Suspicious binds: Conspiracy thinking and tenuous perceptions of causal connections between co‐occurring and spuriously correlated events
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 25 of the 25 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Previous research indicates that conspiracy thinking is informed by the psychological imposition of order and meaning on the environment, including the perception of causal relations between random events. Four studies indicate that conspiracy belief is driven by readiness to draw implausible causal connections even when events are not random, but instead conform to an objective pattern. Study 1 (N = 195) showed that conspiracy belief was related to the causal interpretation of real‐life, spurious correlations (e.g., between chocolate consumption and Nobel prizes). In Study 2 (N = 216), this effect held adjusting for correlates including magical and non‐analytical thinking. Study 3 (N = 214) showed that preference for conspiracy explanations was associated with the perception that a focal event (e.g., the death of a journalist) was causally connected to similar, recent events. Study 4 (N = 211) showed that conspiracy explanations for human tragedies were favored when they comprised part of a cluster of similar events (vs. occurring in isolation); crucially, they were independently increased by a manipulation of causal perception. We discuss the implications of these findings for previous, mixed findings in the literature and for the relation between conspiracy thinking and other cognitive processes.
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Cites
Required sample size to detect the mediated effect
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Judgment of contingency in depressed and nondepressed students: Sadder but wiser?
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The Psychology of Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Sutton, R. M., & Cichocka, A. (2017) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721417718261 · Cited by 1,316
Self-citationLacking control increases illusory pattern perception
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“Getting students to understand and apply the principle is a crucial aim in their training in critical thinking (Halpern, 1998; Wilson, Aronson, & Carlsmith, 2010).”
BackgroundGoertzel, T. (1994) · Political Psychology · doi:10.2307/3791630 · Cited by 1,094 · cited 2×
“For example, conspiracy beliefs were found to be more prevalent among disadvantaged groups, who presumably have a stronger need to explain events beyond their control (e.g., Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Thorburn & Bogart, 2005).”
BackgroundSpeaking (Un–)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as A Generalised Political Attitude
Imhoff, R., & Bruder, M. (2014) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.1930 · Cited by 831
Analytic thinking reduces belief in conspiracy theories
Swami, V., Voracek, M., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., & Furnham, A. (2014) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2014.08.006 · Cited by 726
Political Extremism Predicts Belief in Conspiracy Theories
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Cited by
Understanding Conspiracy Theories
Douglas, K. M., Uscinski, J. E., Sutton, R. M., Cichocka, A., Nefes, T., Ang, C. S., & Deravi, F. (2019) · Political Psychology · doi:10.1111/pops.12568 · Cited by 1,511
Self-citationBelief in conspiracy theories: Basic principles of an emerging research domain
van Prooijen, J., & Douglas, K. M. (2018) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2530 · Cited by 483
Douglas, K. M., & Sutton, R. M. (2023) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-032420-031329 · Cited by 313
Self-citationConspiracy theories and the conspiracy mindset: implications for political ideology
Sutton, R. M., & Douglas, K. M. (2020) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.02.015 · Cited by 264
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Metadata
- Authors
- van der Wal, R. C., Sutton, R. M., Lange, J., & Braga, J. P. N.
- Venue
- European Journal of Social Psychology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2018-06-26
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 7
- Pages
- 970-989
- ISSN
- 0046-2772 (ISSN-L)
- 1099-0992
- OpenAlex
- W2804029813
- Cited by
- 71
- References
- 25
- FWCI
- 11.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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