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Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining
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Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, E. J., Camerer, C., Sen, S., & Rymon, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Theory
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2002-05
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 16-47
- ISSN
- 0022-0531 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2120404464
- Cited by
- 411
- References
- 54
- FWCI
- 52.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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