Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 380

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of family firms

Schulze, William S., Lubatkin, Michael H., Dino, Richard N.·2002·Managerial and Decision Economics
DOI 10.1002/mde.1064
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

The core belief among agency theorists is that when a firm is both owned and managed by family members, its governance structure is efficient. We argue that this belief over‐simplifies the complexity of exchanges that occur among the family firm's decision agents, and does not conform to reality. We develop an alternative agency view of family firm governance that accounts for agency problems that are understated in extant agency models. These problems are rooted in the firm's ownership structure, as well as the altruistic relationships that exist between the firm's decision agents. We conclude with four propositions that address the competitive implications of this alternative view. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1002/mde.1064

Cites

7 of 7 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Cited by

See all 380

Metadata

Authors
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N.
Venue
Managerial and Decision Economics
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2002-05-30
Volume
23
Issue
4-5
Pages
247-259
ISSN
  • 0143-6570 (ISSN-L)
  • 1099-1468
DOI
10.1002/mde.1064
OpenAlex
W2156398750
Cited by
380
References
7
FWCI
2.92
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.