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Cited by 502

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Collective action and the evolution of social norms

Ostrom, Elinor·2014·Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research

Abstract

I assume multiple types of players--“rational egoists,” as well as “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers”--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.

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Metadata

Authors
Ostrom, E.
Venue
Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research
Published
2014-10-01
Volume
6
Issue
4
Pages
235-252
ISSN
  • 1939-0459 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-0467
OpenAlex
W4249824308
Cited by
502
References
60
FWCI
148.09
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Collective action and the evolution of social norms. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/19390459.2014.935173
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Ostrom, E. (2014). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research. https://doi.org/10.1080/19390459.2014.935173

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.