The DOI matches its Crossref record; 60 of the 60 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collective action and the evolution of social norms
Abstract
I assume multiple types of players--“rational egoists,” as well as “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers”--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.
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Citations
Cites
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
Ostrom, E. (1990) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511807763 · Cited by 20,653
Self-citationOlson, M. (1965) · doi:10.4159/9780674041660 · Cited by 14,191
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556151 · Cited by 11,264
On The Language Instinct: (412952005-009)
Pinker, S., & American Psychological Association (1994) · PsycEXTRA Dataset · doi:10.1037/e412952005-009 · Cited by 5,646
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
RABIN, M. (2011) · Advances in Behavioral Economics · doi:10.2307/j.ctvcm4j8j.15 · Cited by 4,705
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
Ostrom, E., Gardner, R., & Walker, J. (1994) · University of Michigan Press eBooks · doi:10.3998/mpub.9739 · Cited by 3,732
Self-citationОстром, Э. (2010) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2010-0-1-5-52 · Cited by 2,850
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Kreps, D. M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J., & Wilson, R. (1982) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 · Cited by 2,494
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Legros, S., & Cislaghi, B. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691619866455 · Cited by 388
Beliefs about Climate Beliefs: The Importance of Second-Order Opinions for Climate Politics
Mildenberger, M., & Tingley, D. (2019) · British Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1017/s0007123417000321 · Cited by 300
Reddit Rules! Characterizing an Ecosystem of Governance
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Metadata
- Authors
- Ostrom, E.
- Venue
- Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research
- Published
- 2014-10-01
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 235-252
- ISSN
- 1939-0459 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-0467
- OpenAlex
- W4249824308
- Cited by
- 502
- References
- 60
- FWCI
- 148.09
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.