The DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 27 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics
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“…rather encompassing high-level formalization of a wide variety of agent-internal optimization processes, be they cross-generational as in cultural evolution or (asexual) reproduction [54], or within-generational as in imitation-based dynamics [55, 54] or simple forms of reinforcement learning [56].”
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(1998) · American Economic Review
Metadata
- Authors
- Börgers, T., & Sarin, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1997-11
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-14
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1995622844
- Cited by
- 737
- References
- 27
- FWCI
- 94.76
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.