Cited by 1,037Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationExperimental Behavioral Economics StudiesEvolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior

Explaining altruistic behavior in humans

Gintis, Herbert, Bowles, Samuel, Boyd, Robert, Fehr, Ernst·2003·Evolution and Human Behavior

Integrity signals

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Crossref · 10.1016/s1090-5138(02)00157-5

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3 of 3 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Altruistic punishment is a prominent solution to the challenge of free riding.

    “Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment.”

    From Cooperation without punishment (2023) · cites this paper as [18]

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Authors
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E.
Affiliations
  • Santa Fe Institute (US)
  • University of California, Los Angeles (US)
  • University of Zurich (CH)
Corresponding author
Gintis, Herbert
Venue
Evolution and Human Behavior
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2003-05
Volume
24
Issue
3
Pages
153-172
ISSN
1090-5138 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2150844554
Cited by
1,037
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 15 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 26 · 2021: 49 · 2020: 42 · 2019: 44 · 2018: 38 · 2017: 39 · 2016: 59 · 2015: 64 · 2014: 58 · 2013: 50 · 2012: 71
FWCI
134.29
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Evolution and Human Behavior (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
  • Santa Fe Institute
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
strong reciprocity, altruism, cooperation, evolutionarily stable strategy, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, human evolution, public goods, tax compliance, wage determination, local environmental protection

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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