Cited by 481Experimental Behavioral Economics StudiesDecision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsGame Theory and Applications

Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States

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Bohnet, Iris, Greig, Fiona, Herrmann, Benedikt, Zeckhauser, Richard·2008·American Economic Review

Abstract

Due to betrayal aversion, people take risks less willingly when the agent of uncertainty is another person rather than nature. Individuals in six countries (Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States) confronted a binary-choice trust game or a risky decision offering the same payoffs and probabilities. Risk acceptance was calibrated by asking individuals their “minimum acceptable probability” (MAP) for securing the high payoff that would make them willing to accept the risky rather than the sure payoff. People's MAPs are generally higher when another person, rather than nature, determines the outcome. This indicates betrayal aversion. (JEL C72, D81, Z13)

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Crossref · 10.1257/aer.98.1.294

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  • The worry that another person may not reciprocate influences transfers beyond the perceived riskiness of the game, and betrayal aversion inhibits investors' trust.

    “Interestingly, the worry that another person may not reciprocate appears to influence transfers beyond the perceived riskiness of the game 9,10 , i.e., it is not just the risk of losing money but the fear of being cheated (i.e., betrayal aversion) that inhibits the investors' trust.”

    From A registered replication study on oxytocin and trust (2020) · cites this paper as [9]

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Authors
Bohnet, I., Greig, F., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R.
Affiliations
  • Harvard University (US)
  • University of Nottingham (GB)
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2008-03-01
Volume
98
Issue
1
Pages
294-310
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2062459235
Cited by
481
References
60
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 27 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 49 · 2020: 28 · 2019: 25 · 2018: 29 · 2017: 39 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 34 · 2014: 34 · 2013: 39 · 2012: 33
FWCI
57.23
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • American Economic Review (publishedVersion)
  • Digital Access to Scholarship at Harvard (DASH) (Harvard University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Safety Research › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
betrayal aversion, risk aversion, trust, risky decision making, trust game, cross-national comparison

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