An advantage model of choice
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A descriptive model of choice between simple lotteries is proposed. According to the model, people combine 'absolute' and 'comparative' strategies in choice situations. Three experimental tests of the model are reported. In its limited domain, the model appears superior to Prospect Theory on qualitative grounds, and to 1‐parameter versions of Expected Utility Theory on both qualitative and quantitative grounds.
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Shafir, E. B., Osherson, D. N., & Smith, E. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1989-01
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-23
- ISSN
- 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0771
- OpenAlex
- W2015810438
- Cited by
- 124
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 11.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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