
Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior
Loewenstein, G. (1996) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1006/obhd.1996.0028 · Cited by 2,610
PRICE, G. R. (1970) · Nature · doi:10.1038/227520a0 · Cited by 1,964
Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2000) · The Journal of Legal Studies · doi:10.1086/468061 · Cited by 1,816
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91
Lohmann, S. (1994) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2950679 · Cited by 1,035 · cited 2×
“Finally, a number of historical and anthropological studies suggest the long term stability of some norms followed by their precipitous unraveling, as well as the rapid emergence and then enduring stability of new norms: for example the thousand year long duration of foot binding in China and its virtual disappearance…”
BackgroundA mechanism for social selection and successful altruism.
Simon, H. A. (1990) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.2270480 · Cited by 769 · cited 1×
“Simon (1990), EiblEibesfeldt (1982) and others have proposed a mechanism whereby costly but group beneficial behaviors free ride on the individually beneficial behaviors ("docility," or "indoctrinability," for example) with which they are pleiotropically paired.”
BackgroundStructured Demes and the Evolution of Group-Advantageous Traits
Wilson, D. S. (1977) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/283146 · Cited by 363
Warfare, Man's Indoctrinability and Group Selection
Eibl-eibesfeldt, I. (2010) · Zeitschrift für Tierpsychologie · doi:10.1111/j.1439-0310.1982.tb01079.x · Cited by 86
Cited by
The evolution of altruistic punishment
Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S., & Richerson, P. J. (2003) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0630443100 · Cited by 1,748
Self-citationCultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation
Henrich, J. (2004) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/s0167-2681(03)00094-5 · Cited by 1,096
Explaining altruistic behavior in humans
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (2003) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(02)00157-5 · Cited by 1,037
Self-citationCostly Signaling and Cooperation
GINTIS, H., SMITH, E. A., & BOWLES, S. (2001) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406 · Cited by 862
Self-citation(2001) · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2000.2202 · Cited by 803
Metadata
- Authors
- Bowles, S.
- Venue
- Social Dynamics
- Publisher
- The MIT Press
- Published
- 2001-04-13
- Pages
- 155-190
- ISSN
- 0253-3952 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1600122713
- Cited by
- 54
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 20.26
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.