A case study of expert judgment: Economists' probabilities versus base‐rate model forecasts
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this case study of economists' forecasts concerning economic downturn, we examine key issues concerning the psychology of prediction and the controversy surrounding the value of expertise in forecasting. We examine when experts' knowledge promotes forecast accuracy and whether biases found in psychological studies (including underutilization of relevant base rates and tendencies to extreme prediction) occur in these economic forecasts. Experts' forecasts were compared to forecasts derived from base‐rate models that relied on the historical frequencies of economic downturns. The performance patterns of the experts and models crossed over the forecast horizon. Experts outperformed models in shorter‐term forecasting, whereas models outperformed experts in longer‐term forecasting. These results highlight the abilities and limits of experts and models in prediction and the sources of their inaccuracy.
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Cites
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Cited by
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Slovic, P., Finucane, M., Peters, E., & MacGregor, D. G. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.025 · Cited by 2,349
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
(2002) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098 · Cited by 2,192
The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence
Griffin, D., & Tversky, A. (1992) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/0010-0285(92)90013-r · Cited by 1,841
Metadata
- Authors
- Braun, P. A., & Yaniv, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1992-07
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 217-231
- ISSN
- 0894-3257 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0771
- OpenAlex
- W2130254675
- Cited by
- 110
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 4.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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