Paranormal and Religious Believers Are More Prone to Illusory Face Perception than Skeptics and Non‐believers
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Summary: Illusory face perception, a tendency to find human‐like faces where none are actually present in, for example, artifacts or scenery, is a common phenomenon that occasionally enters the public eye. We used two tests (N = 47) to analyze the relationship between paranormal and religious beliefs and illusory face perception. In a detection task, the participants detected face‐like features from pictures of scenery and landscapes with and without face‐like areas and, in a rating task, evaluated the face‐likeness and emotionality of these areas. Believer groups were better at identifying the previously defined face‐like regions in the images but were also prone to false alarms. Signal detection analysis revealed that believers had more liberal answering criteria than skeptics, but the actual detection sensitivity did not differ. The paranormal believers also evaluated the artifact faces as more face‐like and emotional than the skeptics, and a similar trend was found between religious and non‐religious people. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Citations
Cites
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Are Children “Intuitive Theists”?: Reasoning About Purpose and Design in Nature
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“Theoretical arguments (e.g., Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2007; Kelemen, 2004) and empirical findings (e.g., Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lindeman et al., 2008; Svedholm, Lindeman, & Lipsanen, 2010) suggest that paranormal and religious believers stretch universally and early developing human attributes, such…”
What Makes Anthropomorphism Natural: Intuitive Ontology and Cultural Representations
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Cited by
McKay, R., & Whitehouse, H. (2015) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0038455 · Cited by 353
Järnefelt, E., Canfield, C. F., & Kelemen, D. (2015) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.02.005 · Cited by 133
Banerjee, K., & Bloom, P. (2014) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.06.017 · Cited by 129
An Overview of the Association between Schizotypy and Dopamine
Mohr, C., & Ettinger, U. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2014.00184 · Cited by 63
Linking unfounded beliefs to genetic dopamine availability
Schmack, K., Rössler, H., Sekutowicz, M., Brandl, E. J., Müller, D. J., Petrovic, P., & Sterzer, P. (2015) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00521 · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Authors
- Riekki, T., Lindeman, M., Aleneff, M., Halme, A., & Nuortimo, A.
- Venue
- Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2012-10-02
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 150-155
- ISSN
- 0888-4080 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0720
- OpenAlex
- W1931762741
- Cited by
- 86
- References
- 9
- FWCI
- 10.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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