The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?
Abstract
Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts actually undermine trust and thereby encourage the opportunistic behavior they are designed to discourage. In this paper, we develop and test an alternative perspective: that formal contracts and relational governance function as complements. Using data from a sample of information service exchanges, we find empirical support for this proposition of complementarity. Managers appear to couple their increasingly customized contracts with high levels of relational governance (and vice versa). Moreover, this interdependence underlies their ability to generate improvements in exchange performance. Our results concerning the determinants of these governance choices show their distinct origins, which further augments their complementarity in practice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Cites
Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error
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Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives
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Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms
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Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of Capitalism
Adler, P. S. (2001) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.12.2.215.10117 · Cited by 1,512
Cited by
Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry
Mayer, K. J., & Argyres, N. S. (2004) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1040.0074 · Cited by 915
At What Level (and in Whom) We Trust: Trust Across Multiple Organizational Levels
Fulmer, C. A., & Gelfand, M. J. (2012) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206312439327 · Cited by 886
The Two Facets of Collaboration: Cooperation and Coordination in Strategic Alliances
Gulati, R., Wohlgezogen, F., & Zhelyazkov, P. (2012) · Academy of Management Annals · doi:10.5465/19416520.2012.691646 · Cited by 768
Levina, N., & Ross, J. W. (2003) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/30036537 · Cited by 699
What really is alliance management capability and how does it impact alliance outcomes and success?
Schreiner, M., Kale, P., & Corsten, D. (2009) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.790 · Cited by 507
Metadata
- Authors
- Poppo, L., & Zenger, T.
- Venue
- Strategic Management Journal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-05
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 707-725
- ISSN
- 0143-2095 (ISSN-L)
- 1097-0266
- OpenAlex
- W2151388372
- Cited by
- 3,652
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 74.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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