Cited by 769Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Psychology and Human BehaviorEvolution and Genetic Dynamics

A mechanism for social selection and successful altruism.

Simon, Herbert A.·1990·Science

Abstract

Within the framework of neo-Darwinism, with its focus on fitness, it has been hard to account for altruism behavior that reduces the fitness of the altruist but increases average fitness in society. Many population biologists argue that, except for altruism to close relatives, human behavior that appears to be altruistic amounts to reciprocal altruism, behavior undertaken with an expectation of reciprocation, hence incurring no net cost to fitness. Herein is proposed a simple and robust mechanism, based on human docility and bounded rationality that can account for the evolutionary success of genuinely altruistic behavior. Because docility-receptivity to social influence-contributes greatly to fitness in the human species, it will be positively selected. As a consequence, society can impose a "tax" on the gross benefits gained by individuals from docility by inducing docile individuals to engage in altruistic behaviors. Limits on rationality in the face of environmental complexity prevent the individual from avoiding this "tax." An upper bound is imposed on altruism by the condition that there must remain a net fitness advantage for docile behavior after the cost to the individual of altruism has been deducted.

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Crossref · 10.1126/science.2270480

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Authors
Simon, H. A.
Affiliations
Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Corresponding author
Simon, Herbert A.
Venue
Science
Published
1990-12-21
Volume
250
Issue
4988
Pages
1665-1668
ISSN
  • 0036-8075 (ISSN-L)
  • 1095-9203
OpenAlex
W2010648543
Cited by
769
References
9
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 16 · 2023: 15 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 16 · 2020: 17 · 2019: 17 · 2018: 36 · 2017: 15 · 2016: 28 · 2015: 36 · 2014: 35 · 2013: 33 · 2012: 55
FWCI
46.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology › Genetics › Evolution and Genetic Dynamics
Keywords
altruism, social selection, docility, bounded rationality, reciprocal altruism, fitness, social influence, social tax, evolution of cooperation, human behavior
MeSH terms
Altruism, Economics, Humans, Learning, Models, Psychological, Politics, Selection, Genetic, Social Behavior

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